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11Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In the Netherlands, questions regarding the appropriate way to 
organize the delivery of hospital care long predate the introduction 
of competition in the 1990s and 2000s. In 1978, a symposium on 
‘inter-institutional co-operation and mergers’ was organized by the 
Dutch National Hospital institute (NZi). The questions discussed 
during this symposium included: “why do hospitals merge?” And, 
because the Dutch government was at that time closely involved 
in the planning of hospital services: “which distribution of hospital 
services across the country leads to the highest efficiency, 
accessibility and quality of care?” Almost forty years later, the 
same questions continue to dominate the debate on the structure 
of the healthcare market in the Netherlands, although because 
of changes to the Dutch healthcare system, additional questions 
have emerged. The large number of mergers between hospitals is 
a point of concern in terms of the consequences of further consol-
idation in the hospital market, especially now that a larger role 
for competition is envisioned in the sector than forty years ago. 
However, the gradual introduction of competition into the Dutch 
healthcare system also led people to ask how far competition 
in healthcare should be taken, what the impact of mergers on 
competition is, and what the effects of competition are. These 
questions were seldom asked in relation to the heavily regulated 
healthcare market of 1978.
In this thesis, we will seek to contribute to a better understanding 
of the effects of competition and mergers in the Dutch healthcare 
sector. The findings of this thesis may help the government, its 
regulatory agencies and other countries to improve the functioning 
of markets in healthcare. Although some form of competition has 
now been introduced into most of the markets for healthcare 
in the Netherlands, this thesis will focus on the hospital sector. 
Hospital care accounts for the majority of overall healthcare 
spending (OECD, 2015). More importantly, however, the hospital 
sector was among the first healthcare sectors in the Netherlands 
in which competition was introduced, following a long period of 
strict regulation, and it simultaneously experienced increasing 
levels of consolidation. The combination of these factors creates an 
excellent opportunity to study the effect of market structures in the 
healthcare sector.
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In the remainder of this chapter, we present a brief overview of 
existing research concerning the effect of competition and mergers in 
healthcare. First, we will explain why health economists do not simply 
open an economics textbook, read what the sections on oligopolies 
or bilateral bargaining have to say about the rationales and effects of 
mergers and competition and leave it at that (section 1.2). In section 
1.3, we will provide a brief overview of the empirical research done so 
far. Finally, we will outline the research topics that will be addressed in 
this thesis (section 1.4).
1.2 Why study mergers and competition in healthcare?
In the Netherlands, as in many other countries, the scope for 
competition between healthcare providers and healthcare payers has 
increased substantially in recent decades. Although competition in 
healthcare was long restricted almost exclusively to the United States, 
over the last twenty years European countries have also been seeking 
to increase competition between healthcare providers, healthcare 
payers or both (Propper, 2012). Propper and Leckie (2011: 671) 
explain why competition in healthcare holds such promise for policy 
makers:
However, healthcare markets differ from textbook competitive 
markets (Gaynor et al., 2015; Propper & Leckie, 2011). In 1963, Arrow 
explained that the prevalence of uncertainty regarding the timing, 
nature, extent and impact of illness and healthcare causes unregulated 
competition in healthcare markets to be suboptimal. Dranove and 
Satterthwaite (2000: 1096) conclude that “the model of perfect 
competition can [...] serve as the benchmark of optimal performance, 
but generally it can not be used to illuminate the health care market’s 
specific functioning”. Because healthcare markets are imperfectly 
competitive, non-market institutions have arisen in addition to 
“Competitive pressure helps make private firms more efficient. 
They cut costs and improve their goods and services in order 
to attract consumers, and this continual drive for improvement 
is good for the economy. Firms that are unable or unwilling to 
become more efficient will be priced out of the market while new, 
more efficient, firms will enter the market. (...) Giving purchasers 
or service users the ability to choose applies competitive 
pressure to healthcare providers and, analogously with private 
markets, they will raise their game to attract business.”
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1  It should be noted, that in practice, 
there are almost no perfectly 
competitive markets and that in every 
market there is always some form of 
governmental intervention (Tirole, 
1988). However, after studying the 
specifics of healthcare markets, Dranove 
& Satthertwaite (2000) conclude that no 
other market of substantial importance 
violates the requirements of perfect 
competition to the same extent as the 
market in healthcare.
market institutions. Hence, although many countries have introduced 
competitive forces into their healthcare systems, in practice these 
markets remain heavily regulated (Helderman et al., 2012)1.
Where does this leave us? Are there any theoretical models that “take 
into account [healthcare market’s] deviations from the competitive 
market’s prerequisites” (Dranove & Satterthwaite, 2000:1096) and 
which we can draw on in order to evaluate market performance 
in healthcare? Fortunately, research concerning the industrial 
organization of healthcare markets has led to significant progress in 
understanding how non-market institutions in healthcare are able 
to overcome the issues of the unregulated market (Dranove, 2012). 
Although most early theoretical work relied heavily on simple models 
of oligopolistic markets, recent studies have incorporated game 
theoretical concepts in order to model the peculiarities of healthcare 
markets more convincingly and thereby increase our understanding 
of the functioning of healthcare markets. Hence, from a theoretical 
perspective, health economists are acquiring a better understanding of 
the functioning of healthcare markets that depend on both regulation 
and competition. This conceptual understanding has also been 
supported by empirical findings, which are discussed in the next 
section.
1.3 Empirical research on the impact of hospital mergers and 
competition
Empirical research on the industrial organization of private healthcare 
markets (i.e., markets with competing health insurers and providers) 
is based on five stages (Gaynor et al., 2015). In the first stage, 
healthcare providers determine the level of quality that they provide. 
In the second stage, providers negotiate with insurers to determine 
the insurers’ provider networks and the prices paid to providers. 
In the third stage, insurers choose their premiums. In the fourth 
stage, consumers choose their insurers and in the last stage, some 
consumers utilize healthcare. While currently each of the individual 
stages that Gaynor et al. (2015) identifies has been analyzed at least to 
some extent, very few papers have addressed more than one or two of 
these stages at once because of modelling issues (Gaynor et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, early studies were hampered by a lack of data. However, 
since much more data is now available and we have more advanced 
econometric techniques at our disposal, health economists are able to 
tackle many more questions empirically.
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One important finding from the empirical literature is that the 
effect of competition depends heavily on the institutional features of 
a healthcare market (Propper & Leckie, 2011). That is, competition-
inducing reforms take place in the context of different institutions 
and policy programs, which determine the responsiveness of 
market players to changes. Each country therefore displays its own 
combination of competition and regulation in healthcare markets. 
In their report on provider competition in healthcare, the European 
Commission’s Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing in 
Health (EXPH) acknowledged the potential value of competition 
in European healthcare systems. However, the Panel also stressed 
that minor differences in market characteristics can lead to very 
different outcomes and that it is therefore important for policy 
evaluation studies to take account of the specifics of the market 
in question (Barros et al., 2016). The same is likely to be true for 
studies into the effect of healthcare mergers. This does not mean 
that it is impossible to learn from other countries’ experiences, 
but international differences do mean that policies – and the 
results of empirical research – need to be translated rather than 
directly transferred (Dixon & Poteliakhoff, 2012). By gathering 
knowledge on the effect of competition and mergers within diverse 
institutional contexts, researchers and policy makers are able to 
learn whether competition is effective, which policies work and 
which policies need to be improved.
In the subsequent sections, we will first discuss the empirical 
research into the impact of healthcare mergers and competition 
on prices (section 1.3.1). Then, in section 1.3.2, we will focus on 
the impact of mergers and competition in healthcare markets on 
quality of care.
1.3.1 Empirical research on the impact of healthcare mergers 
and competition on prices
Studies that estimate the impact of concentration differ widely in 
terms of the methodology used and measurement assumptions 
made (Gaynor & Town, 2012). Most of the early studies in this 
field relied on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach. 
In practice, the SCP approach boils down to regressing price 
on some measure of market concentration, usually the Herfin-
dahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), while controlling for observable 
confounding variables. Although relatively easy to understand, 
these studies suffer from several shortcomings. For example, 
studies adopting this approach often neither account for the fact 
15Chapter 1 – Introduction
that the measure of competition may be affected by the outcomes 
that were being studied, nor do they define the healthcare markets 
in question concisely enough (Propper & Leckie, 2011). It is 
well-documented that for this reason, SCP studies underestimate 
the impact of concentration on prices (e.g., Gaynor & Town, 2012).
Recent empirical research has focused more on these methodo-
logical issues and its results are therefore generally considered 
more reliable. These studies usually look at consummated mergers 
or policy changes by employing a difference-in-differences 
approach. A difference-in-differences approach involves comparing 
the price changes at the organizations that are subject to a reform 
or a merger with price changes among a group of comparison 
organizations which are unaffected by the reform or the merger. 
Although many of the problems that beset the traditional SCP 
approach are eliminated when newer approaches are adopted, 
these newer approaches are associated with difficulties of their 
own. For example, defining which organizations are unaffected 
by the event that is being studied, and may therefore be 
included in the control group, can be a daunting task under the 
 difference-in-differences approach. Another concern is that the 
merger or the reform may be endogenous (Gaynor & Town, 2012). 
Propper (2012) also points out that difference-in-differences 
designs are essentially black box analyses that do not shed light 
on how exactly changes in incentives are translated. Hence, our 
understanding of these mechanisms often remains limited.
The latter issue is partly solved by newer research that uses 
structural and semi-structural techniques that stem directly from 
economic theory. These approaches also have their challenges, 
which lie mainly in the translation of economic models to actual 
data as well as the determination of a sensible counterfactual, 
but because of recent progress, these techniques are nonetheless 
considered promising avenues for further research in the industrial 
organization of healthcare markets (Gaynor & Town, 2012).
Although the empirical literature on the impact of healthcare 
mergers and competition differs widely in the methods used, the 
results that follow from the studies are remarkably similar: most 
studies found that increased competition leads to lower prices 
and lower costs (Gaynor & Town, 2012). Hospital mergers, which 
generally lead to less competition, are mainly found to lead to 
large price increases (Gaynor & Town, 2012). However, the effect 
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of mergers varies between different market settings, hospitals and 
insurers, and the mechanisms by which these heterogeneities occur 
are not always well understood (Gaynor & Town, 2012; Propper, 
2012). This heterogeneity in the effects of mergers also means that it 
is unclear how the findings – which emanate mainly from the United 
States – translate into settings involving newly emerging competitive 
healthcare markets. Moreover, there is limited evidence on whether 
and how this evidence can be used to predict the price effects of 
future mergers and reforms. In this thesis, we will discuss a number 
of these issues (see the outline in section 1.4).
1.3.2 Empirical research on the impact of healthcare mergers 
and competition on quality
Like the literature on the price effects of competition and mergers, 
the empirical literature on the impact on quality is growing, albeit at 
a much slower rate. Only a few studies have investigated the effect 
of mergers on quality and these studies do not agree on whether 
there is an effect and if so, whether it is positive or negative (see 
Gaynor & Town, 2012 for an overview). The literature on the impact 
of competition on quality, however, is more extensive and its findings 
are more consistent.
Generally, there are two market configurations in which quality 
competition is observed: quality competition in systems with 
regulated prices, and quality competition in systems with freely 
negotiable prices. Most research on the competition-quality 
relationship under regulated prices has found that competition has 
a positive impact on quality, which is in line with the predictions 
of economic theory in relation to markets with regulated prices 
(Gaynor & Town, 2012). Economic theory predicts that the impact of 
competition on quality in markets where prices are freely negotiable 
is much more variable, and this is also confirmed by empirical 
studies (Gaynor & Town, 2012).
However, earlier studies leave plenty of scope for further research 
on the competition-quality relationship. For example, currently 
a very limited set of quality indicators is used to establish the 
relationship between competition and quality. Our knowledge would 
be greatly enhanced by broadening the scope of quality that is 
measured. Furthermore, research in this field has been limited to 
the United States and England and it would be interesting to find out 
how these findings translate to other settings. We will explore these 
and other issues in this thesis (see section 1.4 for an outline).
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1.4 This thesis
This thesis contains six research chapters and one concluding 
chapter. This final chapter reflects on the main findings of this 
thesis and provides policy recommendations as well as directions 
for further research. All chapters can be read independently, 
which inevitably implies there is some overlap in their descriptive 
sections.
1.4.1 How do institutional changes relate to hospital 
mergers?
Chapter two sets the stage for the remainder of the thesis by 
outlining the history of hospital mergers in the Netherlands. In this 
chapter, we will summarize which policy changes have occurred 
over the past forty years and relate these to changes in the hospital 
market structure. We will show that the Dutch hospital market 
has experienced several waves of mergers and that these waves 
are the main reason for the existing high level of concentration in 
the Dutch hospital sector. The introduction of competition into the 
sector implied that market concentration has become a source of 
concern. After all, competition can only lead to increased efficiency, 
quality and accessibility when a sufficient number of alternatives 
are available to consumers and/or insurers. This precondition may 
not be fulfilled in a market that becomes excessively concentrated, 
particularly because there is no reason to believe that the ongoing 
consolidation of the hospital sector will stop in the near future. 
Neither is it likely that new (international) hospital organizations 
will enter the market in the foreseeable future. In the remainder 
of this thesis, we will discuss our research into the effects of these 
changes.
1.4.2 What is the effect of hospital competition on quality 
of care?
In chapter three, we will present our study into the effect of 
hospital competition on quality of care. This study looks at the 
effect of the introduction of price competition into the Dutch 
hospital market and examines whether its impact on the quality 
of hip replacements differs between highly concentrated hospital 
markets and less concentrated hospital markets. Hitherto, the 
small number of studies on the impact of the introduction of 
price competition in the Netherlands have produced mixed 
results and none of them has been able to establish a causal 
relationship between competition and the quality of care provided. 
18 Mergers and Competition in the Dutch Healthcare Sector
The most important finding of our study is that, despite the 
lack of information on quality when free price negotiations 
were introduced, competitive pressure does not appear to have 
deteriorated quality.
1.4.3 What are the price effects of a hospital merger?
In chapter four, we turn our attention to price effects. In this 
chapter, we introduce a case study involving a hospital merger in 
the Netherlands. We used this case study to research the effect of 
market concentration on prices. In most studies into the effects of 
hospital mergers, the unit of observation is the merged hospital, 
while the observed price is the weighted average across hospital 
products and across payers. Little is known, however, about 
whether price effects vary between different hospital locations, 
different products and different payers. In chapter four, existing 
bargaining models are expanded to allow for the potentially 
heterogeneous price effects of mergers. Furthermore, a difference-
in- differences model is estimated in which price changes at the 
merging hospitals are compared to price changes at comparison 
hospitals. The most important findings are that (i) where this 
merger affected prices, this effect was positive and (ii) price effects 
may differ across locations, products and payers.
1.4.4 What is the predictive power of an ex ante merger 
simulation model?
Chapter five addresses the question of whether we are able to 
predict merger price effects prospectively. In this chapter, we 
will investigate the same merger case as in chapter four, but we 
take the analyses one step further and compare the predicted 
results of a merger simulation model to the actual changes that 
were reported in chapter four to evaluate whether the current 
models perform sufficiently well to be used in antitrust cases. We 
conclude that the merger simulation model that we used could be 
a useful and powerful addition to the toolkit of antitrust agencies, 
but further refinements are needed in order to better reflect 
the  peculiarities of the Dutch healthcare market. We also make 
suggestions with regard to the latter.
1.4.5 Why do healthcare providers merge?
In chapter six we study merger motivations of healthcare providers. 
Although mergers occur frequently in the Dutch healthcare sector, 
empirical insight into why healthcare providers opt to merge is 
lacking. Neither do we know enough about the influence of national 
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healthcare policies on mergers. The introduction of competition 
has led many to assert that healthcare mergers may be at least 
partially motivated by a desire to anticipate an increasingly 
competitive environment by improving their bargaining position 
vis-à-vis third-party payers, but empirical evidence to support 
this hypothesis is lacking. To identify the reasons for mergers and 
their relation to (changes in) healthcare policies, we conducted a 
survey on the motivation for mergers that was sent to the majority 
of Dutch healthcare executives. The study indicates that healthcare 
providers opt to merge predominantly in order to improve the 
provision of healthcare services and to strengthen their market 
position. We find that motives for merging are related to changes 
in health policies, in particular to increasing pressure from 
competitors, insurers and municipalities.
1.4.6 Why are healthcare mergers abandoned?
In chapter seven, we turn to the question of why healthcare 
mergers are abandoned. So far, we have focused on why healthcare 
organizations merge and the effect of concentration on quality and 
prices. However, it is also interesting to consider those merger 
plans that are less successful, because research in other sectors 
has shown that the effects of abandoning merger plans can be 
substantial. Chapter seven aims to improve our understanding of 
the reasons why healthcare mergers may be abandoned, based 
on the same survey that was used in chapter six. We show that 
merger plans are frequently abandoned in the healthcare sector: 
thirty-eight percent of the mergers that our respondents were 
involved in, ended prematurely. The most frequently mentioned 
causes of merger abandonment are (i) changing insights regarding 
desirability and feasibility during the merger processes, (ii) incom-
patibilities between executives, and (iii) insufficient support for the 
merger among internal stakeholders.
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A Brief History of Dutch Hospital 
Mergers and Competition
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Abstract
The Dutch hospital market has become increasingly concentrated 
over the past 40 years. This was caused by a high number of 
mergers, some closures and very few new entrants to the market. 
Particularly since the introduction of competition into the hospital 
sector, market concentration has become a source of concern. 
The few studies that have investigated the effects of concentration 
suggest that high market concentration may not be beneficial for 
society or the organizations involved. In the discussion on how to 
best organize and finance healthcare, the underlying and structural 
changes that have led to the high levels of concentration in today’s 
hospital market have largely been neglected.
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2.1 Introduction
Because ongoing hospital consolidation is at odds with the 
objectives of introducing more competition into the Dutch hospital 
market, merger activity over the past decade has fueled a debate 
regarding the consequences of mergers and the desirability of 
further concentration. However, consolidation in the Dutch hospital 
sector long predates the introduction of competition. This paper 
describes developments in the Dutch hospital market structure 
over the past 40 years and discusses the implications of those 
developments for current healthcare policy. The paper shows that 
although the organization and financing of the Dutch hospital 
market has changed tremendously over the past 40 years, market 
concentration has increased consistently and continuously over 
that same period, notwithstanding the wider policy context. If 
anything, the introduction of more competitive pressure seems to 
have accelerated consolidation, but it has done so in an already 
highly concentrated market. The difficulty is that, although it is 
possible to modify the organization and financing of healthcare, 
changing the market structure turns out to be less feasible. Because 
mergers leave remaining hospitals with greater market power 
and few new competitors enter the market, the effect of consoli-
dation on market structure is (semi-)permanent. We argue that the 
Dutch health policy debate about the merits of introducing more 
competition into the hospital sector, has paid too little attention 
to the underlying structural changes in this market, which have 
greatly enhanced hospitals’ market power.
In the next section, we will provide a chronological overview of the 
policy changes that have occurred over recent decades and relate 
these to changes in the structure of the hospital market. We will 
explain how the policies of successive Dutch governments have 
influenced hospital mergers and closures. After a brief discussion 
of the first three decades of the postwar period, the overview will 
start around 1978 – the year in which mergers between hospitals 
were subject to public criticism for the first time – and will cover 
the following almost 40 years (until 2017). In section 2.3, we will 
discuss the implications of these developments.
Chapter 2 – A Brief History of Dutch Hospital Mergers and Competition
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2.2 Health policies and their impact on hospital mergers
2.2.1 Before 1978: the welfare state, post-war reconstruction 
and government attempts to influence the structure of the 
hospital market
Until the 1970s, the primary focus of the Dutch government’s 
healthcare policy was to promote public health, guarantee 
minimum levels of quality and ensure universal access to basic 
healthcare services through access to health insurance (Schut & 
Van de Ven, 2005). At the same time, there was also some focus on 
the supply-side of the market. In the first half of the 20th century, 
specialist physician practices developed into small-scale, private, 
non-profit hospitals that were scattered across the country. Dutch 
governments of the interbellum questioned the fragmented nature 
of the hospital market and considered a policy of centralized 
hospital planning (Können, 1984). However, World War II (WWII) 
meant that these plans never came to fruition (Können, 1984). 
In the aftermath of WWII, the government’s first priority was 
societal reconstruction. The government introduced Reconstruction 
Laws that required licenses for construction projects, including 
the (re)building of hospitals. The focus was on rebuilding the 
country’s industries and housing, however, and licenses to build 
new hospitals were not granted unless absolutely necessary 
(Juffermans, 1982). In addition to limiting the number of new 
hospitals, hospital costs were contained by price controls and the 
regulation of physician remuneration (Juffermans, 1982).
These restrictive policies were proving increasingly problematic 
by the 1960s. With new technologies entering the market rapidly 
and demand for healthcare increasing, the outdated Dutch hospital 
infrastructure was causing increasing problems. Therefore, in the 
early 1960s, stimulated by growth in the overall economy and the 
welfare state, the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction began 
to issue licenses to build hospitals more liberally. When, in 1965, 
the Reconstruction Laws were also abandoned for most areas 
of the country, the number of new hospitals being built took off, 
particularly because many municipalities wished to have a hospital 
within their municipal boundaries (Juffermans, 1982).
Due to the lack of constraints on demand or supply, healthcare 
expenditure grew rapidly over this period. In 1953, the Netherlands 
spent 3.2 of its GDP on healthcare but by 1970 this had grown to 
5.6 percent (Können, 1984). Because of the growth in healthcare 
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spending, the focus of government policy in the 1970s (and beyond) 
shifted to introducing and strengthening supply-side constraints2: 
i.e., reforming the hospital financing system and reducing excess 
hospital capacity (Casparie & Hoogendoorn, 1991; Maarse et al., 
1992; Van der Lugt & Huijsman, 1999). Excess capacity was being 
caused by a steady decrease in the average length of hospital stays, 
resulting in a drop in the occupancy rate of general hospitals from 
93 to 85 percent between 1969 and 1978 (Lorsheijd, 1981). Smaller 
hospitals (e.g., hospitals with less than 150 beds) were of particular 
concern to the government because studies had shown that quality 
of care was related to hospital size (Können, 1984) and that if 
there were any economies of scale to be achieved, these were to be 
achieved by the smallest hospitals (Van Aert, 1977; Van Montfort, 
1980).
In 1971, the government first attempted to structurally reduce 
excess capacity. That year, the government introduced the Hospital 
Facilities Act (WZV), which subjected the construction of new 
hospitals and all other major hospital investments to governmental 
approval. Because of the hurdle that the government imposed 
on investment and construction through the introduction of 
this legislation, the WZV led to hospital closures, mergers and 
partnerships, especially among smaller hospitals (Können, 1984). 
Before the introduction of the WZV, mergers between hospitals in 
the Netherlands were rare (Können, 1984). Until the late 1960s, 
closures and the construction of larger hospitals were the main 
reason for increased concentration in the Dutch hospital market. 
Only 5 hospital mergers took place in the 1960s (Können, 1984). By 
contrast, since 1970, mergers have become the primary cause of 
increased concentration in the hospital market. Between 1970 and 
1978, 24 mergers took place (Können, 1984). The majority of these 
were caused by the WZV and as a result the number of hospitals 
with less than 200 beds fell substantially (Können, 1984). Another 
result of the mergers during this period was that the few public 
hospitals that existed in the Netherlands were mainly converted into 
private companies. By the end of the 1970s, most Dutch hospitals 
were therefore under private ownership (Jeurissen, 2010). The 
nonprofit status of hospitals had by that time been formalized 
by article 10 of the WZV, which stated that only public or private 
nonprofit providers would be granted licenses to build hospitals 
(Jeurissen, 2010), so that by the end of the 1970s, most Dutch 
hospitals had been transformed into private nonprofit foundations.
2  Successive Dutch governments also 
tried to limit demand by introducing 
various cost-sharing arrangements 
or reducing social health insurance 
coverage, but strong societal resistance 
meant that the extent of cost sharing 
remained very modest and demand 
constraints played only a marginal 
role in containing costs compared to 
supply-side constraints (Schut & Van de 
Ven, 2005).
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The incentives to merge that emanated from the WZV were only 
reinforced by the ‘Memorandum on the Structure of Health Care’ 
that had been issued by the Ministry of Health in 1974 (MinVM, 
1974), which implied comprehensive health planning. According 
to the Memorandum, the allocation of healthcare services was to 
be improved by regional planning and organizational clustering 
(Schut, 1995). The Memorandum proposed new legislation on 
healthcare facilities to regulate volume and capacity, legislation 
on healthcare prices to regulate prices and legislation on national 
health insurance to introduce a uniform insurance system (Schut, 
1995). Although none of these proposals became law before new 
elections took place in 1977 and, after the elections, were either 
abandoned (national health insurance) or substantially amended 
(health planning and price regulation), the Memorandum of 1974 
is said to have encouraged the propensity of hospitals’ decisions to 
merge and form partnerships (NZi, 1978).
2.2.2 1978: first concerns over mergers
In 1978, the Dutch National Hospital institute (NZi) first issued a 
warning regarding the large number of mergers that were taking 
place (Können, 1978). Until that point, due to quality and efficiency 
considerations, the government had been primarily concerned 
with the minimum size of hospitals (Können, 1984). The focus of 
governmental policy had therefore been on incentivizing smaller 
hospitals to merge, form partnerships or close. Because hospitals 
were privately owned, the government could not compel them to 
close or merge, but the incentives that resulted from policies like 
the WZV proved successful: many small hospitals did indeed decide 
to merge. In 1978, the NZi studied ten hospital mergers and found 
that the hospitals involved experienced many unforeseen and 
 underestimated organizational difficulties (Können, 1978). The study 
also concluded that hospitals often opted to merge without having 
considered less radical alternatives such as strategic partnerships 
(Können, 1978). It should be noted that the doubts raised over 
hospital mergers at this stage stemmed primarily from concern 
over the organizations involved, rather than concerns about market 
power. A symposium organized in 1978 on ‘inter- institutional 
co-operations and mergers’, which brought together represen-
tatives of the government, health insurers and hospitals to discuss 
the distribution of hospital services over the country, reflected this 
sentiment. During their discussion of hospital mergers, the focus 
of those attending was on the difficulties of mergers for the or-
ganizations involved: e.g., the problems experienced by hospital 
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employees working in larger-scale  organizations, or the difficulties 
experienced by hospital managers in harmonizing procedures and 
culture in the hospitals involved (NZi, 1978).
The government did not seem to share these concerns over 
mergers and showed no interest in putting a brake on consoli-
dation in healthcare. In the meantime, the economy experienced 
the most severe downturn since the 1930s while healthcare 
spending continued to rise at an alarming rate. By 1978, healthcare 
expenditure had increased to 7.9 percent of GDP (Können, 1984), 
an increase of over two percentage points in just 8 years. The 
government’s primary focus was therefore on cost containment, 
which was to be achieved by health planning and the more 
effective allocation of healthcare resources (Schut et al. 1991).
2.2.3 1978-1982: further regulation
Although the policies of the 1970s substantially reduced the 
number of smaller hospitals, they did not achieve a structural 
reduction of the growth in overall healthcare expenditure. By 
1981, healthcare expenditure had increased to 8.5 percent of GDP 
(Können, 1984) and the government therefore enacted the Health 
Care Prices Act (WTG), which regulated hospital rates (Schut, 
1995). In addition, in 1982, the Minister of Health introduced a 
plan to substantially reduce the total number of beds in general 
hospitals in order to increase efficiency (MinVM, 1982; Van der 
Lugt & Huijsman, 1999; Van der Lee, 2000). The plan identified 25 
facilities that were to close and 75 hospitals that were to divest a 
specified number of beds. In total, 8,000 beds were to be divested 
(NZi, 1982). The plan was highly controversial, not least because 
of the privately owned status of the facilities identified, which 
precluded direct government intervention in these organizations. 
Although the plan was therefore never put into effect, some of these 
hospitals seem to have responded to these proposals and merged 
in order to safeguard their future survival (Können, 1984; Van der 
Lugt & Huijsman, 1999). By 1983, a further 13 hospital mergers 
had taken place (see table 2.1 appendix 2.1).
2.2.4 1983-1985: prospective budgeting
The WTG and WZV had failed to permanently reduce the volume 
of care being provided (Schut & Van de Ven, 2005; Maarse et al., 
1993; Maarse, 1989). In a further attempt to curb healthcare 
spending, in 1983, a regime of prospective global budgeting 
replaced the open-ended reimbursement system. Initially, 
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budgets were simply set at the level of the expenditure of each 
hospital in the preceding year, but this resulted in inflexible and 
inefficient budget allocation (Maarse et al., 1993). Therefore, in 
1985, a distinction between fixed and variable hospital costs 
was introduced. Hospitals and regional representatives of health 
insurers were to negotiate about the variable component of the 
budget, while the fixed component was defined by two input 
parameters. This system included higher payments for larger 
hospitals to compensate for higher costs associated with the 
provision of more sophisticated hospital services and differences 
in case-mix (Varkevisser, 2010). The global budgeting system 
therefore provided smaller hospitals with a financial incentive to 
consolidate in order to scale up. Hence, this policy is often referred 
to as the merger bonus (Varkevisser, 2010; MinWVC, 1992; 
MinWVC, 1993).
The push for larger organizations that resulted from the 
financing system was reinforced by the Operating Costs Reducing 
Investments (EVI) directive that was also introduced in 1985. The 
EVI directive was introduced for the next 5 years and subjected 
the construction of new hospitals and major hospital investment 
to governmental approval. Only those investment plans that would 
lead to a substantial reduction in the total number of beds or 
hospital functions, and therefore reduced operating costs, were 
approved. In order to fulfill these requirements, hospitals often had 
to cooperate or merge. Although the EVI directive was not designed 
to encourage mergers, the directive may have led to a strategic 
response that involved mergers by hospitals. This directive may 
therefore have increased hospitals’ propensity to merge, especially 
among hospitals with substantial excess capacity (MinWVC, 1992; 
Van der Lugt & Huijsman, 1999). Between 1983 and 1986, 11 more 
hospitals mergers took place (see table 2.1 appendix 2.1).
2.2.5 1986-1991: Dekker Committee and functional budgeting
Over time, the lack of incentives for efficiency and innovation 
within the system of healthcare finance and delivery became 
the subject of increasing criticism (Schut, 1995). In 1986, the 
government appointed the independent Dekker Committee to 
design a blueprint of an efficient and equitable healthcare system. 
The Dekker Committee outlined a market-oriented healthcare 
system. The mandatory national health insurance scheme proposed 
by the Dekker Committee would guarantee universal access to 
basic healthcare services, and regulated competition would create 
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incentives for both insurers and providers to improve the efficiency 
of healthcare delivery (Schut & Van de Ven, 2005). The implemen-
tation of the Dekker plan proved highly problematic, however 
(Schut, 1995; Schut, 1996), and if the Dekker plan was to work, 
a number of requirements would first have to be met in order to 
create the appropriate incentives for consumers, providers and 
health insurers (Schut & Van de Ven, 2005). Since none of these 
requirements had been met when the Dekker plan was published, 
such radical reform was not feasible. The market-oriented 
program also quickly ran out of steam because it could not provide 
short-term solutions to the urgent need to contain costs that still 
existed (Helderman et al., 2005).
Instead, an attempt was made to improve the budgeting system: 
‘functional budgeting’ replaced the prospective budgeting model 
in 1988. Functional budgeting was a normative allocation model 
based on parameters that related to three budget components: 
availability, capacity and production (COTG, 1987). Under this 
system, hospitals had to negotiate prospectively with the regional 
representatives of health insurers over the parameters. The 
availability component comprised approximately 25 percent of 
the budget and was chiefly a measure of the hospital’s catchment 
area. The capacity component was approximately 35 percent of 
the budget and included variables such as the number of beds, the 
number of physicians, the availability of special services and so 
on. The production component made up the remaining 40 per cent 
of the budget and reflected a cluster of parameters relating to the 
number of discharges, admissions, outpatient treatments and so 
on (Post, 1988; COTG, 1987). Yet again, the new system provided 
hospitals with an incentive to merge (Den Hartog & Janssen, 1993). 
By enlarging their geographical area or market share by merging, 
smaller hospitals were able to increase their budget claims in the 
availability component, as well as their claims for other parameters 
(e.g., the permitted number of beds and/or specialists which were 
included in the capacity parameter) (Post, 1988; COTG, 1987). 
Between 1986 and 1992 alone, 30 further hospital mergers took 
place (see table table 2.1 appendix 2.1).
Since the objective of government policy was to incentivize smaller 
hospitals to merge, the policies could be considered successful. 
Of the hospitals that exited the market, either through mergers 
or closures, between 1979 and 1991, 86% had less than 150 
beds (Den Hartog & Janssen, 1993). However, the policies were 
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less successful in meeting the government’s real priority: the 
elimination of excess capacity. Although hospital capacity (in 
number of beds) was reduced by 14% between 1979 and 1990 (Den 
Hartog & Janssen, 1993), this was much less than the government 
had anticipated or hoped for (Maarse et al., 1992; Maarse et al., 
1997). Moreover, the occupancy rate of general hospitals was still 
decreasing – from 85 percent in 1978 (Lorsheijd, 1981) to 70.9 
percent in 1992 (Bartels, 1993) – and due to the many mergers 
that had occurred, the hospital sector had become much more 
concentrated than many other sectors (Schut et al. 1991).
2.2.6 1992-2000: moving towards competition
Even though the Dekker plan had not been implemented in 1986 
and successive governments continued to focus on strengthening 
supply and price controls, the period subsequent to 1986 
was also characterized by government attempts to fulfill the 
requirements for a system of regulated competition to be put in 
place. The budgeting system was successful in containing cost 
increases (Groenewegen, 1994; Maarse et al., 1993), but the lack 
of incentives for efficiency and innovation continued to plague 
the healthcare system and waiting lists were increasing (Schut & 
Varkevisser, 2013). As time passed and it became clearer that the 
future healthcare system would be based more on competitive 
forces, further consolidation in the Dutch hospital market came to 
seem more and more problematic (Schut, 1989; Schut et al. 1991; 
Schut, 1992). In 1992, the Minister of Health first expressed an 
awareness of this inconsistency, stating that mergers in healthcare 
should no longer be encouraged by the government (MinWVC, 
1992b). Although from that point onwards the government did 
indeed cease to explicitly encourage healthcare mergers, mergers 
nevertheless remained quite common. Between 1991 and 2001, 20 
further mergers took place (see table 2.1 appendix 2.1). This was 
partly because the government lacked the instruments necessary 
to actively block mergers. In 1992, the government tried to address 
the incentive to merge that resulted from the ‘merger bonus’ by 
refining the hospital budgeting system (MinWVC, 1993). However, 
since hospitals that had similar functions but were dissimilar in 
scale were exposed to budget differences, some financial incentives 
to consolidate remained. Only in 2003, the ‘merger bonus’ was 
officially removed from the hospital financing system (TK, 2003).
The legal framework also prevented the government from 
intervening in the hospital market. Prior to 1998, the Economic 
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Competition Act (1956) did not even provide for preventive merger 
controls. In 1998, the Competition Act replaced the Economic 
Competition Act. The Competition Act not only established the 
Dutch Competition Authority (now known as the Authority for 
Consumers and Markets) but also included a prohibition on cartels, 
a prohibition on the abuse of a dominant market position and a 
preventive merger control regime. However, because competition 
in healthcare had yet to be officially introduced, the Competition 
Authority did not exercise anticompetitive control over the hospital 
sector. As such, the government had no legal instruments with 
which to block hospital mergers. 
In fact, during this period, although mergers were no longer 
directly being encouraged by the government, the incentives that 
were implemented in this period and were designed to result in 
increased competition may actually have led to collusion or conso-
lidation. This was particularly true of the healthcare sector, which 
was dominated by cartels that facilitated anticompetitive conduct 
and that were often instituted or backed by the government (Schut 
et al. 1991; Schut, 1992). Many scholars have therefore argued 
that hospital mergers during and after the 1990s were at least 
partially motivated by hospitals’ desire to anticipate the changing 
institutional environment and to improve their bargaining position 
vis-à-vis third-party payers (Den Hartog et al., 2013; Den Hartog 
& Janssen, 2014; Varkevisser, 2010; Van der Lee, 2000; Schut, 
1996; Van der Lugt & Huijsman, 1999; Groenewegen, 1994; Schut 
et al. 1991). It should furthermore be noted that it was not only 
national government that had encouraged hospital mergers, but 
provincial and local government too. Provincial governments, 
which were responsible for the implementation of the hospital 
planning guidelines, were sometimes even more inclined to 
encourage hospital concentration than national government. Even 
though central government appeared to take the view, from 1992 
onwards, that mergers were not consistent with the goals of future 
healthcare policy, local or provincial governments often had their 
own reasons to encourage merger activity.
2.2.7 2001-beyond: competition and prospective merger 
control
By the end of the 1990s, the combination of a booming economy, 
lengthening waiting lists, calls for more autonomy by individual 
providers and insurers and a widely perceived lack of responsi-
veness in the healthcare system was leading to great pressure on 
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the government to abandon its rationing policies (Schut & Van 
de Ven, 2005; Helderman et al., 2005). In 2001, the government 
decided to suspend the hospital budgeting system to allow sickness 
funds, private insurers and consumers to reimburse hospitals 
and medical specialists for all the services provided. With hospital 
care accounting for the majority of healthcare spending (Maarse 
et al., 2002), open-ended reimbursement in the hospital sector 
resulted in a sharp increase in healthcare expenditure (Schut & 
Varkevisser, 2013). The government considered the reinstatement 
of the open-ended reimbursement system as a temporary solution 
to the issue of waiting lists. The limited incentives for efficiency and 
the lack of countervailing power on the part of the health insurers 
within the context of rapidly increasing healthcare expenditure and 
a by then stagnating economy, however, increased the urgency of 
comprehensive healthcare reform (Schut & Van de Ven, 2005).
For this reason, a new healthcare reform plan was launched in 
the Vraag aan bod report that was sent to parliament in 2001. The 
plan was strikingly similar to the Dekker plan of 15 years earlier 
(MinVWS, 2001), but by now these ideas had become much more 
practical to implement. Although progress in the areas of quality 
and outcome measurement had been limited, major progress had 
been made in developing an adequate system of risk adjustment 
and better product classifications. Also, the government had revised 
the governance structure by reinforcing the independent role 
of supervisory bodies in health insurance, price setting and the 
provision of care (Schut & Van de Ven, 2005).
With incentives for greater competition taking shape and no signs 
of any reduction in the number of mergers taking place, in 2001 
and 2002, successive Ministers of Health again attempted to reduce 
the pace of consolidation, this time by proposing a moratorium on 
hospital mergers (MinVWS, 2002). Dutch hospitals (represented 
by the Dutch Hospital Association) temporarily agreed to this 
voluntary halt, but decided to abandon the agreement (NVZ/
IPO, 2003) as soon as the Netherlands Board for Health Facilities 
concluded that hospital merger activity did not threaten access to 
hospital care (CBZ, 2002).
In 2004, the government decided that it was feasible to implement 
some of the key reforms outlined in the Vraag aan bod report. Of 
particular importance to hospitals were the proposals to introduce 
a new Health Insurance Act (Zvw) and to gradually introduce 
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hospital-insurer bargaining over prices. In the same year, the 
Dutch Competition Authority concluded that competition was now 
effectively taking place in the Dutch hospital sector and it began 
to prospectively scrutinize hospital mergers. Before that point, six 
more mergers had taken place with no antitrust oversight (see table 
2.1 appendix 2.1).
As of 2004, mergers exceeding certain thresholds in terms of 
revenue had to be reported to the Dutch Competition Authority for a 
general review. In practice, all hospital mergers exceed the threshold 
and therefore have to be reported and reviewed. Based on the 
review, the Competition Authority decides whether a license for the 
merger is required. If there is reason to assume that “a dominant 
position that appreciably restricts competition on the Dutch market 
or a part thereof could arise or be strengthened as a result of 
the said concentration”, a license is required (section 41.2 of the 
Competition Act). If the merging parties submit an application for 
a license, the competition authority performs another analysis and 
decides whether the merger is allowed, prohibited or only allowed 
subject to remedies.
Although the Dutch Competition Authority began exercising controls 
over hospital mergers in 2004, it has to date blocked only one 
merger (in 2015). Some Dutch hospital mergers that were evaluated 
by the Competition Authority, were permitted subject to certain 
conditions, such as temporary price caps and commitments to 
quality improvement, but most mergers were given the go-ahead 
without any such remedies. The Competition Authority concluded 
that these mergers would not appreciably impede effective 
competition on the market or a part thereof and should therefore 
be permitted to proceed. It has also argued that, in relation to the 
(future) development of competitive forces in the healthcare system, 
any potentially negative effects of concentration would quickly become 
negligible. This policy has provoked considerable criticism because 
the Authority has been seen as too lenient (Varkevisser & Schut, 
2017; Schmid & Varkevisser, 2016; Loozen, 2015; 2015b; Varkevisser, 
2015; Loozen et al., 2014; 2014b; Schut et al., 2014; Varkevisser & 
Schut, 2012; 2011; 2010; 2008; 2008b Loozen, 2011; Varkevisser et 
al., 2012; 2012b). Since 2004 and until September 2017, 28 hospital 
mergers have taken place (see table 2.1 appendix 2.1).
In the meantime, the high number of mergers between hospitals 
had also begun to cause political unease (e.g., RVZ, 2008). In 2014, 
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the Minister therefore introduced a healthcare-specific merger 
assessment. The healthcare-specific merger assessment entails 
an administrative assessment performed by the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority of (i) all stakeholders involved in the merger process and 
(ii) the provision of “crucial care” (i.e., ambulance care, emergency 
care, acute obstetrics and acute mental care) as a result of the 
merger. So far, no mergers have been blocked on the basis of this 
assessment and the assessment itself has been criticized because 
it is considered unnecessary. Loozen (2015), for example, argues 
that standard and strict competition enforcement is perfectly 
consistent with the institutional design of healthcare systems based 
on competition and that competitive healthcare sectors therefore 
need not involve additional rules, but stricter enforcement of the 
existing competition rules. Following ongoing criticisms, in 2016 
the Minister of Health proposed retaining the healthcare-specific 
merger assessment, but only for mergers between healthcare 
organizations of a certain (yet to be determined) size. Furthermore, 
she proposed a reorganization of the controls on healthcare 
mergers by accommodating all concentration assessments 
within the Authority for Consumers and Markets. With financial 
support from the government, the Authority for Consumers and 
Markets has, in turn, created its own ‘Health Care Taskforce’ 
which specializes in healthcare competition policy, including 
merger control. To date (September 2017), however, the Minister’s 
proposals have yet to be decided on by Dutch Parliament.
2.3 Effects of mergers on market structure, quality and 
efficiency
2.3.1 Descriptive statistics on Dutch hospital mergers
Between 1978 and August 2017 (i.e., the most recent date on which 
table 2.1 appendix 2.1 was updated), 109 hospital consolidations 
took place in the Netherlands (an average of 2.8 mergers per year). 
In addition, 30 hospitals exited the market in the same period 
(Den Hartog et al. 2013). These were primarily smaller (<150 
beds) or highly specialized hospitals (Den Hartog & Janssen, 1993; 
Den Hartog & Janssen, 2000). Market entrance on the other hand 
was very limited. During the study period, only one general hospital 
entered the market in the 1990s (Den Hartog & Janssen, 2000). 
A handful of specialized Independent Treatment Centers (ITCs) have 
been allowed to enter the market since 1998, but their participation 
was only fully legalized in 2006. Since 2006, the number of ITCs 
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that entered the market has grown rapidly, but their overall national 
market share has remained limited to about 2.5% (NZa, 2012). In 
recent years, however, the number of ITCs has somewhat decreased 
(from 260 in 2014 to 229 in 2016; NZa, 2016), so their current market 
share is likely to be even lower than in 2012. Hospital mergers and, to 
a lower extent, closures have therefore caused the largest changes in 
the Dutch hospital market structure.
In absolute terms, the largest wave of mergers occurred in the 
1980s, with 39 mergers in one decade (figure 2.1). Rather than any 
deceleration, the 2010s seem to have ushered in a new wave of 
mergers, with the annual numbers of mergers reaching 
(or surpassing) comparable levels to those seen in the 1980s (figure 2.2). 
In fact, because previous mergers have reduced the overall number 
of hospitals in the market, the relative number of mergers has been 
increasing in recent years. Since 1978, there have been only five years 
in which no hospital mergers took place (figure 2.2).
Not much is known about the specifics of Dutch hospital mergers. 
Table 2.1 (appendix 2.1) provides some information on the hospital 
consolidations that took place between 1978 and August 2017. 
Depending on which definition of a hospital is used (i.e., the locations 
or concerns/specialized hospitals taken into account or not), estimates 
of the number of hospitals in 1978 range from 233 (Stolwijk, 1981) 
to 240 (NZi, 1978) to 243 (Den Hartog, 2004). Of all the hospitals that 
existed in 1978, 174 were involved in one or more merger transactions 
Source: number of mergers from 1960-1978: Können (1984); remaining numbers: table 2.1 (appendix 2.1)
FIGURE 2.1 — Number of hospital mergers per decade (1960– August 2017)
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between 1978 and August 2017. In total, 233 hospital entities (i.e., which 
existed in 1978 or hospitals that resulted from mergers after 1978) were 
involved in a merger transaction over these years. Once the 30 hospitals 
that exited the market in the same period are taken into account, this 
means that only a handful of hospitals have not been involved in a 
merger or closure during this period.
The majority of merged hospitals only merged once during the study 
period. Some hospitals were involved in mergers more than once; that 
is, 28 merged hospitals resulted from one or more consolidations in 
one of the previous years. Two hospitals merged more than four times 
during the study period before they took their current form (figure 2.3).
Most hospital mergers have occurred between two hospitals (figure 2.4). 
Only 12 hospital consolidations have involved three hospitals, and only 
one consolidation has involved more than three hospital partners.
Table 2.1 (appendix 2.1) also demonstrates that a merger between 
hospitals does not necessarily or immediately result in a single hospital 
location. In fact, so far, the majority of hospital mergers have not resulted 
in a single hospital location. Figure 2.5 shows the time until the creation 
of a new hospital, the conversion to an outpatient facility or closure 
without replacement (in box plots).
Source: table 2.1 (appendix 2.1)
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FIGURE 2.2 — Number of hospital mergers per year (1978 – August 2017)
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Table 2.1 (appendix 2.1) shows that 45 hospital locations were closed 
because a new hospital had been built, but only in 2 cases was the 
new hospital built within one year of the merger. On average, it took 
merging hospitals 8 years to physically merge. One hospital was built 
23 years after the merger took place (figure 5.2).
Over time, 29 hospital locations were converted into outpatient 
facilities after the merger. It was sometimes difficult to determine the 
year of the conversion, but for the locations for which the conversion 
date could be found, we found that this happened on average 7 years 
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FIGURE 2.4 — Number of hospital partners per merger (1978 – August 2017)
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after the merger. Some hospitals had already been converted to 
outpatient facilities in anticipation of the merger, hence the negative 
values.
Between 1978 and August 2017, 36 hospital locations closed due 
to mergers. These were not replaced by new hospitals or converted 
into outpatient facilities. Of these, only 6 hospital locations closed in 
the same year as the merger took place. On average, these hospital 
locations closed 9 years after the merger (min. -1 years; max. 
28 years).
2.3.2 Effects of mergers on market structure
Because of the high number of mergers, most hospital markets in 
the Netherlands have become fairly concentrated (Den Hartog et al., 
1998). In the 1980s alone, the number of hospitals with less than 
300 beds had already halved, while the number of hospitals with 
more than 600 beds had almost doubled (MinWVC, 1992).
Source: table 2.1 (appendix 2.1)
FIGURE 2.5 — Time to new hospital/conversion/closure after merger (1978 – August 2017)
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3  In the 2010 merger guidelines, the 
FTC applies different thresholds. By then, 
markets with an HHI of between 1500 
and 2500 were considered moderately 
concentrated. Markets with an HHI 
above 2500 were considered highly 
concentrated. Even then we find that, on 
average, Dutch hospital markets can be 
considered moderately concentrated in 
1984, and highly concentrated by 1988. 
In 1984, the HHI of 7 regional markets 
exceeded the 2500 threshold. Another 
11 regional hospital markets could be 
considered moderately concentrated. 
In 1988, the HHI exceeds 2500 in 
10 regional hospital markets, and 8 
markets could be considered moderately 
concentrated.
Because patients in the Netherlands are on average willing to travel 
for 20 minutes to reach the hospital of their choice (Beukers et al. 
2014; Varkevisser et al. 2012; Varkevisser et al. 2010), hospital 
markets are usually considered regional. Most studies that focus 
on the Dutch hospital market structure use administrative hospital 
regions that were developed for planning purposes to delineate the 
geographic markets of hospitals. These are reasonable proxies for 
the relevant hospital markets. In total, there were 27 (later 25) admi-
nistrative regional markets.
In 1978, there were only three regional markets in which the largest 
hospital had a market share (calculated in terms of number of 
beds) of 50 percent or higher, but even at that time, in 23 regional 
markets, the four largest hospitals had a joint market share of 60 
percent or more. Den Hartog & Janssen (1993) therefore conclude 
that even in 1978, most Dutch hospital markets could be considered 
as tightly oligopolistic. By 1984, in 19 of 25 regional markets the 
two largest hospitals had a joint market share of 40 percent or 
higher. On average, the market share of the two largest hospitals 
in all regional markets was 53.1 percent (Schut, 1989). Four years 
later, in 1988, this had increased by more than 10 percent to about 
60 percent (Schut et al. 1991). Because Dutch merger control 
was lacking in that period, meaning that reasonable standards to 
interpret these findings were also lacking, Schut (1989) applies the 
thresholds that were formulated by the then prevailing US FTC 
Merger Guidelines to the Dutch hospital context. According to the 
1982 FTC merger guidelines, markets with a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of over 1800 were ‘highly concentrated’ and markets 
in which the HHI was between 1000 and 1800 were considered 
‘moderately concentrated’. In 1984, the average HHI of all Dutch 
hospital markets was well above 2000 and in 16 of 25 regional 
markets, the HHI was above 1800 (Schut, 1989). In only one market 
the HHI was below 1000. The HHI of all other markets was between 
1000 and 1800 (Schut, 1989). By 1988, the HHI of all markets 
was above 1000 and in 18 markets, the HHI was above 1800. The 
average HHI of all markets had, by that time, increased to 25003.
In 1990, the four largest hospitals in each hospital region had a 
joint market share of 50 percent or higher, and almost all Dutch 
regional hospital markets could be described as highly oligopolistic 
(Den Hartog & Janssen, 1993). In 1999, in 5 regional hospitals 
markets the HHI exceeded 5000. In 19 hospital markets, the HHI 
was between 1800 and 5000. The average HHI had increased by 
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58 percent between 1979 and 1999 (Den Hartog & Janssen, 2000). By 
2001, the average HHI had increased to about 3700 (Den Hartog, 2004) 
and in 2012 the number was 4200 (Den Hartog & Janssen, 2014). In 
2012, the average weighted market share of general Dutch hospitals 
was 50.3 percent (NZa, 2014), which increased to 58.5 percent by 
2014 (NZa, 2016).
More recent data is, unfortunately, not available, but the picture is 
clear: Dutch hospital market concentration has increased tremendously 
over the past 40 years. This was caused by a high number of mergers, 
some closures and very few new entrants to the market. And, as we 
learned in section 2.2, not much seems to have been done to prevent 
this from happening.
2.3.3 Effects of mergers on efficiency and quality
The question is, of course, whether (the push for) concentration has 
achieved the desired effects. For many years, the government explicitly 
encouraged hospitals to merge on the basis of quality or efficiency 
considerations. Whether this policy was effective is a question that has 
been given very limited attention. Previously, we saw that the financing 
system was effective in terms of cost containment and that several 
policies also resulted in considerable reductions in hospital capacity. 
However, this decrease in capacity was much less than the government 
had anticipated, and the lack of incentives in the payment system also 
resulted in long waiting lists. What about efficiency and quality?
Before the start of the wave of mergers in the 1980s, at least two 
studies (Van Aert, 1977; Van Montfort, 1980) indicated that the 
potential for scale efficiencies in the Dutch hospital market was present 
but very limited. In later years, with the number of hospital mergers 
increasing, other studies indicated that Dutch hospitals were, on 
average, moving beyond the optimal scale (e.g., Blank et al., 1998; 
2002; RVZ, 2003; Blank et al. 2008; 2011; Blank & Eggink, 2011; 
Blank, 2015; Van Hulst, 2016). It is also questionable whether potential 
scale efficiencies can be achieved if merging hospitals do not physically 
merge. Dranove and Lindrooth (2003), for example, found that US 
consolidations involving the actual consolidation of facilities seem to 
lower hospital costs, while mergers that do not involve the combination 
of facilities produce no effects. Given that it takes Dutch hospitals 
on average 8 years to physically merge (see section 2.3.1), if indeed 
they do so at all, the potential benefits of merging in terms of cost 
efficiencies, may be low, at least in the short run.
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Bukkems et al. (1999) performed a financial analyses of 30 Dutch hospital 
mergers and conclude that mergers reduce overcapacity, but have no 
effect on financial performance. Können (1984) undertook a qualitative 
study of ten hospital mergers and concluded that in the majority of cases, 
mergers did not have a positive effect on the hospitals’ financial situation. 
Haring (1993 in Van der Lee, 2000) finds that mergers increased patients’ 
travel time but did not affect the average length of stay or the number 
of patients’ discharged from a hospital. Van der Lee (2000) undertook a 
qualitative study of three hospital mergers and concluded that all three 
mergers eventually (i.e., after 5 years) resulted in lower management costs.
More recently, the Dutch Health Care Authority has used merger 
simulation models to predict the price effect of mergers and found 
that 8 of the 13 hospital mergers that were assessed by the Authority 
of Consumers and Markets between 2011 and April 2015 may have 
resulted in price increases of more than 5 percent (NZa, 2015). Kemp 
et al. (2012) retrospectively analyzed the price effects of six mergers 
and found that in the majority of cases studied, prices significantly 
increased after the merger. ACM (2017) studied twelve hospital mergers 
and found indications of post-merger price increases, while finding 
limited evidence of reductions in volume. A positive correlation between 
hospitals’ HHI and price was also found. These findings are consistent 
with the conclusions of Halbersma et al. (2010). Halbersma et al. (2010) 
found that, in the Dutch hospital sector, the market share of hospitals 
(insurers) has a significantly positive (negative) impact on the hospital 
price-cost margin. Significant (2016 in Broers and Kemp, 2017) studied 
three merger cases qualitatively and performed difference-in-differences 
estimations on 14 healthcare mergers in order to study the effect of 
mergers on the quality of care. According to the interviewees in the case 
studies, mergers affect organizational processes and structural charac-
teristics that are relevant to the quality of care provided by the hospitals 
(Significant, 2016 in Broers & Kemp, 2017). Barely any significant 
effect of the mergers on quality was found in the quantitative analyses, 
however (Significant, 2016 in Broers & Kemp, 2017). Based on the 
results of this study, the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets 
has stated that in future merger cases, (i) it will critically assess the 
hospitals’ assertion that the proposed merger will lead to better quality 
of care; and (ii) it will actively support the development of more insightful 
quality indicators. In addition, ACM stated that hospitals should consider 
other forms of cooperation than merging, in order to achieve quality 
improvements (ACM, 2016). Based on the findings of the price effect 
study mentioned above, ACM also concluded that future hospital mergers 
should be assessed more critically (ACM, 2017).
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In conclusion, the limited evidence that is available does not 
particularly favor consolidations. Most studies performed in relation 
to Dutch hospital mergers have found no effect or negative effects as 
a result of mergers. Although much is still unknown, this conclusion 
does generally correspond to findings from the US and the UK (see 
Gaynor et al., 2015; Gaynor & Town, 2012; Propper & Leckie, 2011; 
Gaynor, 2006 for reviews of the literature). International studies have 
generally found that markets with lower concentration levels have 
lower prices and lower costs (Gaynor & Town, 2012). Hospital mergers 
have mainly been found to lead to (large) price increases. The results of 
the few studies that have looked at the effect of mergers on quality are 
mixed. The literature on the effect of competition generally shows that 
increased competition impacts positively on quality (Gaynor & Town, 
2012).
2.4 Conclusion
Although the Dutch hospital market has become increasingly 
concentrated over the past 40 years, few studies have investigated the 
effects of this trend. The little that we know, however, suggests that 
the effects of concentration may not have been beneficial for society 
or the organizations involved. In recent decades, government policy 
has focused on regulating the hospital market, while at the same 
time introducing incentives for competition between providers. The 
introduction of competition into the sector has meant that market 
concentration is a concern. This is because competition can only be 
an effective way of increasing efficiency, quality and accessibility if 
sufficient alternatives are available to consumers and/or insurers. 
This precondition risks not being met in a highly concentrated market, 
which is the case for most hospital markets in the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, markets may even become more concentrated, since 
there is no reason to believe that in the near future hospital merger 
activity will stop. Neither is it likely that new hospital organizations will 
enter the market in the foreseeable future. In the discussion on how to 
best organize and finance healthcare, the underlying and structural 
changes that have led to the levels of concentration in today’s hospital 
market have largely been neglected. In the remainder of this thesis, 
we will discuss our research into the effects of these changes.
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4  According to the website of Canisius-Wilhemina 
Ziekenhuis, the merger took place in 1974 (https://
www.cwz.nl/over-het-cwz/historie/van-hout-
markt-tot-weg-door-jonkerbos.html) [retrieved 
25-02-2015)
5  Source: website of Canisius-Wilhelmina 
Ziekenhuis: https://www.cwz.nl/over-het-cwz/
historie/van-houtmarkt-tot-weg-door-jonkerbos.
html [retrieved 25-02-2015]
6  Source: Wikipedia page on Sint Gerardus 
Majella Ziekenhuis: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Sint_Gerardus_Majellaziekenhuis [retrieved 
25-02-2015]
7  According to the website of St. Jansdal, the 
merger took place in 1976 (https://www.stjansdal.
nl/over-st-jansdal/karakteristieken/geschiedenis) 
[retrieved 25-02-2015]
8  Source: website of St. Jansdal: https://www.
stjansdal.nl/over-st-jansdal/karakteristieken/
geschiedenis [retrieved 25-02-2015]
9  Source: website of St. Jansdal: https://www.
stjansdal.nl/over-st-jansdal/karakteristieken/
geschiedenis [retrieved 25-02-2015]
10  According to the website of Gemini Ziekenhuis, 
the merger took place in 1971 (http://www.
gemini-ziekenhuis.nl/algemeen/Over-Gemini-Zie-
kenhuis/Geschiedenis) [retrieved 25-02-2015]
11  According to the website of Gemini Ziekenhuis, 
this was the Ludwina Ziekenhuis instead of the 
Luduïna Ziekenhuis (http://www.gemini-zie-
kenhuis.nl/algemeen/Over-Gemini-Ziekenhuis/
Geschiedenis) [retrieved 25-02-2015]
12  Source: website of Gemini Ziekenhuis: http://
www.gemini-ziekenhuis.nl/algemeen/Over-Gemi-
ni-Ziekenhuis/Geschiedenis [retrieved 25-02-2015]
13  According to the website of Ziekenhuis 
Amstelland, the merger took place in 1978 (http://
www.ziekenhuisamstelland.nl/nl/over-zha/de-jood-
se-identiteit/) [retrieved 25-02-2015]
14  Source: Wikipedia page of Centrale Israelitische 
Ziekenverpleging: https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Centrale_Isra%C3%ABlietische_Ziekenverpleging 
[retrieved 14-08-2017]
15  Source: website of local historic society: 
http://oogopnederland.nl/tiel/2016/07/03/
oud-oog-het-st-andreas-streekziekenhuis/ [retrieved 
14-08-2017]
16  According to the Wikipedia page of Slingeland 
Ziekenhuis, the merger took place in 1975 (http://
nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slingeland_Ziekenhuis) 
[retrieved 25-02-2015]
17  Source: website of the local historic society: 
https://www.archieven.nl/nl/zoeken?mivast=0&mi-
zig=210&miadt=26&miaet=1&micode=0465&-
minr=5696484&miview=inv2 [retrieved 
14-08-2017]
18  Source: Wikipedia page of Slingeland 
Ziekenhuis: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Slingeland_Ziekenhuis [retrieved 25-02-2015]
19  According to the website of Academisch 
Medisch Centrum, the merger took place in 1983 
(https://www.amc.nl/web/Het-AMC/Organisatie/
Academisch-Medisch-Centrum.htm) [retrieved 
15-08-2017] 
20  Source: website of Academisch Medisch 
Centrum: https://www.amc.nl/web/Het-AMC/
Organisatie/Academisch-Medisch-Centrum.htm 
[retrieved 25-02-2015]
21  According to the website of the local 
historic society, the merger took place in 1974 
(http://www.historischcentrumoverijssel.nl/
doorzoek-de-collecties/archieven?mivast=141&-
mizig=210&miadt=141&miaet=1&mico-
de=0564&minr=751549&miview=inv2) [retrieved 
25-02-2015]
22  Source: website of the local historic society: 
http://www.historischcentrumoverijssel.nl/
doorzoek-de-collecties/archieven?mivast=141&-
mizig=210&miadt=141&miaet=1&mico-
de=0564&minr=751549&miview=inv2 [retrieved 
25-02-2015] 23 According to the Wikipedia page of 
Van Dam-Ziekenhuis, the merger took place in 1980 
(http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Van_Dam-Ziekenhuis) 
[retrieved 25-02-2015]
24  Source: Wikipedia page of Van Dam-
Ziekenhuis: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Van_
Dam-Ziekenhuis [retrieved 25-02-2015]
25  Source: Wikipedia page of Van Dam-
Ziekenhuis: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Van_
Dam-Ziekenhuis [retrieved 25-02-2015]
26  According to the Wikipedia page of Schieland 
Ziekenhuis, the merger took place in 1981 (http://
nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schieland_Ziekenhuis) 
[retrieved 25-02-2015]
27  Source: Wikipedia page of Schieland 
Ziekenhuis: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schiela
Ziekenhuis [retrieved 25-02-2015]
28  Source: Wikipedia page of Gemeentezieken-
huis: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemeentezieken-
huis_(Schiedam) [retrieved 25-02-2015]
29  According to the website of a local newspaper 
(http://www.mijngelderland.nl/#/culemborg/het-
ziekenhuis-moet-dicht) [retrieved 25-02-2015] and 
the local historic society (http://culemborgnl.tripod.
com/culemborg/id47.html) [retrieved 06-03-2015], 
the merger took place in 1975
30  Source: website of a local newspaper: http://
www.mijngelderland.nl/#/culemborg/het-zieken-
huis-moet-dicht [retrieved 25-02-2015]
31  Source: Wikipedia page of Reinier de Graaf 
Gasthuis: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinier_de_
Graaf_Gasthuis [retrieved 06-03-2015]
32  Source: website of a local historic society: http://
elisabethstichting-oudenbosch.jouwweb.nl/historie 
and the Wikipedia page of Franciscus Ziekenhuis: 
http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franciscus_Ziekenhuis 
[both retrieved 06-03-2015] 
33  According to the Wikipedia page of St. 
Willibrord ziekenhuis, the merger took place in 
1970 (http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Willibrord_
ziekenhuis) [retrieved 06-03-2015].
34  Source: Wikipedia page of St. Willibrord 
ziekenhuis: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._
Willibrord_ziekenhuis [retrieved 06-03-2015]
35  According to Van Proosdij. C. 1991. Honderd 
jaar Hilversumse Ziekenhuishistorie, 1891-1991, 
the merger took place 01-02-1983
36  Source: website of the municipality: http://
www.tgooi.info/hilversum/ziekenhuis.php 
[retrieved 06-03-2015]
37  Source: website of the municipality: http://
www.tgooi.info/hilversum/ziekenhuis.php 
[retrieved 06-03-2015]
38  Source: website of Streekziekenhuis Koningin 
Beatrix: http://www.skbwinterswijk.nl/Contact 
[retrieved 25-02-2015]
39  Source: website of the hospital broadcasting 
service: http://zsom.nl/geschiedenis.html [retrieved 
25-02-2015]
40  Source: website of Streekziekenhuis Koningin 
Beatrix: http://www.skbwinterswijk.nl/Contact 
[retrieved 25-02-2015]
41  Source: website of Waterlandziekenhuis: http://
www.waterlandziekenhuis.nl/over-het-waterland-
ziekenhuis/#/over-ons/geschiedenis [retrieved 
06-03-2015]
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42  According to the website of Saxenburgh Groep, 
the merger took place in 1981 (http://sxb.nl/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57&I-
temid=57) [retrieved 06-03-2015] 43 Source: 
website of a local historic society: http://www.
encyclopediedrenthe.nl/Aleida%20Kramer%20
Stichting [retrieved 06-03-2015]
44 Source: Wikipedia page of Röpcke-Zweers 
Ziekenhuis: https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%B-
6pcke-Zweers_Ziekenhuis [retrieved 14-08-2017]
45  Source: website of Deventer Ziekenhuizen: 
http://www.dz.nl/Organisatie/Gezondheids-
centrum-Jozef/Paginas/default.aspx [retrieved 
06-03-2015]
46  According to the Wikipedia page of Westfries-
gasthuis, the merger took place in 1983 (https://
nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westfriesgasthuis) [retrieved 
14-08-2017]
47  Source: website of constructing company: 
http://www.djga.nl/projecten/westfriesgasthuis 
[retrieved 14-08-2017]
48  Source: website of Westfriesgasthuis: http://
www.westfriesgasthuis.nl/over-het-westfriesgast-
huis/Paginas/Historie.aspx [retrieved 06-03-2015]
49  According to the website of Admiraal de 
Ruyterziekenhuis, the merger took place in 1984 
(http://www.adrz.nl/over-adrz/historie?steID=1&ca-
tID=428) [retrieved 6-03-2015]
50  According to the website of ZorgSaam 
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, the merger took place in 
1975 (http://www.zorgsaam.org/images/stories/
over-zorgsaam/Historie_fusies_ZorgSaam.pdf) 
[retrieved 13-03-2015]. According to a document 
on the history of St. Elisabeth ziekenhuis, the 
merger took place in 1973 (http://www.zorgsaam.
org/images/stories/over-zorgsaam/Heemkundige_
informatie_ziekenhuizen_Zeeuws-Vlaanderen.pdf) 
[retrieved 13-03-2015].
51  Source: website of ZorgSaam Zeeuws-Vlaande-
ren: http://www.zz.nl/nl/werken/organisaties/94_
zorgsaam-zeeuws-vlaanderen/98_zorgsaam-zieken-
huis/2.htm [retrieved 06-03-2015]
52  According to the website of Admiraal de 
Ruyterziekenhuis, the merger took place in 1981 
(http://www.adrz.nl/over-adrz/historie?steID=1&ca-
tID=428) [retrieved 06-03-2015]
53  Source: website of Admiraal de Ruyterzie-
kenhuis: http://www.adrz.nl/over-adrz/histo-
rie?steID=1&catID=428 [retrieved 06-03-2015]
54  Source: website of Admiraal de Ruyterzie-
kenhuis: http://www.adrz.nl/over-adrz/histo-
rie?steID=1&catID=428 [retrieved 06-03-2015]
55  According to the website of Medisch Centrum 
Leeuwarden, the merger took place in 1982 (https://
www.mcl.nl/Over-het-MCL/Geschiedenis/) [retrieved 
06-03-2015]
56  Source: website of Medisch Centrum 
Leeuwarden: https://www.mcl.nl/Over-het-MCL/
Geschiedenis/ [retrieved 06-03-2015]
57  Source: website of Medisch Centrum 
Leeuwarden: https://www.mcl.nl/Over-het-MCL/
Geschiedenis/ [retrieved 06-03-2015]
58  Source: website of Medisch Centrum 
Leeuwarden: https://www.mcl.nl/Over-het-MCL/
Geschiedenis/ [retrieved 06-03-2015]
59  Source: website of Rijnstate: http://www.
rijnstate.nl/web/Over-Rijnstate/Wie-is-Rijnstate/
Historie.htm [retrieved 06-03-2015] 
60  Source: Wikipedia page of St. Elisabeth 
Gasthuis: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elisabeths_
Gasthuis [retrieved 06-03-2015]
61  Source: website of Albert Schweitzerzieken-
huis: http://www.asz.nl/organisatie/organisatie/
historie/695/ [retrieved 06-03-2015] 
62  Source: website of Albert Schweitzerzieken-
huis: http://www.asz.nl/organisatie/organisatie/
historie/695/ [retrieved 06-03-2015] 
63  Elkerliek Ziekenhuis since 1990
64  Orbis Medisch en Zorgconcern since 2000 and 
Orbis Medisch Centrum since 2009
65  According to the website of Orbis Medisch 
en Zorgconcern, the merger took place in 1980 
(http://www.orbisconcern.nl/historie/) [retrieved 
13-03-2015] 
66  Source: website of Orbis Medisch en 
Zorgconcern: http://www.orbisconcern.nl/historie/ 
[retrieved 13-03-2015]
67  Source: website of Orbis Medisch en 
Zorgconcern: http://www.orbisconcern.nl/historie/ 
[retrieved 13-03-2015]
68  Source: Wikipedia page of Gelre ziekenhuizen: 
http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gelre_ziekenhuizen_
Apeldoorn [retrieved 13-03-2015]
69  Since 2000 ZorgSaam Zeeuws-Vlaanderen
70  According to the website of ZorgSaam the 
merger took place in 1985 (http://www.zorgsaam.
org/images/stories/over-zorgsaam/Historie_
fusies_ZorgSaam.pdf) [retrieved 13-03-2015]. 
According to a document on the history of St. 
Elisabeth ziekenhuis, the actual merger took 
place in 1986 (http://www.zorgsaam.org/images/
stories/over-zorgsaam/Heemkundige_informatie_
ziekenhuizen_Zeeuws-Vlaanderen.pdf) [retrieved 
13-03-2015].
71  Source: website of ZorgSaam Zeeuws-Vlaande-
ren: http://www.zz.nl/nl/werken/organisaties/94_
zorgsaam-zeeuws-vlaanderen/98_zorgsaam-zieken-
huis/2.htm [retrieved 06-03-2015]
72  According to the Wikipedia page of Laurens-
ziekenhuis, the merger took place in 1985 (http://
nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laurensziekenhuis) [retrieved 
13-03-2015]. According to the website of a local 
newspaper, the actual merger took place in 1986 
(http://www.bndestem.nl/regio/breda/geschie-
denis-van-de-bredase-ziekenhuizen-1.441376) 
[retrieved 13-03-2015]
73  Source: website of a local newspaper (http://
www.bndestem.nl/regio/breda/geschiede-
nis-van-de-bredase-ziekenhuizen-1.441376) 
[retrieved 13-3-2015]
74  According to the website of BovenIJ ziekenhuis, 
the merger took place in 1984 (https://www.
bovenij.nl/4/BovenIJ/Wie_zijn_wij/BovenIJ-ge-
schiedenis/Het_Juliana_ziekenhuis.html) [retrieved 
13-03-2015]
75  Source: website of BovenIJ ziekenhuis: https://
www.bovenij.nl/BovenIJ/Wie_zijn_wij/BovenIJ-ge-
schiedenis/Het_Ziekenhuis_Amsterdam_Noord.
html [retrieved 14-08-2017]
76  Source: website of BovenIJ ziekenhuis: https://
www.bovenij.nl/4/BovenIJ/Wie_zijn_wij/Bo-
venIJ-geschiedenis/Het_Juliana_ziekenhuis.html 
[retrieved 13-03-2015]
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Abstract
One of the reasons why regulators are hesitant about permitting 
price competition in healthcare markets is that it may damage 
quality when information on quality is poor. Evidence on whether 
this fear is well-founded is scarce. We provide evidence by 
examining the impact of a reform that permitted Dutch health 
insurers and hospitals to freely negotiate prices for elective 
procedures. Assuming that price liberalization creates greater 
competitive pressure in less concentrated hospital markets,  
difference-in-differences across more and less concentrated 
markets can identify the effect of increased price competition. 
Unlike previous research that has relied on indicators of the quality 
of urgent treatments that are largely shielded from competition, 
we take advantage of the plausible absence of selection bias 
in our setting to identify the effect on quality of non-acute hip 
replacements that are delivered in a competitive environment. 
Using administrative data on all admissions to Dutch hospitals, 
we find no evidence that increased exposure to price competition 
reduces quality measured by readmission rates, despite the lack 
of publicly available information on this outcome. In fact, there is 
evidence of a temporary, positive impact on quality. Our estimated 
null effect over the full post-liberalization period is robust to 
different definitions of market size as well as to using the 30-day, 
rather than 90-day, readmission rate.
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3.1 Introduction
Health systems around the world are increasingly designed to 
encourage competition between providers in the hope that this 
will improve quality of care while slowing the growth of health 
spending (Propper, 2011). When prices are regulated, providers are 
forced to compete on quality to attract patients or contracts with 
insurers. But when prices are unregulated, the effect of competition 
on quality is less clear. If demand is more responsive to price than 
to quality, then the optimal competitive strategy will involve driving 
down the price and sacrificing quality (Gaynor, 2006). This is a 
plausible scenario when information on quality is poor, much of the 
variation in quality is unobservable and so demand is insensitive 
to it. However, not-for-profit healthcare providers may not adopt 
the most competitive strategy. Their intrinsic motivation may lead 
them to maintain quality even if this means forgoing opportunities 
to gain a competitive advantage by cutting prices at the expense of 
quality. Whether quality suffers in competitive healthcare markets 
with unregulated prices is an empirical question. To date, evidence 
to answer it is sparse. A highly regulated form of price competition 
introduced in the UK National Health Service (NHS) at a time when 
there was poor information on quality was found to be (weakly) 
associated with worse health outcomes from hospital treatment 
(Propper et al., 2008; 2004). Health outcomes also deteriorated in 
one US state when prices were deregulated in the hospital care 
market (Volpp et al., 2003). However, policy and market changes 
that occurred at the same time as the deregulation may have 
confounded the effect of deregulating prices.
This paper presents evidence on the impact of unconstrained 
price competition on the quality of hospital care delivered in the 
Dutch healthcare market in which insurers compete for customers 
and providers compete for contracts with insurers. We estimate 
the effect of moving from financing hospitals through prospective 
budgeting to allowing insurers and hospitals to freely negotiate 
prices in contracts for the delivery of certain medical procedures. 
We identify the effect of this price liberalization by exploiting 
variation in its consequences across hospitals differentiated by 
the concentration of the market in which they operate. Assuming 
that free negotiation of prices creates greater competitive pressure 
where the market is less concentrated, difference-in-differences 
(DID) across more and less concentrated markets can identify the 
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effect of liberalizing prices and this can be interpreted as the effect 
of exposure to greater price competition. This is similar to the 
approach taken by Propper et al. (2008), Cooper et al. (2011) and 
Gaynor et al. (2013) to evaluate the impact of competition in the UK 
NHS.
Most studies of the impact of hospital competition use mortality 
after acute myocardial infarction (AMI) as an indicator of quality 
(see e.g., Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013; Kessler & 
Geppert, 2005; Mutter et al., 2011; Romano & Balan, 2011). The 
reason is that the urgency of AMI treatment greatly reduces the 
risk of selection bias. Patients are taken to the nearest hospital, 
which is obliged to treat them. There is little or no opportunity 
for difficult-to-treat patients selecting hospitals that deviate from 
the average in both quality and exposure to competition. And 
there is little scope for those hospitals to cherry pick the easier 
cases. The downside of this empirical strategy is that it identifies 
the impact of competition on the quality of a treatment that is 
demand inelastic with respect to quality. It identifies the impact of 
competition on quality only in so far as the pressure to compete in 
the delivery of some procedures affects the general management 
of a hospital and this feeds through to treatments, such as AMI, 
that are largely shielded from competition. This leaves us with little 
or no evidence on the effect of competition on treatments, such 
as elective surgeries, that hospitals directly compete for and that 
potentially exhibit much greater demand sensitivity to quality than 
is true of urgent procedures (Skellern, 2017; Gravelle et al., 2014; 
Bevan & Skellern, 2011). Provided quality is sufficiently observable, 
competition has the potential to impact more positively on the 
quality of elective surgery than on the quality of acute surgery (Colla 
et al., 2016). 
We present evidence of the impact of competition on the quality of 
a procedure – non-acute hip replacements – over which hospitals 
directly compete, including through freely negotiated prices. We use 
unplanned readmission rates to indicate quality. Higher readmission 
rates following hip replacement have been shown to be related to 
suboptimal quality (e.g., Rosen et al., 2013; Mokhtar et al., 2012). 
In England, providers facing more competition were found to face 
a more elastic demand with respect to quality (and waiting times) 
for elective hip replacements than providers facing less competition 
(Moscelli et al., 2016).
73
The institutional context and our empirical strategy give us the 
option to identify the effect of competition on the quality of an 
elective procedure without running much risk of selection bias. 
Previous studies, particularly those of the UK NHS, have identified 
the impact of competition by exploiting reforms that intensified 
competitive pressure through increasing the scope for patient 
choice of the provider (Cooper et al., 2011 and Gaynor et al., 2013). 
These studies avoided using outcomes of elective procedures to 
measure quality because of the considerable potential for selection 
bias. The Dutch healthcare market reform we exploit introduced 
price competition but left patient choice unaffected. Before and 
after the liberalization of prices patients and insurers had uncon-
strained choice of provider. But the absence of any information on 
hip replacement readmission rates made it impossible for patients 
and insurers to select a hospital on the basis of the outcome. 
Further, to identify the effect of competition we separate hospitals 
into two broad (treatment/comparison) groups according to the 
concentration of the market in which they operate. If there was 
any selection correlated with the outcome, it would most likely 
involve switching between neighboring hospitals that will belong 
to the same group, which would not induce selection bias given 
our strategy. Baseline patient characteristics are similar across the 
treatment and comparison groups, changes in these characteristics 
do not differ between the groups and conditioning on these charac-
teristics has little or no impact on the estimates. If the estimates are 
insensitive to conditioning observables, it is unlikely that they are 
even moderately biased by correlated unobservables.
Given that information on the quality of hospital care was absent at 
the time free price negotiation was introduced in the Dutch hospital 
market, there was a risk of a negative impact on quality if hospitals 
competed on price and neglected quality. We find no evidence of 
this. Our main point estimate is that exposure to price competition 
reduced the 90-day readmission rate of hospitals in less concentrated 
markets by almost 1 percentage point (baseline: 8.2 percent) 
compared with hospitals in more concentrated markets that were 
exposed to less competitive pressure. But this estimate is not signi-
ficantly different from zero. In the year immediately after the prices 
were liberalized, we estimate that increased exposure to competition 
did significantly (p-value = 0.02) reduce the readmission rate but this 
was not sustained. The finding that there was no significant effect 
that persisted over the full post-reform period is robust to different 
definitions of market size and to using the 30-day, rather than 90-day, 
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readmission rate. Hence, although competition was introduced in 
the market for a potentially demand sensitive elective procedure and 
information on its quality was absent when prices were made freely 
negotiable, the quality of care does not seem to have suffered. If 
anything, there was a temporary improvement in quality. While it is 
merely speculation, one possible explanation for this is that providers, 
who were contracting for the delivery of specific procedures for the 
first time, initially did not appreciate the extent to which insurers 
would focus on price in the (re)negotiation of contacts. Consequently, 
the hospitals exposed to greater competitive pressure were careful to 
maintain, or even improve, quality in the first year operating under 
the new contracting regime. Only later, when they witnessed insurers' 
preoccupation with price, did they also concentrate on competing in 
that domain. More concretely, our study provides evidence that price 
competition in healthcare markets is not necessarily always at the 
expense of quality, even when information on quality is poor.
3.2 Competition and healthcare quality with unregulated 
prices: theory and evidence
When prices are unregulated, the impact of competition on quality 
depends on how it affects on the responsiveness of demand to 
quality relative to price. If consumers or insurers observe prices 
but have only imperfect information on quality, then competition 
might be expected to raise the price sensitivity relative to the quality 
sensitivity of demand, and so reduce quality. Gaynor (2006) makes 
this argument using an amended version of the Dorfman-Steiner 
condition (Dorfman & Steiner, 1954): z =   ∙    where z is quality, 
p is price, d is the marginal cost of quality,     is the elasticity of 
demand with respect to quality and     is the elasticity with respect 
to price180. If competition exerts downward pressure on the price 
relative to the marginal cost and/or raises the magnitude of the 
price elasticity relative to the quality elasticity, then it will reduce 
quality (Gaynor et al., 2015). However, if quality becomes sufficiently 
observable, then competition could conceivably raise the quality 
elasticity relative to the price elasticity. Quality would increase, 
provided price does not fall relative to the marginal cost of quality.
In the Netherlands, as in most high-income countries, consumers of 
healthcare can be expected to be rather price insensitive because of 
comprehensive health insurance with limited cost sharing. However, 
this does not imply that demand is perfectly price inelastic. Health 
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180  Although Dorfman & Steiner 
(1954) model a monopolist’s behaviour, 
Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) show 
that the model is an approximation 
to the behaviour of an oligopolistic or 
monopolistically competitive firm if 
we think of the demand function as 
a reduced form demand. Hence, the 
model has relevance for imperfectly 
competitive healthcare markets (Gaynor, 
2006; Gaynor et al., 2015).
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insurers are sensitive to prices (Gowrisankaran et al., 2015). The 
reform we use for identification was intended to make insurers 
more price sensitive. It gave them the freedom to negotiate prices 
for specific procedures with individual hospitals. This price liber-
alization would be expected to increase the price elasticity of the 
insurers’ demand and push prices downward. According to the 
Dorfman-Steiner condition, quality would then suffer unless there 
was a sufficient countervailing increase in the quality elasticity181. 
This would occur only if quality was sufficiently observable 
such that insurers could monitor it and, the new contracting 
arrangements gave them greater motivation and scope to pressure 
hospitals for quality improvements. 
The complexity of healthcare and its stochastic relationship with 
health outcomes makes measurement of its quality inherently 
difficult. This, together with a lack of published information on 
hospital quality both before and after the reform we examine, would 
be expected to result in hospitals exposed to greater competitive 
pressure shifting effort from maintaining poorly observed quality to 
cutting costs in order to become more price competitive (Propper et 
al., 2008). On the other hand, the new contracts involved hospitals 
and insurers negotiating for the first time over the delivery of 
specific procedures akin to diagnostic-related groups. Hospitals 
exposed to more competition might have exerted greater effort 
in improving the quality of these procedures for fear of losing a 
contract. Without experience of the weight the insurers would place 
on price relative to quality in contract renewal negotiations, the 
hospitals may have been motivated, at least initially, to ensure that 
price competitiveness was not achieved at the cost of quality. If this 
motivation was sufficiently strong, then potentially competition 
could even have raised quality. The effect of price competition on 
quality is therefore ambiguous. It depends on characteristics of the 
market, the observability of quality and the objective functions of 
the insurers and hospitals (Gaynor et al., 2015).
Evidence on the effect of price competition on healthcare quality 
is scarce182. This is mainly because only a few countries permit 
free price negotiation in healthcare markets and data on the 
performance of private healthcare providers are typically not 
accessible. Using data from Southern California, Gowrisankaran 
and Town (2003) find that increased competition for Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO) patients is correlated with 
reduced risk-adjusted hospital mortality for both pneumonia and 
181  It is unlikely that hospitals 
deliberately set out to lower quality of 
care. Studies that investigate the compe-
tition-quality relationship often assume 
that in response to competitive pressure, 
hospitals cut services that affect quality 
outcomes (Propper et al., 2008; Bloom 
et al., 2015). Nonetheless, models on 
the relationship between competition 
and quality assume a direct relationship 
between competition and quality 
rather than between competition and 
effort. Gaynor and Town (2012) show 
that for the purpose of modeling the 
distinction between effort and quality of 
care is irrelevant. A given service level 
generates an expected level of outcome 
of care (e.g., mortality or a readmission) 
and therefore it does not matter whether 
a model assumes hospitals to choose 
quality of services or any other outcome 
(Gaynor & Town, 2012).
182  There is more evidence on the 
impact of competition on quality when 
prices are regulated. Findings are mixed. 
Some studies find that competition 
improves quality in this context (Cooper 
et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2016; Gaynor 
et al., 2013; Gobillon & Milcent, 2017; 
Kessler & Geppert, 2005; Kessler & 
McClellan, 2000; Propper et al., 2010), 
others find evidence of the contrary 
(Moscelli et al., 2016b; Skellern, 2017), 
while one study finds no effect at all 
(Berta et al., 2016).
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AMI. Consistent with this, Sari (2002) uses a similar methodology 
based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) framework 
and finds that increased competition (lower hospital market share 
and market concentration) in 16 US states is associated with fewer 
hospital complications. However, the internal validity of these 
studies can be doubted because of endogeneity problems that are 
known to beset the SCP approach (Gaynor & Town, 2012), and their 
external validity is limited because the HMO markets studied are 
very particular to the US hospital market in the 1990s.
The few studies that exploit a policy change to identify the quality 
effect of a change in price competition are stronger with respect 
to internal validity but also difficult to generalize because the 
findings are obtained in specific settings with a particular design 
of price competition. Subject to this caveat, these studies generally 
find that price competition does damage hospital quality. Volpp et 
al. (2003) compare AMI mortality rates of New Jersey hospitals 
before and after the deregulation of prices in 1992 with those of 
New York hospitals where there was no deregulation. However, 
coincident to the reform, hospital prices were also pressured 
through rapid growth of large-volume buyers, such as HMOs, 
and large reductions in subsidies for hospital care of uninsured 
patients. The mortality rate of uninsured AMI patients increased 
in New Jersey relative to New York but it is not clear how much, 
if any, of this was attributable to the price deregulation. The 
switch from fixed budgets that hospitals received directly from 
the national government to negotiating over contracts with 
purchasing organizations in the British NHS in 1991 has been 
used to estimate the quality effect of a highly regulated form of 
price competition (Propper et al., 2004; 2008). The competition 
was highly regulated since contracts were written for blocks of 
services, including accident and emergency procedures and not for 
defined procedures, such as DRGs, and hospitals were not free to 
set prices. They were mandated to set price equal to average costs, 
had to publish the price and were not permitted to carry surpluses 
or losses across financial years. However, some form of price 
competition was possible at the specialty level because arbitrary 
apportionment of costs to a particular service made it difficult for 
the regulator to check on adherence to the pricing rule at that level 
(Propper et al., 2008). There is some evidence that prices in this 
period were indeed not solely determined by costs but were related 
to market forces (Propper, 1996). The evidence suggests that even 
this regulated form of price competition had a negative impact on 
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quality (measured by AMI mortality rates), which is attributed to 
incentives for hospitals to compete on prices rather than quality 
when the available information on the latter is poor (Propper et 
al., 2004; 2008). If this highly regulated form of price competition 
can damage quality, then entirely free price competition could 
potentially be seriously detrimental to the quality of care delivered 
by hospitals. The 2005 liberalization of price setting in the Dutch 
healthcare market allows us to test this hypothesis. Since there 
was no quality information available either publicly or to health 
insurers at the time of the reform, the risk of a negative impact on 
quality was substantial.
3.3 Price competition in the Dutch healthcare market
All Dutch hospitals are private nonprofit foundations. Before 2005, 
Dutch hospitals were financed by a prospective budgeting system 
with relatively stable revenue flows known at the beginning of 
each year. From 2005, revenues became contingent on contracts 
secured with individual health insurers. There were five health 
insurance companies plus a joint purchasing cooperative of small 
health insurers in the market183. Hospitals and insurers negotiate 
over volume and quality of care per product, which is defined by a 
Diagnosis and Treatment Combination (DTC), the Dutch equivalent 
of a DRG184. These DTC products had no relation to the output 
parameters of the pre-reform hospital budgets (e.g., number of 
admissions and hospital days). In 2005, free negotiation of price was 
permitted in writing contracts for a subset of DTCs that accounted 
for about 10% of hospital revenues. This included non-acute hip 
replacements, which is the procedure we use to evaluate the impact 
of the introduction of price competition on quality. The number of 
DTCs for which free price setting was permitted was extended over 
time. In 2008, 20% of all hospital revenues were obtained from DTCs 
with negotiated prices. This fraction increased to 34% in 2009 and 
70% in 2012. Because of the high overall number of DTCs, insurers 
and hospitals often negotiate over clusters of DTCs. However, 
contracting is done separately for high-revenue/high-volume 
products like non-emergency hip replacements185.
The goal of the contracting reform was to make insurers, acting as 
purchasing agents for their customers, more responsive to price, 
volume and quality. Health insurers were allowed to contract 
hospitals selectively, which would enable them to negotiate lower 
183  The four largest companies 
account for 90 percent of the market. 
Market concentration by region is often 
even higher, which is due to the fact 
that these companies typically evolved 
from former regional sickness funds 
(Halbersma et al., 2010).
184  The DTC system is more 
comprehensive than DRGs. It includes 
outpatient consultations and the 
remuneration of medical specialists. 
There were 29000 DTCs in the period we 
examine (2005-2007).
185  This has been confirmed in 
interviews with representatives of 
insurers and hospitals involved in 
contract negotiations during the period 
we study.
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prices with selected hospitals. In a competitive insurance market, 
these lower prices would feed through to lower premiums (Ho, 
2009). A major reform of the health insurance market in 2006 
increased price competition among health insurers, which were 
expected to put pressure on hospitals to cut their costs (Schut & 
Van de Ven, 2011). If consumers not only value lower premiums 
but also access to quality hospitals, then health insurers should 
compete both on premiums and the scope and quality of their 
provider networks (Determann et al., 2016). Hospitals are expected 
to compete on price and quality for inclusion in the insurers’ 
network.
Existing evidence on the market response to the liberalization 
of prices in Dutch insurer-hospital negotiation of contracts is 
limited. Qualitative examination of insurer-provider contracting 
suggests that price rather than quality has been the primary focus 
of the contract negotiations (Meijer et al., 2010; Ruwaard et al., 
2014; Schut & Van de Ven, 2011). This is perhaps unsurprising 
given the dearth of information available on quality. For example, 
hospital-specific readmission rates for hip replacement patients 
– the quality indicator we use – were not available to patients 
nor insurers during the period we study. The Dutch Healthcare 
Authority (NZa, 2009) found that hospital prices increased less in 
the free-pricing segment of DTCs than in the regulated segment 
between 2005 and 2008. Between 2006 and 2008 prices in the 
free-pricing segment even declined in real terms. There is no 
evidence that hospitals offset lower price increases by increasing 
service volume in the free-pricing segment (Krabbe-Alkemade 
et al., 2016; Schut & Van de Ven, 2011). Krabbe-Alkemade et al. 
(2016) found that the introduction of price competition led to lower 
total hospital costs. 
The effect of the introduction of price competition on hospital 
quality has not previously been estimated. A few studies look at 
the relationship between price and quality variation or between 
hospital concentration and quality after prices were liberalized. 
Heijink et al. (2013) find only limited variation in hospital quality 
and no relationship between contract prices and quality for 
cataract care. Croes et al. (2017) report a negative relationship 
between hospital market share and quality scores for two of 
the three diagnostic groups studied. Bijlsma et al. (2013) find 
that hospital concentration is associated with various process 
indicators, but both positive and negative relationships are found 
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and there is no relationship between hospital concentration and 
any of a number of outcome indicators examined. None of these 
studies have a design capable of identifying a causal effect of 
competition on quality.
3.4 Data and measures
3.4.1 Sources and sample
We use comprehensive, hospital-level data from the National 
Medical Registry on patient discharges from all Dutch hospitals 
between 2001 and 2007. For each discharge, we observe the 
patient’s gender, age, zip code, primary/secondary/tertiary 
diagnoses (ICD-9CM), admission period, admission hospital and 
procedures. Procedures are classified according to a Dutch method 
based on (and for the procedures examined equivalent to) the 
International Classification of Procedures in Medicine (WHO-FIC, 
2017). We restrict attention to patients discharged after a non-acute 
hip replacement (see below for details of the selection criteria). 
We construct a hospital-level panel which includes information 
on quality of care and patient case mix, and supplement this with 
an index of socio-economic status that is averaged over all the 
non-acute hip replacement patients of a hospital in a given year. 
This index is constructed by the Netherlands Institute for Social 
Research from the education, income and labor market status of 
residents of a zip code area (SCP, 2017).
In total, our panel consists of 89 hospitals observed from 2003 
to 2007, yielding 445 hospital-year observations. These hospitals 
admitted a total of 29,923 non-acute hip replacement patients per 
year, on average (SD: 1,525).
3.4.2 Quality measures
We use the unplanned 90-day readmission rate following non-acute 
hip replacement as our main quality indicator. This is preferred to 
the post hip replacement mortality rate because the latter was very 
low in the Netherlands in the period studied186. Higher (unplanned) 
readmission rates have been shown to be related to suboptimal 
quality of treatment both generally (e.g., Rosen et al., 2013; Mokhtar 
et al., 2012) and following hip replacement (e.g., Clement et al., 
2013; Avram et al., 2014; Saucedo et al., 2014; Kurtz et al., 2016). 
Because planned readmissions (e.g., for a scheduled procedure) 
are not generally a signal of quality of care, we restrict attention to 
186  Using the Causes of Death 
Register provided by Dutch Hospital 
Data and Statistics Netherlands, we 
calculate a within hospital mortality 
rate of 0.23 percent and a 30-day 
mortality rate of 0.29 percent following 
non-acute hip replacement in the period 
2003-2007.
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unplanned readmissions. All unplanned readmissions are attributed 
to the original treatment hospital. Unplanned readmissions 
following joint replacement are determined, in part, by the quality 
and safety of the initial hospital stay, transitional care services and 
post discharge support (Friebel et al., 2017). Widespread belief that 
readmissions are indicative of poor quality treatment is reflected in 
the fact that financial penalties for excess readmissions (including 
for hip replacements) have been imposed on hospitals in both the 
US and the UK since 2012 (Joynt & Jha, 2012). Consistent with this, 
in our data, four of the top five reasons (identified from diagnostic 
codes) for hip replacement patients to be readmitted within 
90-days are related to complications, infections or inflammatory 
reactions due to prosthetic implants. There is no consensus on 
whether a 90-day or 30-day follow-up window to define orthopedic 
readmissions provides the better indicator of quality (Ramkumar et 
al., 2015). Since the two are highly correlated for hip replacements 
in our data (r(81)=.84, p<0.01 in 2003 and r(61)=.87, p<0.01 in 
2007), it should make little difference which is used. As for 90-day 
readmissions, complications are the main reason to be readmitted 
within 30-days. We examine robustness of the estimates to using 
30-day readmissions. Information on hip replacement readmission 
rates is not in the public domain or available to health insurers 
in the Netherlands, and so this indicator is unlikely to have been 
subject to manipulation by hospitals.
Sample inclusion and exclusion criteria were based on those defined 
in the technical specifications of the US Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) Inpatient Quality Indicator #14 (AHRQ 
QI Version 5.0; IQI #14), which measures the hip replacement 
mortality rate. The population includes discharged patients aged 18 
or older with any procedure code that indicates partial or full hip 
replacement and any diagnosis code that indicates osteoarthrosis of 
the pelvic region or thigh187. There were 79,140 such cases between 
2003 and 2007. To exclude acute cases, we drop those with any 
listed diagnosis codes indicating hip fracture and those with codes 
indicating pregnancy, childbirth or puerperium. We also exclude 
those who transfer to another hospital because it is impossible to 
determine whether readmission in such cases indicates sub-optimal 
quality of the treatment received in the first or the second hospital. 
Cases with missing information on discharge address, gender, 
age, year or principal diagnosis (n=405) are also dropped, as are 
patients who died in the hospital (n=183)188. After imposing all these 
exclusion restrictions, we are left with 70,273 discharges following 
187  See appendix 3.1 for the relevant 
procedure codes and ICD-9CM diagnosis 
codes.
188  Given the very low within hospital 
mortality rate following non-acture 
hip replacement, any selection bias 
arising from excluding those who die 
is likely to have a negligible impact 
on the estimates (Fischer et al., 2014; 
Laudicella et al., 2013).
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non-acute hip replacement between 2003 and 2007. Of these, 8.2 
percent were readmitted to a hospital within 90 days for any reason 
that was not planned.
3.4.3 Measures of hospital market structure
We measure concentration at the hospital level using the Her-
findahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on the number of hospital 
beds189:                     , where      is the percent market share of 
hospital i that lies within a fixed radius of hospital h and     is the 
total number of hospitals in that market. Some hospitals have 
multiple locations that do not all lie within the same market defined 
by distance190. Appendix 3.2 explains how we calculate the HHI 
in these cases. For our baseline analysis, we use a 30 kilometers 
(by road) fixed radius because patients travel, on average, for 
20 minutes to get to the hospital of their choice (Beukers et al., 
2014; Varkevisser et al., 2012; Varkevisser et al., 2010) and most 
Dutch hospitals provide hip replacements (Roos et al., 2017). But 
since variation around the mean travel time is high (Beukers et 
al., 2014; Varkevisser et al., 2012; Varkevisser et al., 2010), we 
examine sensitivity to fixing the radius at 20, 40 and 50 kilometers 
to define the market. Because providers are anonymized in the 
data to protect confidentiality, we cannot use the continuous 
measure of HHI once the hospital data are linked with patient-level 
data. The HHI of each hospital was therefore constructed in a 
database not containing patient-level data. Next, an indicator of 
whether the HHI is under 2500 was derived and this was then 
linked to the patient-level dataset using the hospital identifier by 
Statistics Netherlands. Choice of the 2500 threshold is based on 
the convention in antitrust regulation that considers hospitals with 
an HHI at or above that value to be part of a highly concentrated 
market (e.g., FTC merger guidelines, 2010). It is assumed that these 
hospitals would be exposed to less price competition after 2005 
when free negotiation of prices was allowed for hip replacements 
than hospitals operating in less concentrated markets.
3.5 Empirical strategy
We identify the effect of price competition on quality by 
comparing the change after price liberalization in hip replacement 
readmission rates of hospitals operating in less concentrated 
markets with the before-and-after difference in the readmission 
rates of hospitals in highly concentrated markets. Hospitals with 
HHI Nh h 2i i1= =∑ m im
Nh
189  The information on the number 
of beds per hospital location per year 
was assembled using several datasets 
that are/were partly publically available 
(Bartels, 2001; 2002; Prismant, 2003; 
2004; 2005; 2006; CIBG, 2008; 2009; 
CBS, 2010; RIVM, 2006; 2008; 2009).
190  Of the 103 hospitals, 5 had more 
than one location within the period 
that we study.
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an HHI below 2500 form our treatment group, while those with a 
HHI of at least 2500 belong to the comparison group. Comparing 
changes in hip replacement readmission rates of these two groups 
does not identify the impact of introducing price competition per 
se, but identifies the effect of greater exposure to price competition 
provided the two groups would have followed parallel trends in 
readmission rates if price setting had not been liberalized.
Only hospitals with a HHI either always below 2500 or always 
above 2500 during the period of analysis are used. Hence, no 
hospital can switch from the treatment group to the comparison 
group or vice versa, and the composition of each group is held 
constant by construction. Sixteen hospitals out of a total of 103 are 
excluded because they fail to meet this criterion. This is mainly 
because of merger activity191.
To avoid contamination from earlier and later policy changes192, we 
focus on a relatively narrow time window around the implemen-
tation of price liberalization. We use data from 2003 and 2004 to 
capture the period before price liberalization and data from 2006 
and 2007 for the post-reform period. We exclude data from 2005 as 
the policy was implemented on February 1 of that year.
We estimate the following fixed effects model by least squares:
(3.1)h h hα λδ иμ+ + + + ++t tt t=RR POST X1(HHIh <2500) htε
where RRht is the unplanned 90-day readmission rate (percent) 
for non-acute hip replacements at hospital h in year t, 1() is the 
indicator function, POSTt is a binary indicator equal to 1 for the 
post-reform period (2006 & 2007), Xht is a vector of hospital 
characteristics that vary over time but are plausibly not affected by 
the introduction of price liberalization, uh is a hospital fixed effect, λt 
is a year effect and εht is a random error term.
The covariates consist of the Charlson index of comorbidity (Quan 
et al., 2011; 2005) averaged over a hospital’s non-acute hip 
replacement patients in a year, the percentage of these patients 
aged 65+, 40-60 and 18-39 years, the percentage female, the 
percentage discharged to a skilled nursing facility193, and the 
mean zip code-specific socioeconomic score of the patients. These 
indicators of case mix are included to increase efficiency and to allow 
191  Two other hospitals had to be 
excluded because the number of hip 
replacement cases was too low in the 
post-reform period.
192  In 2008, the Health Care 
Inspectorate set up a program to 
develop reliable, comparable and 
valid quality information, free pricing 
negotiations were extended to about 
20 per cent of hospitals’ revenues, 
specialists’ payments changed and 
entry to the hospital market became 
easier because of the abolishment of 
government approval over hospital 
construction. All of these changes 
potentially affect the relationship 
between market concentration and 
quality of care. Hence, we are limited 
to using data until 2007 to examine 
the impact of price liberalization for hip 
replacements introduced in 2005.
193  Our dataset indicates whether the 
patient went home, to another general 
hospital, to another academic hospital, 
to a nursing home or to another 
healthcare organization after discharge. 
According to a recent (and unpublished) 
study by Statistics Netherlands, the 
majority of patients that is included in 
the ‘another healthcare organization’ 
category is transferred to a nursing 
home facility (approximately 70 
percent). In this paper, we assigned 
every patient that is included in the 
‘nursing home’ and ‘other healthcare 
organization’ categories to a ‘transferred 
to a skilled nursing home facility’ 
variable. This measure is obviously not 
entirely correct but given that we are not 
able to distinguish specific organizations 
within the ‘another healthcare 
organization’ group, this was the best 
we could do.
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for any change in the composition of hip replacement patients that 
differs between hospitals in less and more concentrated markets 
without being caused by the differential effect of price liberalization. 
We argue at the end of this section that there is little or no reason to 
expect the reform to have caused hip replacement patients to select 
different hospitals or hospitals to have selected different patients.
Table 3.1 presents means of the covariates before and after the 
reform for the treatment and comparison groups. Prior to the 
reform, there are some significant differences in the characteristics 
of the patients across the two groups. But the differences are rather 
small. Significance reflects the large sample size. The treatment 
group has a slightly higher proportion of females, its patients are 
older by about 1 year and they have higher socioeconomic status 
and propensity to be admitted to a skilled nursing facility after 
discharge, on average. There are no pre-reform differences in 
comorbidity measured by the Charlson index. The characteristics of 
the patients change relatively little between the two periods for both 
groups. None of the difference-in-differences of these characteristics 
are significantly different from zero, indicating that there was no 
differential change in the composition of the groups with respect to 
these observables.
If in the absence of price liberalization in 2005 the average 
readmission rate of hospitals in less concentrated markets would 
have changed in 2006-07 by as much as the change that actually 
occurred in the hospitals operating in the more concentrated 
markets, then the parameter δ in (3.1) corresponds to the average 
effect of the increased exposure to price competition on the 
readmission rate among the hospitals in the less concentrated 
markets.
Figure 3.1 supports the plausibility of the common trends identifi-
cation assumption. Even going back to 2001, two years before the 
start of the pre-reform period that we use for identification of the 
effect, the trend in the readmission rate, and indeed its level, prior 
to the 2005 reform is very similar for hospitals operating in more 
and less concentrated markets. Estimation of a model similar to (3.1) 
using data from 2001 to 2004 and allowing the year effects to differ 
between hospitals located in more and less concentrated markets 
reveals no evidence of differential trends in the period immediately 
preceding the reform (Appendix 3.3; table 3.1; column (i)).
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A gap opens up in the readmission rates in 2006 immediately after 
the liberalization of price setting (figure 3.1). The readmission 
rate falls in the less concentrated markets but not in the more 
concentrated markets. If the common trends assumption holds, 
this would suggest that hospitals that were more exposed to price 
competition raised the quality of the care they delivered. However, 
the divergence is not sustained. In 2007, the readmission rate 
rises again in less concentrated markets, while remaining constant 
for hospitals largely shielded from competitive pressures. Over 
the two-year post-reform period, the graph suggests that price 
liberalization did not consistently lower or raise the quality of 
hip replacements. Motivated by the figure and because hospitals 
and insurers may not have fully adjusted to the new contracting 
conditions immediately after prices became freely negotiable, we 
estimate a second model that allows the treatment effect to differ in 
the two post-reform years:
k = 6,7
RRht  = α + ∑ δk 1(HHIh <2500) × YEAR0kt + Xht μ + иh + λt  + εht (3.2)
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FIGURE 3.1 – 90-day readmission rate after hip replacement per year & per HHI group (radius 30 km)
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where YEAR06t=1 (YEAR07t=1) if the year is 2006 (2007). 
Under the same common trends assumption, δ6 gives the average 
effect of increased exposure to price competition in 2006 and δ7 
gives the equivalent effect in 2007.
Market concentration is generally considered to be potentially 
endogenous because performance may feed back into structure and 
unobservable attributes may influence both quality and patients’ 
choice of hospital (Evans et al., 1993). In this study, both the 
empirical strategy and the institutional context eliminate or, at least 
greatly minimize, the threat to identification from endogeneities 
of both types. Hospital fixed effects deal with any time invariant 
correlated unobservables. Further, we avoid using any time varying 
information on market concentration. Each hospital is categorized 
into one of two groups according to whether its HHI starts and 
remains either below 2500 or above 2500. Since barely any 
quality information was available around the time of the reform, 
it is unlikely that any change in quality would affect patient flows. 
But even if there was a feedback from quality to market concen-
tration, any such endogenously induced variation in the HHI is not 
used in the estimation, and so cannot cause bias. Hospitals that 
cross the HHI threshold of 2500, possibly arising from a change 
in performance that either attracts or deters patients, are dropped 
from the sample. Quality-induced changes in market concentration 
of this magnitude, if they exist, are also not used in the estimation. 
Since we do not identify from time variation in HHI, there would be 
no advantage from calculating the HHI on the basis of predicted, 
rather than actual, patient flows, as some others have done (Kessler 
& McClellan, 2000; Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013).
We deliberately choose an elective procedure to measure quality in 
order to obtain evidence on the effect of competition on a treatment 
that is likely to exhibit much greater demand elasticity with respect 
to quality than is the case with acute treatments (e.g., for AMI), 
the demand for which is likely dominated by proximity. Hitherto, 
the literature has made the opposite choice (see e.g., Cooper et al., 
2011; Gaynor et al., 2013). Lack of direct relevance of competition 
to the acute procedure used to measure quality has been accepted 
in order to obtain a measure that is less vulnerable to endogeneity 
arising from patient selection of the provider. There are three 
reasons why our study is less vulnerable to this selection bias. First, 
we eliminate correlated, time invariant unobservable differences 
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in patient composition across hospitals with fixed effects. Only if 
the reform were to change unobservable patient characteristics 
differentially across the treatment and comparison groups would 
there be any potential bias. Second, as previously mentioned, 
patients and insurers lacked information on hospital quality, 
including readmission rates for hip replacements, before and 
after the reform. There was limited scope for selection on quality. 
Third, in contrast to the UK healthcare market reforms that have 
been the subject of many previous studies194, price liberalization 
in the Netherlands did not change opportunities for patient choice. 
Patients and health insurers had free choice of provider before and 
after the reform. In addition to these conceptual arguments, the 
comparisons of patient characteristics in table 3.1 give empirical 
grounds to believe that identification is unlikely to be invalidated 
by endogenous patient selection. None of the observable indicators 
of case mix changed differently in the treatment group than in 
the comparison group. In fact, there was very little change at all 
in these characteristics. If observables changed little and, if at all, 
comparably, there is little reason to believe that unobservables 
changed markedly differentially across the groups.
Hospital initiated selection of patients is potentially of greater 
concern in the context of this study. Price liberalization could 
potentially give hospitals operating in competitive markets the 
incentive to drive down costs and simultaneously cherry pick more 
straightforward cases so that tighter budgets would not impinge 
on quality. However, because we identify from comparison across 
hospitals categorized by broad ranges of HHI, any cherry picking 
could bias our results only if it resulted in patients being shunted 
long distances. More likely is that a hospital would refer a patient 
who is at greater risk of readmission to a neighboring hospital, 
which is likely to be in the same treatment or comparison group. 
So, while the case mix of individual hospitals may change due to 
patient selection in response to the reform, it is rather unlikely that 
this would change the composition of the groups. The comparisons 
of observable patient characteristics given in table 3.1 again 
support this.
194  These studies either use rich 
data or intruments to deal with time 
varying patient selection. Skellern 
(2017) controls for risk-adjusted Patient 
Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs), 
while Gaynor et al. (2013); Cooper et 
al. (2011) and Moscelli et al. (2016) 
instrument hospital choice using GP/
patient-hospital distances. Cooper et 
al. (2011) do not reject exogeneity of 
market structure and Moscelli et al. 
(2016) find that instrumenting has very 
little impact on the estimates, relative 
to controlling for a rich set of patient 
covariates.
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Patients’ characteristics
Proportion female
Mean age
Mean socioeconomic score
Mean Charlson Score 
(comorbidity)
Proportion discharged 
to skilled nursing facility
Number of hospitals 
Number of patients
Pre-reform (2003-04) 
Post-reform (2006-07) 
Change
Pre-reform (2003-04) 
Post-reform (2006-07) 
Change
Pre-reform (2003-04) 
Post-reform (2006-07)
Change
Pre-reform (2003-04) 
Post-reform (2006-07) 
Change
Pre-reform (2003-04) 
Post-reform (2006-07) 
Change
Treatment group 
(HHI < 2500)
0.72 
[0.05] 
0.69 
[0.06] 
0.03*** 
(0.01)
70.97 
[2.42] 
70.98
[2.69] 
-0.01
(0.45)
7.46 
[0.48] 
7.48 
[0.49] 
-0.01 
(0.08)
0.0024 
[0.0089] 
0.0018 
[0.0048] 
0.0006 
(0.0012)
0.08 
[0.10] 
0.08 
[0.13] 
-0.00 
(0.02)
72 
25,197
Comparison group 
(HHI > 2500)
0.69 
[0.05] 
0.67 
[0.06] 
0.01 
(0.01)
69.96 
[2.22] 
70.26 
[1.84] 
-0.31 
(0.35)
6.88 
[0.52] 
6.92 
[0.55] 
-0.04 
(0.09)
0.0015 
[0.0045] 
0.0008 
[0.0022] 
0.0007 
(0.0006)
0.05 
[0.06] 
0.05 
[0.01] 
-0.00 
(0.01)
72 
30,281
Difference 
(-in-differences)
0.03*** 
(0.01)
-0.01 
(0.01)
1.01*** 
(0.37)
-0.29 
(0.57)
0.58*** 
(0.08)
-0.03 
(0.12)
0.0009 
(0.0011)
0.00 
(0.00)
0.03*** 
(0.01)
-0.00 
(0.02)
72 
55,478
Notes: Pre-/post-reform cell entries are obtained by first computing the mean across all non-acute hip replacement patients discharged 
from each hospital and then taking the simple average of these means across all hospitals within a group and period. Figures in square 
brackets are standard deviations across hospitals. Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated change in the mean. 
Hospitals and patients are selected using the criteria described in section 3.4.2. The socioeconomic score is increasing in socioeconomic 
status and ranges from 0 to 10. The Charlson score (Quan et al. 2011) ranges from 0 to 9, with higher being more severe.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
TABLE 3.1 — Means of covariates by period and treatment group
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Main estimates
Prior to the reform, there was no significant difference in 
either the 90-day or the 30-day readmission rate between the 
treatment (high competitive pressure) group and the comparison 
(low competitive pressure) group (table 3.2). Post reform, the 
90-day readmission rate remained constant in the treatment and 
comparison group, whereas the 30-day readmission rate increased 
(10% significance) in the comparison group. Consequently, the 
simple  difference-in-differences is negative, which would indicate 
that increased competition led to lower readmission rates (i.e., higher 
clinical quality), but it is not significantly different from zero.
Notes: Table gives the simple mean readmission rate averaged over all hospitals in the treatment (HHI<2500) group and the comparison 
(HHI>2500) group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hospitals and patients selected by criteria described in section 3.4.2. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Outcome
90-day readmission rate
30-day readmission rate
Number of hospitals 
Number of patients
Pre-reform 
Post-reform
Change (Post – Pre)
Pre-reform 
Post-reform
Change (Post – Pre)
Treatment group 
(HHI < 2500) 
(1)
0.0825 
(0.0037) 
0.0814 
(0.0041) 
-0.0011 
(0.0055)
0.0480 
(0.0027) 
0.0492 
(0.0031) 
0.0012 
(0.0041)
36 
25,197
Comparison group 
(HHI > 2500) 
(2)
0.0788 
(0.0027) 
0.0855 
(0.0032) 
0.0067 
(0.0042)
0.0434
(0.0020) 
0.0486 
(0.0022) 
0.0052* 
(0.0030)
36 
30,281
Difference 
(-in-difference) 
(1)-(2)
0.0037 
(0.0045)
-0.0077 
(0.0069)
0.0046 
(0.0034)
-0.0040 
(0.0051)
72 
55,478
TABLE 3.2 — Unplanned 90-day and 30-day hip replacement readmission rates by period and treatment group
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The conditional difference-in-differences (DID) estimate given in 
the first column of the top panel of table 3.3 is essentially the same 
as the simple DID estimate in magnitude and lack of significance. 
The similarity provides a further indication that there is likely to 
be little bias from correlated time varying unobservables. These 
results suggest there was no effect of greater exposure to price 
competition on 90-day readmission rates. Consistent with what was 
observed in figure 3.1, the conditional DID estimates in the first 
column of the second panel of table 3.3 suggest that increased price 
competition reduced the 90-day readmission rate by 1 percentage 
point in the first year (2006) after the reform but had no effect 
in the second year (2007). As is apparent from figure 3.1, the 
significant effect in 2006 is driven by a fall in the readmission rate 
of the hospitals exposed most to competition while the readmission 
rate of hospitals that are dominant in their markets did not change.
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Notes: Top panel gives OLS estimates of δ from regression (3.1). Second panel gives OLS estimates of δ6 and δ7 from regression (3.2). All estimates obtained 
from regressions containing hospital and year fixed effects and covariates identified in table 3.1. Full estimates in appendix 3.3 tables 3.2 and 3.3. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Hospitals and patients selected by criteria described in section 3.4.2. Radius X indicates that the estimates are based on 
treatment/comparison groups formed on the basis of a HHI calculated with a radius of X km defining the boundary of a market. The sample size falls as the 
radius is reduced because more hospitals cross the HHI threshold of 2500 used to define the treatment/comparison groups during the estimation period.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
Model (3.1)
      
    R2
Model (3.2)
       6 (2006)
       7 (2007)
    R2
N treatment hospitals 
N comparison 
hospitals
N hospitals×years
N patients
N readmitted patients
90-day readmission 
(radius 30)
-0.0095 
(0.0066)
0.55
-0.0189** 
(0.0074) 
-0.0000 
(0.0082)
0.56
36 
36
287 
55,478 
5,706
90-day readmission 
(radius 20)
-0.0041 
(0.0067)
0.58
-0.0114 
(0.0079) 
0.0040 
(0.0083)
0.59
19 
44
247 
46,823 
4,788
90-day readmission 
(radius 40)
-0.0094 
(0.0061)
0.58
-0.0170** 
(0.0076) 
-0.0011 
(0.0071)
0.58
44 
20
249 
45,472 
4,705
90-day readmission 
(radius 50)
-0.0084 
(0.0075)
0.58
-0.0179** 
(0.0091) 
0.0024 
(0.0085)
0.59
52 
12
245 
46,696 
4,787
30-day readmission
(radius 30)
-0.0042 
(0.0048)
0.55
-0.0084 
(0.0056) 
0.0001 
(0.0059)
0.55
36 
36
287 
55,478 
1,290
TABLE 3.3 — Estimated effects of price competition on readmission rates after hip replacement
δ̂
δ̂
δ̂
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3.6.2 Robustness 
Market definition
The main estimates are generated on the basis of HHIs calculated 
with a radius of 30km used to define the boundary of the market 
around a hospital. To check robustness, we recalculate the HHI 
using a radius of 20, 40 and 50km to define a market, recategorize 
hospitals into the treatment and comparisons groups on the basis of 
the revised index and then re-estimate models (3.1) and (3.2) in each 
case. Estimates are given in the appropriately labelled columns of 
table 3.3. With a radius of 30km, hospitals are evenly split between 
the treatment and comparison groups. As the radius is widened, 
more hospitals get put into the treatment group because the HHI 
decreases as the area that defines the market increases.
Irrespective of the radius used, the treatment effect averaged over 
the two years of the post-reform period is insignificant. When 
the radius is increased, the year specific estimates obtained from 
model (2.3) continue to indicate that exposure to more intensive 
price competition significantly reduced the readmission rate by 
a similar magnitude in 2006. When the radius is reduced, the 
estimate of this effect falls in magnitude and loses significance. This 
may be because more hospitals are then in the comparison group. 
At least some of the hospitals that have a HHI below 2500 using a 
30km radius but above 2500 with a radius of 20km may, in reality, 
be exposed to competitive pressure and so respond to the price 
liberalization similarly to those that remain in the treatment group 
irrespective of the radius used. This will reduce the DID between 
the groups. There is no significant effect in 2007 irrespective 
of the geographic radius used to define the market. In general, 
irrespective of the radius used to define a hospital market, there 
is no clear evidence that increased price competition consistently 
impacted on the readmission rate.
30-day readmission rate
Since arguments and evidence supporting the 90-day readmission 
rate as a better indicator of quality of care than the 30-day rate are 
lacking, we check robustness to using the shorter period. Pre-reform 
trends in 30-day readmission rates are reasonably parallel between 
the treatment and comparison groups, although there is a slight dip 
for the comparison group only in 2003 (see figure 3.2). The 
hypothesis that year effects in the 30-day readmission rate are equal 
for the treatment and comparison group hospitals in the  
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pre-treatment period is not rejected (appendix 3.3, table 3.1; column (ii)), 
which lends plausibility to the parallel trends identification assumption 
for this outcome also.
The final column of table 3.3 reveals that estimated effects on the 
30-day readmission rate are generally smaller in magnitude than those 
on the 90-day rate. Over the full post-reform period, there continues to 
be no evidence that exposure to increased price competition consistently 
affected quality of care.
3.7 Conclusion
This is the first paper to credibly identify the effect of price competition 
on the quality of elective healthcare. When producers are free to 
compete on both price and quality, demand is potentially sensitive to 
both. However, when information on the latter is lacking or poor, organ-
izations may increase profits by cutting both price and quality. This logic 
is one of the reasons why regulators have been leery of permitting price 
competition in healthcare markets. But in most countries, including 
FIGURE 3.2 – 30-day readmission rate after hip replacement per year & per HHI group (radius 30 km)
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the Netherlands, hospitals are not-for-profit organizations that may 
not be prepared to grasp a competitive advantage obtainable by 
cutting prices if this requires skimping on quality. Our findings are 
consistent with this behavior, although they certainly do not confirm 
it. Freedom to negotiate prices for a number of elective procedures 
did not result in lower quality care measured by readmission rates 
after hip replacements in the hospitals in the most competitive 
markets.
In the absence of meaningful quality information, even in a market 
dominated by not-for-profit organizations, one would expect 
contract negotiations between insurers and hospitals to focus 
on price. This focus may result in a (unintended) deterioration 
of quality. We find that exposure to increased price competition 
initially had a positive impact on quality. The hip replacement 
readmission rate fell in the most competitive hospital markets in 
the first year in which prices were liberalized. This may result from 
one side of the market’s (hospital administrators’) initial misappre-
hension of how the other side (insurers) would behave in the new 
contacting arrangements. For the first time, hospitals and insurers 
were negotiating contracts for hospital products (DRG equivalents) 
rather than agreeing on prospective budgets and related 
parameters, like hospital days. Hospitals may have understood that 
the insurers would be sensitive to both price and the quality of the 
products. Hospitals in more competitive markets might have been 
afraid that they would lose out if they did not improve their quality, 
as well as keeping prices down. When hospitals came to realize 
that bargaining primarily focused on price and not on quality, 
they may have decided to scale down initial quality improvement 
efforts. Of course, this is no more than supposition. It would have 
been interesting to extend the post-reform period of analysis to 
check whether, over time, a negative impact on quality did emerge. 
Unfortunately, this is not possible because of later reforms of the 
healthcare market that would confound identification of the effect 
of the 2005 reform (see footnote 192).
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Dutch Classification of Procedures in Medicine procedure codes 
that indicate partial or full hip replacement:
58150; 58160; 58161; 58162; 58163; 58164; 581520; 581523; 
581521; 581522; 581524; 581525; 581651.
ICD-9CM diagnosis codes that indicate osteoarthrosis of the pelvic 
region or thigh:
71500; 71509; 71510; 71518; 71520; 71525; 71528; 71530; 
71535; 71538; 71580; 71589; 71590; 71595; 71598; 71650; 
71655; 71658; 71659; 71660; 71665; 71668; 71690; 71695; 
71698; 71699.
ICD-9CM diagnosis codes that indicate hip fractures:
82000; 82001; 82002; 82003; 82009; 82010; 82011; 82012; 
82013; 82019; 82020; 82021; 82022; 82030; 82031; 82032; 8202; 
8209
ICD-9CM diagnosis codes that indicate pregnancy, childbirth and 
puerperium: 630; 631; 632; 6331; 6339; 634; 635; 636; 637; 638; 
639; 640; 6400; 64003; 641; 6410; 6411; 6412; 6419; 642; 6420; 
6431; 6439; 644; 6441; 6442; 645; 6451; 6452; 646; 6460; 6461; 
6462; 6463; 6464; 6465; 6466; 6467; 647; 6470; 6471; 6472; 
6473; 6474; 6475; 6476; 648; 6480; 6481; 6482; 6483; 6484; 
6485; 6486; 6487; 6488; 64883; 6489; 649; 6490; 6491; 6492; 
6493; 6494; 6495; 6496; 6497; 650; 651; 6510; 6511; 652; 653; 
654; 655; 65573; 656; 6560; 65611; 65631; 65653; 65661; 657; 
658; 6580; 65803; 6581; 6588; 659; 6591; 6598; 660; 66001; 
66011; 66041; 66061; 661; 6611; 6610; 6613; 662; 6621; 663; 
6631; 6633; 664; 66404; 66414; 66434; 665; 6653; 666; 66604; 
66614; 667; 668; 66951; 66970; 6699; 670; 67004; 671; 67144; 
672; 673; 674; 675; 67514; 67594; 676; 67624; 678; 6780; 6781; 
67902
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In the Netherlands, some hospitals have multiple locations. We 
improve on previous research by using the hospital site-specific 
locations rather than the hospital’s main location. Because not 
all treatment locations are within the same market if defined by 
the kilometers range, we can distinguish five different scenarios: 
(i) Hospital A has only one location; (ii) Hospital A1 has another 
treatment location (hospital A2) that lies within hospital A1’s 
radius; (iii) Hospital A1 has another treatment location (hospital 
A2) that does not lie within hospital A1’s radius; (iv) The competitor 
of hospital A (hospital B1) has multiple treatment locations 
(hospital B2) that do not lie within hospital A’s radius and (v) The 
competitor of hospital A (hospital B1) has multiple treatment 
locations (hospital B2) that lie within hospital A’s radius. Example 
calculations of the HHI in each scenario are given below.
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Notes: mh is calculated by dividing the number of beds per hospital by the total 
number of beds in the market.
Hospital 
A
B 
Total
Hospital 
A1
A2 
A
B
C
D
Total
# of beds
100 
200 
300
# of beds
100 
50
150
200
200
300
850
mh
33.33
66.67
100.00
mh
17.65
23.53 
23.53 
35.29 
100.00
mh
2
1111.11
4444.44
5555.56
mh
2
311.42 
553.63 
553.63 
1245.67
2664.35
HHI
5555.56
HHI
2664.35
Notes: mh is calculated by dividing the number of beds per hospital by the total 
number of beds in the market.
SCENARIO I – HHI for hospital A with one location using 30 kilometer radius
SCENARIO II – HHI for hospital A with two locations using 30 kilometer radius
30 km A
B
30 km
30 km
A2
A1
B
C
D
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Notes: mh is calculated by dividing the number of beds per hospital by the total 
number of beds in the market.
Hospital 
A1
B 
Total
# of beds
100 
200 
300
mh
33.33
66.67
100.00
mh
2
1111.11
4444.44
5555.56
HHI
5555.56
SCENARIO III – HHI for hopsital A with two locations (one not 
within the other’s radius) using 30 kilometer radius
30 km A1
A2
C
B
Notes: mh is calculated by dividing the number of beds per hospital by the total 
number of beds in the market.
Hospital 
A
B1 
Total
# of beds
100 
200 
300
mh
33.33
66.67
100.00
mh
2
1111.11
4444.44
5555.56
HHI
5555.56
SCENARIO IV – HHI for hospital A using 30 kilometer radius. Competitor 
(hospital B) has two locations which are not both within hospital A’s radius
30 km A
B2
B1
Notes: mh is calculated by dividing the number of beds per hospital by the total 
number of beds in the market.
Hospital 
A
B1
B2
B 
Total
# of beds
100 
200 
100
300
400
mh
25
75
100.00
mh
2
625
5625
6250
HHI
6250
SCENARIO V – HHI for hospital A using 30 kilometer radius. Competitor 
(hospital B) has two locations which are both within hospital A’s radius
30 km A
B2
B1
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Notes: OLS estimates of     1,     2 and     3 (pre-treatment years) containing hospital and year fxed effects and covariates. All estimates from 
regressions containing hospital and year fixed effects and covariates identified in table 3.1. Charlson Score not included in this analysis 
as our dataset does not include information on comorbidities before 2001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hospitals and patients 
selected by criteria described in section 3.4.2. H0: ß4=ß5=ß6=0 (F3,212=0.62; p-value>0.6035 for the 90-day readmission rates and 
F3,212=0.62; p-value>0.6007 for the 30-day readmission rates)
Radius 
YEAR01
YEAR02
YEAR03
YEAR04 (reference category)
  1 (2001)
 
  2 (2002)
  3 (2003) 
Proportion female
Proportion age category 18-39 (reference category) 
Proportion age category 40-64
Proportion age category 65 and older
Proportion SES score 0-5 (reference category) 
Proportion SES score 6-8
Proportion SES score 8-10
Proportion discharged to skilled nursing facility
(intercept)
N treatment hospitals 
N comparison hospitals 
N hospitals×years
N patients
N readmitted patients
R2
90-day readmission rates after 
hip replacement (radius 30)
-0.0073 
(0.0050) 
0.0004 
(0.0055) 
-0.0004 
(0.0050) 
- 
-0.0027 
(0.0084) 
-0.0110 
(0.0084) 
-0.0060 
(0.0084) 
0.0241 
(0.0526) 
- 
-0.0484 
(0.1461) 
-0.0804 
(0.1389) 
- 
0.0334 
(0.0571) 
0.0548 
(0.1075) 
0.0827 
(0.0412) 
0.0984 
(0.1411)
41 
40 
323 
57,648 
4,380
0.63
30-day readmission rates after 
hip replacement (radius 30)
-0.0053 
(0.0042) 
0.0043 
(0.0044) 
-0.0007 
(0.0038) 
- 
-0.0025 
(0.0069) 
-0.0087 
(0.0068) 
-0.0029 
(0.0065) 
-0.0470 
(0.0356) 
- 
-0.0560 
(0.1142) 
-0.0603 
(0.1076) 
- 
0.0335 
(0.0497) 
0.0285 
(0.0815) 
0.0691 
(0.0300) 
0.1045 
(0.1122)
41 
40 
323 
57,648 
2,483
0.60
Table 3.1 – Estimated effects of price competition on readmission rates after hip replacement (pre-reform period)
δ̂
δ̂
δ̂
δ̂ δ̂ δ̂
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Radius 
YEAR03
YEAR04 (reference category) 
YEAR06
YEAR07
δ
Proportion female
Proportion age category 18-39 
(reference category) 
Proportion age category 40-64
Proportion age category 65 and older
Proportion SES score 0-5 
(reference category)
Proportion SES score 6-8
Proportion SES score 8-10 
Charlson Score
Proportion discharged to skilled 
nursing facility
(intercept)
N treatment hospitals 
N comparison hospitals 
N hospitals×years
N patients
N readmitted patients
R2
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 30)
-0.0043 
(0.0038)
- 
0.0050 
(0.0048)
0.0041 
(0.0048)
-0.0095 
(0.0066)
-0.0579 
(0.0466)
-
-0.2404 
(0.2159)
-0.2397 
(0.2238)
-
-0.0440 
(0.0887)
0.0529 
(0.1271)
-0.3242 
(0.5515) 
-0.0113 
(0.0327) 
0.3943 
(0.2395)
36 
36 
287 
55,478 
5,706
0.55
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 20)
-0.0053 
(0.0044)
- 
0.0014 
(0.0048)
0.0047 
(0.0050)
-0.0041 
(0.0067)
-0.0200 
(0.0468)
-
-0.3268* 
(0.1940)*
-0.3346 
(0.2013)
-
-0.0684 
(0.0692)
0.0661 
(0.1112)
-0.0292 
(0.4085) 
-0.0262 
(0.0315) 
0.4809** 
(0.2062)
19 
44 
247 
46,823 
4,788
0.58
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 40)
-0.0056 
(0.0046) 
- 
0.0063 
(0.0055)
0.0098* 
(0.0054) 
-0.0094
(0.0061) 
-0.0193 
(0.0468)
-
-0.1690 
(0.1965) 
-0.1730 
(0.2031) 
-
-0.0662 
(0.0714) 
0.0563 
(0.1143) 
0.1794
(0.4603) 
-0.0333 
(0.0307) 
0.3209 
(0.2095)
44 
20 
249 
45,472 
4,705
0.58
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 50)
-0.0054 
(0.0046) 
- 
0.0059 
(0.0072)
0.0105 
(0.0073) 
-0.0084
(0.0075) 
-0.0170 
(0.0480)
-
-0.1805 
(0.2014) 
-0.1911 
(0.2097) 
-
-0.0485 
(0.0754) 
0.0682 
(0.1181) 
0.1103
(0.4758) 
-0.0272 
(0.0319) 
-0.3198 
(0.2179)
52 
12 
245 
46,696 
4,787
0.58
30-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 30)
-0.0032 
(0.0031) 
- 
0.0034 
(0.0035)
0.0009 
(0.0034) 
-0.0042
(0.0048) 
-0.0571* 
(0.0292) 
-
-0.2715 
(0.1679) 
-0.2433 
(0.1725) 
-
-0.0579 
(0.0644) 
0.0244 
(0.0963) 
-0.7032**
(0.3197) 
0.0133 
(0.0203) 
0.3826** 
(0.1878)
36 
36 
287 
55,478 
1,290
0.55
Notes: OLS estimates of δ from regression (3.1). All estimates from regressions containing hospital and year fixed effects and covariates 
identified in table 3.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hospitals and patients selected by criteria described in section 3.4.2. Radius 
X indicates that the estimates are based on treatment/comparison groups formed on the basis of a HHI calculated with a radius of X km 
defining the boundary of a market.
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.2 – Estimated effects of price competition on readmission rates after hip replacement
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Radius 
YEAR03
YEAR04 (reference category) 
YEAR06
YEAR07
     6(2006)
     7 (2007)
Proportion female
Proportion age category 18-39 
(reference category) 
Proportion age category 40-64
Proportion age category 65 and older
Proportion SES score 0-5 
(reference category)
Proportion SES score 6-8
Proportion SES score 8-10 
Charlson Score
Proportion discharged to skilled 
nursing facility
(intercept)
N treatment hospitals 
N comparison hospitals 
N hospitals×years
N patients
N readmitted patients
R2
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 30)
-0.0042 
(0.0038)
-
0.0096* 
(0.0051)
- 0.0005 
(0.0049)
-0.0189** 
(0.0074)
-0.0000 
(0.0082) 
-0.0607 
(0.0457)
-
-0.2309 
(0.2122)
-0.2266 
(0.2195)
-
-0.0349 
(0.0905)
0.05449 
(0.1254)
-0.3042 
(0.5579) 
-0.0090 
(0.0345) 
0.3764 
(0.2346)
36 
36 
287 
55,478 
5,706
0.56
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 20)
-0.0052 
(0.0044)
- 
0.0036 
(0.0050)
0.0025 
(0.0051)
-0.0114 
(0.0079)
0.0040 
(0.0083) 
-0.0192 
(0.0459)
-
-0.3059* 
(0.1827)
-0.3179* 
(0.1897)
-
-0.0672 
(0.0668)
0.0551 
(0.1077)
0.0158 
(0.3855) 
-0.0256 
(0.0340) 
0.4622** 
(0.1937)
19 
44 
247 
46,823 
4,788
0.59
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 40)
-0.0055 
(0.0046) 
- 
0.0115* 
(0.0063)
0.0043 
(0.0054) 
-0.0170**
(0.0076) 
-0.0011
(0.0071) 
-0.0197 
(0.0459)
-
-0.1601 
(0.1958) 
-0.1618 
(0.2020) 
-
-0.0593 
(0.0722) 
0.0535 
(0.1144) 
0.2117
(0.4489) 
-0.0315 
(0.0320) 
0.3050 
(0.2085)
44 
20 
249 
45,472 
4,705
0.58
90-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 50)
-0.0053 
(0.0047) 
- 
0.0138* 
(0.0083)
0.0022 
(0.0076) 
-0.0179**
(0.0091) 
0.0024 
(0.0085) 
-0.0099 
(0.0471)
-
-0.1641 
(0.2004) 
-0.1771 
(0.2085) 
-
-0.0323 
(0.0773) 
0.0797 
(0.1178) 
0.1544
(0.4686) 
-0.0272 
(0.0325) 
0.2857 
(0.2164)
52 
12 
245 
46,696 
4,787
0.59
30-day 
readmission 
rates after hip 
replacement 
(radius 30)
-0.0032 
(0.0031) 
- 
0.0055 
(0.0037)
-0.0019 
(0.0035) 
-0.0084
(0.0056) 
0.0001 
(0.0059) 
-0.0584** 
(0.0289)
-
-0.2672 
(0.1678) 
-0.2374 
(0.1719) 
-
-0.0538 
(0.0644) 
0.0251 
(0.0959) 
-0.6942**
(0.3207) 
0.0143 
(0.0204) 
0.3745 
(0.1863)
36 
36 
287 
55,478 
1,290
0.55
Notes: OLS estimates of δ6 and δ7 from regression (3.2). All estimates from regressions containing hospital and year fixed effects and 
covariates identified in table 3.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hospitals and patients selected by criteria described in section 
3.4.2. Radius X indicates that the estimates are based on treatment/comparison groups formed on the basis of a HHI calculated with a radius 
of X km defining the boundary of a market.
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
̂ ̂
Table 3.3 – Estimated effects of price competition on readmission rates after hip replacement (post-reform period differentiated)
δ̂
δ̂
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Abstract
In most studies on hospital merger effects, the unit of observation 
is the merged hospital, whereas the observed price is the weighted 
average across hospital products and across payers. However, 
little is known about whether price effects vary between hospital 
locations, products and payers. We expand existing bargaining 
models to allow for heterogeneous price effects and use a  
difference-in-differences model in which price changes at the 
merging hospitals are compared to price changes at comparison 
hospitals. We find evidence of heterogeneous price effects across 
health insurers, hospital products and hospital locations. These 
findings have implications for ex ante merger scrutiny.
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4.1 Introduction
An increasing number of empirical studies have been conducted 
concerning the price effects of hospital mergers. In general, the 
aim of these studies is to test the effectiveness of antitrust policy. 
In competitive markets, the aim of preventive merger control is 
to prohibit anticompetitive consolidation. To determine whether a 
merger between two or more firms will result in anticompetitive 
price increases and/or quality decreases, antitrust authorities need 
to carry out a prospective review of the merger. However, merger 
reviews in the healthcare sector encounter specific difficulties 
because there are unique factors that render the most commonly 
used tests for measuring geographic markets less reliable in 
healthcare than in other sectors (Elzinga & Swisher, 2011). Retro-
spective studies are aimed at providing a better understanding of 
the effects of mergers, which, in turn may improve future antitrust 
policy.
The majority of the studies on retrospective merger analyses 
indicate a positive correlation between hospital mergers and 
prices (see e.g., Gaynor & Town, 2012; Vogt & Town, 2006; Gaynor 
& Vogt, 2000 for reviews). In most of these studies, the unit of 
observation is the merged hospital, whereas the observed price is 
the weighted average across different hospital products and across 
different payers. However, little is known about whether price 
effects vary between different hospital locations, different products 
and different payers. Because merged hospitals often continue 
to operate at different locations, produce multiple products and 
negotiate prices with a range of payers, an interesting question is 
whether these differences matter. If it turns out that they do matter, 
this may have important implications for ex ante merger scrutiny 
by antitrust authorities.
This article considers the question of whether the price effects of a 
hospital merger vary between locations, products and third-party 
payers (i.e., health insurers). By means of a  hospital-insurer 
bargaining model, we show that the price effects of a hospital 
merger may vary and that the differences between locations, 
products and insurers may influence the outcome of hospi-
tal-insurer price setting differently. We show that the price effects 
differ between locations, products and insurers depending on: 
(i) the degree of substitution between the merging hospitals for 
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different products, (ii) the relative bargaining ability of hospitals 
and insurers and (iii) the pre-merger price-cost margins. We 
then use a unique national dataset on hospital-insurer negotiated 
contract prices for each hospital product in the Netherlands to 
investigate whether the price effects of a merger between a general 
acute care hospital (henceforth hospital M1) and a neighboring 
general acute care hospital that also provides tertiary hospital care 
(henceforth hospital M2) vary between different hospital locations, 
different products and different insurers. The merger that we study 
was consummated in the Netherlands in year t195.
Our article relates to two literatures. First, we build on the 
literature that structurally estimates multilateral bargaining models 
of healthcare competition. In general, these models contribute to 
our understanding of price setting mechanisms in the healthcare 
industry. This is relevant because standard oligopoly models 
are not applicable to the hospital industry (Gaynor et al., 2015). 
Because the current Dutch healthcare system bears evident 
similarities with the US healthcare system, we are able to build 
on the models that were developed for the US health market by 
Gaynor and Town (2012) (hereafter: GT) and Gowrisankaran et 
al. (2015) (hereafter: GNT). Following these models, we describe a 
bargaining model in which hospital-product prices are bilaterally 
negotiated between insurers and hospitals. We show how hos-
pital-insurer negotiations translate into product prices, and by 
adapting the GT and GNT models for hospital mergers we show 
that the price effect of a merger between two hospitals may be 
heterogeneous depending on the degree of substitution between 
hospitals, the relative bargaining ability of hospitals and insurers 
and the pre-merger price-cost margins of different products at 
both merging hospitals. The most important contribution of this 
article to hospital-insurer bargaining models is that we, unlike GT 
and GNT, endogenize the product price ratio. That is, the models 
by GT and the GNT both assume that hospitals and health insurers 
bargain over a single base price per hospital, holding product-price 
ratios of each hospital fixed. This means that in both benchmark 
models each hospital entering a network always provides all 
treatments. Our model, in contrast, allows for the situation in which 
a hospital may be contracted only for a subset of treatments. In 
section 4.2, we explain that this assumption better matches current 
practice where contracts between hospitals and insurers can be 
concluded for a subset of treatments.
195  For reasons of confidentiality, 
we only report those results that are 
of direct interest to this article. We 
anonymize the names of the merged 
hospitals, rival hospitals and insurers. 
For the same reason, the merger year is 
reported as t (which was between 2005 
and 2012), with the year preceding the 
merger as t-1 and the year following the 
merger as t+1.
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Second, we build on the literature on retrospective analyses of 
hospital mergers. Since the 1980s, hospital sectors in many OECD 
countries have become increasingly concentrated as a result of 
mergers (Gaynor and Town, 2012). Merger activity has fueled a 
public and scientific debate about the consequences of mergers 
and the desirability of further concentration of healthcare sectors. 
An increasing number of empirical studies have been conducted 
concerning the price effects of hospital mergers. Most of these 
studies have shown that although mergers may bring about 
meaningful reductions in marginal costs and therefore improve 
welfare overall, mergers between rival hospitals are likely to raise 
the price of inpatient care in concentrated markets (Gaynor and 
Town, 2012). We build on these studies, but disaggregate the 
merger price effect and show that the price effects of a merger 
between two hospitals may differ between locations, providers and 
products. With that, we contribute to a better understanding of the 
effects of mergers, which, in turn may also improve future antitrust 
policy.
This article is structured as follows. We start with the bargaining 
model. We then discuss the applicability of this model to the Dutch 
hospital market (section 4.3) and describe the merger that we 
study (section 4.4). The next sections concern the empirical model 
(section 4.5) and the data (section 4.6). In section 4.7 we present 
the results and section 4.8 discusses the policy implications. Finally, 
our main findings are summarized in section 4.9.
4.2. The model
To explain the possibility of heterogeneous price effects of hospital 
mergers we consider a game-theoretical model of hospital-insurer 
bargaining, following the lines suggested by Gaynor and Town 
(2012) (GT) and Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) (GNT). These papers 
build on earlier literature analyzing hospital-insurer bargaining, 
notably Gal-Or (1997); Town and Vistnes (2001); Capps et al. (2003) 
and Gaynor and Vogt (2003).
To keep our model as simple as possible, we adopt a two-stage 
set-up following the base model of GNT. In the first stage of this 
model, health insurers196 bargain and contract with hospitals on 
behalf of their insured and in the second stage, each consumer 
196  GNT use the term managed care 
organization or MCO if they refer to 
insurers that use provider networks and 
negotiate prices with providers. We refer 
to similar organizations, but use the 
term ‘health insurer’ instead as this is 
the more commonly used term in the 
Netherlands.
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receives a health draw and seeks treatment at the hospital that 
maximizes his utility. Because the consumer commits to a restricted 
network of hospitals when he buys health insurance, he has the 
option of visiting any of the contracted hospitals when he is in need 
of specific care.
Like in the models by GT and GNT, we simplify some elements of 
the bargaining game: we condition on the network of the insurer197 
and do not allow consumers to switch insurers in response to a 
network change. Following GT and GNT, the bargaining solution 
used in this article is based on the framework that was developed 
by Horn and Wolinsky (1988). While not imposing a complete 
non-cooperative structure, this framework nests a non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium within a cooperative game theoretical concept of 
a Nash bargaining solution.
To be able to explain heterogeneous price effects over products, 
we need to allow for flexibility in the price ratios between different 
products of the same hospital. Both the GT and the GNT models 
consider heterogeneous insurers, hospital locations and hospital 
products. However, they fix all the product-price ratios at the level of 
the respective disease-weight ratios. In their models, the hospitals 
are constrained to negotiate a single base price per hospital location 
and the prices for different products are computed as a product of 
the base price and the disease weight198. Our model deviates from 
this assumption by freeing the product-price ratios. While in both 
benchmark models each hospital that enters a network always 
provides all treatments, our model allows for the situation in which 
a hospital may be contracted only for a subset of treatments. This 
also better matches practice where contracts between hospitals and 
insurers can be concluded for a subset of treatments. For example, 
in the US, we observe cases in which hospitals shifted resources and 
activities to central profitable services, while reducing or eliminating 
some loss making services (i.e., the so-called specialty service lines) 
(Berenson et al., 2006). This is in line with the anticipated strategy 
change towards integrated care delivery systems (Porter, 2009). 
Furthermore, there is an increase in the use of bundled payments, 
global payments or alternative quality contracts by health insurers 
(e.g., Chernew et al. 2011; Delbanco, 2014; Song et al. 2014). In 
these settings, a single payment covers the services that providers 
deliver to treat a given condition or provide a given treatment. Hence, 
in these cases, a price has to be determined for each bundle. Also 
in the Netherlands, which data we use when estimating the model 
197  There is some work on network 
formation games, with Ho (2009) 
being the most notable. Ho (2009) 
estimates the parameters of managed 
care organizations' (MCO) choices of 
provider network focusing on the role 
of different networks on downstream 
MCO competition (Gowrisankaran et 
al., 2015). Like GT and GNT, we treat the 
insurers' network structure as given.
198  Each year, the Center for Medicare 
Services publishes DRG weights. 
The DRG weights measure the mean 
resource usage by diagnosis. In the 
model, they reflect the resource intensity 
of treatment. Using the DRG weights 
with a base price does not allow for 
heterogeneous price effects of mergers.
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parameters, hospitals may be contracted only for a subset of services. 
Interviews with health insurers and hospital representatives who 
were involved in contractual negotiations during our study period 
indicated that especially for high-revenue products insurers and 
hospitals bargain separate prices. In the Netherlands, it is usually 
the insurers that initiate selective contracting of procedures. Dutch 
health insurers have imposed rules on contracting certain types of 
operations. For example, one insurer selectively contracts providers 
of breast cancer surgeries (CZ, 2015), whereas another selectively 
contracts 15 hospital products (VGZ, 2014). As a result of selective 
contracting or hospitals' choices, in practice, the full hospital or a 
subset of procedures in a hospital may be contracted.
4.2.1 Model set-up
Following GT and GNT, we analyze hospital-insurer bargaining in 
a model with multiple hospitals and health insurers. For ease of 
comparison, we follow the model notation by GNT. In this model, 
there is a set of hospitals that is indexed by j = 1, ..., J; and a set 
of health insurance companies indexed by m = 1, ..., M. Each 
consumer buys insurance at a particular health insurer and hence 
the set of enrollees for a particular health insurer is indexed by i = 
1, ..., I. With probability fid enrollees may be stricken by illness d ϵ 
{0, 1, ..., D}, where d = 0 means no illness.
In our model, we associate each illness with a hospital product199. 
Let Dj denote the list of all products of hospital j. We assume that 
the range of products may differ between hospitals. The set of 
all hospitals (each of which delivers a certain range of products) 
is subdivided over S ≤ J systems. Here J denotes the number 
of hospitals, and S denotes the number of hospital systems. Ms 
will denote the respective set of all systems. Each system s ϵ Ms 
is associated with a subset in the hospital-product space of all 
treatment options (jd) that can be provided by this system, where 
index j refers to hospitals and index d to products. Ls denotes the 
list of treatment options (jd) with which hospital j of system s enters 
the hospital-insurer bargaining game. For the sake of simplicity, we 
consider the situation in which each system is initially represented 
by one hospital (i.e., S = J).
For any consumer i, we denote his health insurer by m(i). Following 
the base model version of GNT, we assume that m(i) is chosen via 
long-run employer/health insurer contracts and hence, we assume 
that m(i) is fixed. This implies that we do not allow consumers to 
199  Please note that d can also be a 
cluster of products.
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switch insurers in response to a network change200. We also treat 
the network of each health insurer as given. That is, we assume 
that each health insurer enters the negotiations with some set of 
hospital systems and bargains with each of these systems over the 
prices of products. The network of insurer m denoted by Nm defines 
all hospital- product pairs available to the enrollees of insurer m. 
By introducing the notation Nmd for the subset of hospitals that 
provide product d in network Nm, we obtain the expression: 
Nm Udϵ{1,...,D}, jϵN      ( jd).= md
4.2.2 Value functions of a health insurer and a hospital system
When falling ill with illness d, the patient seeks treatment at a 
hospital that gives him the highest utility level. The utility function 
from the treatment of illness d at hospitals j is given by
(4.1)иijd eijßΧijd= +
where Χijd is a vector of hospital and patient characteristics such 
as travel time, hospital quality, or other characteristics, ß is the 
associated vector of parameters and eij is an i.i.d. error term that 
is distributed type 1 extreme value. We assume that getting treated 
at a hospital does not require an out-of-pocket payment from the 
patient (see below). The patient with illness d may visit any of the 
contracted hospitals that provide this treatment in the insurer's 
network or an outside option. Following GNT, we assume that the 
outside option is treatment at a hospital located outside the market. 
The outside option is denoted by j = 0, so that the associated char-
acteristics are normalized: Χi0d = 0.
Health insurer m provides its enrollees a set of treatment options at 
hospitals in its network Nm, where each option (jd) ϵ Nm listed in the 
insurance policy allows patients access to hospital j for treatment 
of disease d. Therefore, the utility function of enrollees introduced 
above results in the following expression for the probability that 
patient i with disease d chooses hospital j:
(4.2)sijd(Nm(i) )=
ijdδ
∑kϵ{0,N          } ikdδm(i),d
where δijd = ßΧijd, j ϵ {0, Nm(i),d}. The notation Nm(i),d denotes the subset of 
treatment options available to individual i enrolled at insurer m for 
treatment of illness d. Since the right hand side of equation (4.2) does 
not depend on prices and only includes product d, sijd (Nm(i)) = sijd (Nm(i),d).
200  GNT also present a modification 
of their base model to include the 
possibility that an enrollee may choose 
between different health insurers. In 
their posted premium model extension, 
the framework is as follows: (i) the 
health insurers set their network, 
(ii) the health insurers post their 
premiums simultaneously and (iii) the 
enrollees choose their health insurers. 
The bargaining process of the posted 
premium model is similar to the base 
model, except that the threat points are 
different. Since the results of the base 
model broadly align with the extended 
posted premium model, we follow the 
relatively simpler base model.
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It is important to note that GT and GNT differ in their position 
towards copayments. GT assumes that enrollees pay a premium 
to their insurer, which gets them access to the provider network 
without any additional payments, whereas GNT considers an 
extension in which they also model out-of-pocket payments (i.e., 
the negotiated base price multiplied by the coinsurance rate 
and the resource intensity of the illness). The GT model without 
copayments is in this respect similar to the GNT model with zero 
coinsurance rates. Because our empirical analysis focuses on the 
Netherlands and in the Netherlands, coinsurance as defined by 
GNT in the hospital sector is nonexistent201, we follow the approach 
of GT or, put differently, the approach of GNT with zero coinsurance 
rates. For our model this means that the utility from treatment 
does not depend on hospital prices and hence the resulting choice 
probabilities are also independent of product prices.
The ex ante expected utility to patient i from network Nm(i) is then:
(4.3)wi(Nm(i) )= ∑d=1 fid ln   ∑jϵ{0,N          }exp(δijd)m(i),d
D ( (
Aggregating over the enrollees of insurer m, we obtain:
Denoting the prices that insurer m pays to hospital j for treatment d 
by pmjd , we obtain the insurer's total cost as follows:
(4.4)TCm(Nm,pm) = ∑i=1 ∑d=1 1{m(i) = m}fid ∑jϵ{0,N     } pmjd sijd (Nm)I D
md
Following GNT, we assume that the health insurer is seeking to 
maximize the sum of the enrollee surplus (equal to wi − premiumm 
for each consumer) and the insurer's profit (equal to premiumm 
− expected costm(i) for each consumer) over all enrollees. Under 
this assumption, the value function of the health insurer is the 
difference between the ex ante expected utility of all the enrollees 
and the total payment to the hospitals treating these enrollees:
(4.5)Vm(Nm,pm) = Wm (Nm)  ̶  TCm (Nm,pm)
201  Also copayments are very 
limited. There is a yearly mandatory 
deductible that the patient pays when 
he starts using healthcare. However, the 
deductible is limited to a fixed amount. 
Since most hospital prices are higher 
than this amount, each patient receiving 
treatment at any hospital would 
generally pay the same deductible. 
Hence, deductibles are expected to 
hardly affect patient hospital choice.
Wm(Nm)=∑ 1{m(i) = m}wi(Nm)
I
i=1
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202  This is also a reasonable 
assumption in the Netherlands, where 
the provision of basic insurance is 
subject to strict rules so that Dutch 
health insurers too not only care about 
profit maximization, but also enrollee 
welfare. Having originated from social 
insurance funds, some insurers even 
explicitly state that they continue to 
carry out a social mission. See section 
4.3 for more details. 
203  If we assume stronger power on 
the enrollee or the health insurer side, 
we would have to impose a higher 
weight to the respective term (as 
discussed in Gowrisankaran et al., 2015 
and Gaynor et al., 2015).
204   In this article, we assume that 
hospitals are profit maximizers, but 
Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) 
and Gaynor et al. (2015) have shown 
that output maximization can be 
incorporated in the standard hospital 
utility function in addition to profit 
maximization by using perceived 
marginal costs instead of actual 
marginal costs.
Note that in GNT the health insurer acts as an agent for the 
employer and, thus, cares equally about both enrollee welfare and 
insurer profit202. With that, it is assumed that the incentives of 
health insurers and enrollees are perfectly aligned which implies 
that both terms in equation (4.5) will have equal weights203.
Substituting into this expression equations (4.3) and (4.4), and 
rearranging the terms, we derive the same expression in terms 
of prices and choice probabilities. Since both expected utility and 
the payment to the hospital are separable in products d, the total 
value function of a health insurer has an additive structure over the 
products. This can be seen as follows:
Vm(Nm,pm) = Wm (Nm)  ̶  TCm (Nm,pm)
=∑ 1{m(i) 
i
= m}∑ fid       ln[ ∑   exp(δijd)]
d
(
mdjϵ{0,N     }
=∑ ∑ 1{m(i) = m}f       ln[    ∑  exp(δijd)] 
d i
id (
mdjϵ{0,N     }
=∑ Wmd (Nmd)  ̶  TCmd (Nmd ,pmd) =∑Vmd (Nmd ,pmd)  
d d
 ̶  ∑   p    s    (Nm) (mjd ijd
mdjϵ{0,N     }
 ̶  ∑   p    s    (Nm) (mjd ijd
mdjϵ{0,N     }
where pm is the price vector of all product prices negotiated by 
insurer m, pmd denotes the subvector of product d's prices, Nmd 
is the subset of options for product d, Wmd(Nmd) = ∑i1{m(i) = m}fid 
ln[∑jϵ{0,Nmd} exp(δijd)] and TCmd(Nmd, pmd) = ∑d ∑i 1{m(i) = m}   fid ∑jϵ {0,Nmd} 
pmjdsijd (Nm). Since the choice probabilities do not depend on product 
prices, the enrollee surplus from each product also does not depend 
on prices of other products.
Following GT and GNT, we assume profit maximizing hospitals, 
which is typical in the health economics literature, especially 
because numerous studies found that the behavior of for-profit and 
not-for-profit hospitals is similar204. The marginal cost of providing 
115
205  Marginal costs may differ between 
insurers, for example because of 
differences in administrative costs. If 
we assume, however, that marginal 
costs are the same over insurers, we 
could drop index m from the notation of 
marginal costs.
product d in hospital j for health insurer m can then be denoted by 
mcmjd :
mcmjd = γvmjd + ϵmjd (4.6)
where vmjd denotes a fixed effect, γ is the associated parameter 
and ϵmjd is an error term. Because we assume that hospitals are 
maximizing their profits, we let each hospital system s maximize 
the total profits earned from the contracts with health insurers:
π (Ms ,Nm,pm) = ∑       ∑         ( pmjd   ̶  mcmjd) qmjd (Nm)     mϵM ( jd )ϵLs s (4.7)
where qmjd denotes the production volumes of the hospitals 
under hospital-product system s and mcmjd is the marginal cost 
of treatment d at hospital j for enrollees of insurer m.205 Because 
of our assumption on the consumer utility function, the volume 
delivered by the hospital system only depends on the set of 
treatment options included in the network and not on the prices 
of these options. The production quantities of hospital j are then 
expressed by:
qmjd (Nm) = ∑ i l{m(i) = m}f id sijd (Nm)   (4.8)
4.2.3 Bargaining problem
There are M × S potential contracts. However, in our model, 
each contract specifies the prices of treatment options that are 
contracted by the insurer and the hospital system, and not the base 
prices of the hospitals that enter the system, as in the models by 
GT and GNT. Following GT and GNT, we assume that bargaining 
occurs under complete information about the characteristics of 
enrollees and hospitals and we consider the Nash Bargaining 
solution price vector that results from the maximization of the 
product of the exponentiated value functions of both parties from 
agreement, conditional on all other prices. Based on the theoretical 
contributions by Binmore et al. (1986), Horn and Wolinsky (1988) 
and Collard-Wexler et al. (2014), it is assumed that the prices 
of each contract are negotiated conditional on the prices of all 
other contracts and that the agents do not change their strategies 
when they observe the outcome of the contracts that have already 
been concluded. That is, if one negotiating pair fails, the other 
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pairs will continue the negotiation process conditional on their 
initial assumptions regarding the pricing outcomes of the other 
pairs ('passive beliefs'). The introduction of these assumptions 
corresponds with the models that were developed in the recent 
literature on hospital-insurer negotiations (in particular, GT 
and GNT). Here, we additionally assume that both insurers and 
hospitals appoint their negotiating teams per product. Therefore, 
bargaining on one product occurs separately from other products.
Under these assumptions, the objective of the Nash bargaining 
problem of health insurer m and system s is as follows:
NBm,s(pm,s   pm,-s)
=    ∑ [ ∑ qmjd(Nm) (pmjd   ̶  mcmjd)]
x    ∑ [Vm (Nm, pm)   ̶  Vm (Nm\Ls), pm)]
d
d
s( jd)ϵL
s(m)b
m(s)b
(
(
(
(
where bs(m)and bm(s) are the bargaining weights of system s 
and health insurer m respectively. The weights characterize 
the bargaining abilities of both negotiating parties. They are 
normalized to sum up to one. pm,s and pm, ̶ s denote the insurer's 
prices of the treatment options at hospitals that participate in 
hospital system s and those that do not participate in the system, 
respectively.
The Nash equilibrium is a vector of prices that maximizes the Nash 
bargaining value specified above. Each price vector maximizes the 
value for the negotiating pair, conditional on the other prices:
p*mjd = argmax NB
m,s( pmjd ,p*m, ̶ (jd)   p*m,  ̶ s)
mjdp
(4.9)
The new notation p*m,–(jd) denotes the equilibrium price vector 
consisting of all negotiated prices between insurer m and system s 
except for pmjd.
Although each team negotiates separately, different negotiating 
teams of the same agent would generally take into account the 
effect of their decisions on patient flows for other products of 
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the same agent. However, as according to equation (4.2) patient 
flows are fully determined by the network structure (i.e., the set 
of treatment options) and not by prices, the decisions of different 
product teams of the same agent will not be dependent on 
each other. This can be seen as follows. Consider that hospital j 
negotiates with insurer m over the price of product d, conditional 
on the other prices. We partition the set of all diseases into {D',d, 
D"} = {d1, ... , dD}, where {D', d} covers the subset of products with 
which hospital j enters the network of insurer m and D'' covers 
the rest. Because m(i) is fixed, a hospital system that fails to reach 
agreement with a particular insurer regarding treatment option 
(jd) cannot capture any profit on this treatment option from the 
enrollees of this health insurer. Therefore, the disagreement 
outcome of the hospital system in negotiation over this treatment 
option will be zero. The payoff structure in bargaining between 
insurer m and hospital j over (jd) will then be:
jagree = πjd ( Nmd , pmd) + πj,D ,(NmD' , pmD')d
magree = Vmd ( Nmd , pmd) + VmD ,(NmD' , pmD') + VmD" (NmD" , pmD")d
mdisagree = Vmd ( Nmd \ j, pmd) + VmD ,(NmD' , pmD') + VmD" (NmD" , pmD")d
jdisagree = πjD' ( NmD' , pmD') d
This payoff structure implies that the difference between the 
agreement and disagreement payoffs in negotiations on any 
product d only depends on the part related to that particular 
product. In particular, jagree − jdisagree = πjd(Nmd,pmd) and magree – mdisagree
= Vmd (Nmd,pmd) – Vmd (Nmd\j,pmd). Hence, only these terms will be 
relevant for the derivation of the price pmjd. Note that bargaining 
over this price only occurs if the sum of the payoffs is positive: 
jagree − jdisagree + magree – mdisagree > 0, therefore each 'link'
(jd) included in the network must satisfy:
πjd (Nmd, pmd) + Vmd (Nmd, pmd) – Vmd (Nmd\j, pmd)
=Wmd (Nmd) – Wmd (Nmd\ j) – mcmjdqmjd(Nmd)
–     ∑   pmjd (Nmd) (qmld(Nmd\j) – qmld(Nmd)) > 0
l ≠j,lϵ{0,N     }md
d
d d
d
d d
d d
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Hence, hospital j will produce product d only if this condition is 
satisfied. The payoff structure outlined above leads to the following 
Nash bargaining problem with respect to pmjd:
where pm,−j,d corresponds to the price vector of contract prices 
of hospitals other than j in the subset of treatments options Nmd. 
The same type of Nash bargaining problem as described above is 
considered in GNT and GT, with the difference that their problem 
is formulated for a hospital's base price, keeping a product weight 
fixed in accordance to the disease weights of different diagnoses.
From the first order condition (FOC) of this problem, we derive the 
expression for product prices:
pmjd = bs(m) qmjd
+bm(s)mcmjd
Wmd(Nmd ) – Wmd(Nmd\j) +bs(m)∑ [pmkdd   ]jkmd
k ≠ j
where dmd =                            . The numerator of this ratio shows 
how many patients of insurer m with illness d will flow to hospital 
k if hospital j no longer treats this illness, and therefore dmd defines 
the disease-specific diversion share of patients with illness d 
from hospital j to hospital k. A higher value of the diversion share 
suggests a higher degree of substitution between two hospitals in 
treating this illness.
The expression for pmjd suggests that a product price of a hospital 
is increasing in the hospital's marginal costs of this product, the 
product prices of other hospitals, and net value that the inclusion 
of treatment option (jd) brings to the insurer's network. In addition 
to these factors, negotiated prices also depend on the bargaining 
abilities/weights of the hospital and the insurer. Differences in 
these parameters can explain the presence of price differences 
between health insurers, hospital locations and hospital products.
4.2.4 Merger analysis
The merger analysis considered in our article adopts a method 
proposed by GT. The method by GT allows us to derive the 
expressions of product price changes in a closed form, which 
simplifies the price comparison across products and players.
jk q q(N     \j ) –          (N     )mkd mkdmd md
qmkd
jk
mjd| md,   m,–j,dp N
max ( jagree – jdisagree)      (magree – mdisagree)d d dd m(s)bs(m)bp
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GT consider two alternative approaches to model a hospital merger 
of hospitals j and k. In the first approach, it is assumed that after 
the merger, these hospitals still negotiate prices per hospital, 
but take into account the impact of disagreement on the flow of 
patients to each other. In the second approach it is assumed that 
hospitals negotiate jointly and will charge the same price after the 
merger. Because our empirical application deals with the situation 
in which hospitals continue to charge different prices after they 
merged, we follow the first approach. Please note that because in 
our model the patient flows of different products are independent 
of each other, the problem can be split and analyzed separately for 
each product.
Drawing from GT, we analyze the situation in which two hospitals 
that enter the same network are merging and consider the 
bargaining problem for product d after their merger has taken 
place (assuming that the network covers treatment options of d 
at both hospitals). If each of the merged hospitals negotiates its 
own price of the product, but accounts for the effect on the other's 
patient flow, we obtain the following expressions for the agreement 
and disagreement payoffs in the bargaining problem of hospital j:
( j + k)      = [pmjd – mcmjd]qmjd(Nmd) + [pmkd – mcmkd]qmkd (Nmd) agree 
d
( j + k)         = [pmkd – mcmkd]qmkd(Nmd\j) disagree 
d
m      = Wmd (Nmd) – pmjd qmjd (Nmd) – ∑pmldqmld (Nmd) agree d
l≠ j
m         = Wmd (Nmd\j) – ∑pmldqmld (Nmd\j) disagree d
l≠ j
Writing down the Nash bargaining solution for this game and 
transforming the FOC of this problem, we derive the price of 
hospital j's product d after the merger, pmjd  , as follows:
pmjd    = bs(m) qmjd qmjd
(j+k) jk+bm(s)mcmjd+
Wmd(Nmd ) – Wmd(Nmd\j) pmkddmd +bs(m)∑ [pmldd   ]jlmd
l≠ j
(j+k)
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206  The substitution rates may differ 
across products, for example, because 
for some hospital products patients' 
willingness to travel might be higher, 
there is more intense competition with 
nearby hospitals over those products 
or the transparency of different product 
markets differs.
If we then take the difference between this price and the initial 
price level of hospital j, we obtain the expression for price change 
due to merger (given that the marginal costs are not affected by the 
merger):
pmjd    – pmjd = bm(s) (pmkd –  mcmkd)dmd
(j+k) jk (4.10)
The same type of derivations can be done for hospital k, with 
indices k and j changing places.
4.2.5 Heterogeneous price effects of hospital mergers
There are a few important conclusions that can be drawn from 
equation (4.10) with respect to the price effect of a hospital merger. 
The first important finding is that product d's price change after 
the merger in each hospital is increasing in the diversion share 
between these hospitals. Since the diversion share reflects the 
degree of substitution between the hospitals, this result tells us that 
a merger will increase the product's price more if the hospitals 
that partner in the merger are close substitutes with respect to that 
product. Therefore, if substitution between hospitals is stronger for 
one product than for another product206, the price increase after 
the merger will be higher for the first product and hence hospital 
mergers may lead to heterogeneous price effects across different 
products and different locations.
The second most important conclusion that follows from our model 
is that, according to equation (4.10), the price change caused by 
merger is proportional to the difference between the price and 
the marginal cost of the other hospital (i.e., the merger partner). 
Therefore, these differences also contribute to explaining the  
heterogeneity of price changes after the merger for different 
products and locations. Merging with a hospital whose price of 
product d is higher, whereas the marginal cost are lower, would 
result in a greater price increase (other things being equal).
Finally, we observe, perhaps at first sight somewhat contra-intui-
tively, that a price increase caused by merger is proportional to the 
bargaining ability bm(s) of the insurer. Thus, a health insurer with 
greater bargaining ability against hospital system s is confronted 
with a higher price increase after the merger. This result suggests 
that, although a greater relative bargaining ability of the insurer in 
comparison to hospitals provides the insurer with more leverage 
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207  Just 11% of all patients received 
treatments that cost less than 165 euro 
in 2011. The prices of the products that 
we consider in our article all exceed the 
deductible during the study period.
208  For example, the switching rate 
between health insurance companies in 
the Netherlands was 6% in 2012.
against these hospitals, this leverage advantage is reduced after the 
merger of the hospitals.
4.3 The Dutch hospital market
In this article, we estimate the price changes of a merger between 
two Dutch hospitals. From the viewpoint of the bilateral bargaining 
model, the current Dutch healthcare system bears important 
similarities with the US healthcare system. In recent decades, the 
Netherlands, like several other OECD countries, has embraced 
a market-oriented approach to healthcare. After decades of 
strict governmental supply-side regulation, the Dutch healthcare 
system is currently undergoing a transition towards regulated 
(or ‘managed’) competition (Van de Ven & Schut, 2009; 2008; 
Schut & Van de Ven, 2005). The main goal of the market-oriented 
healthcare reforms is to increase the efficiency of the system 
and its responsiveness to patients’ needs, whereas maintaining 
universal access to care (Schut & Van de Ven, 2005).
Of particular importance to this article are the introduction of 
the Health Insurance Act (HIA) in 2006 and the introduction of 
hospital-insurer bargaining in 2005. Under the HIA, all Dutch 
citizens are obliged to buy standardized individual basic health 
insurance from a private insurer. The standardized basic benefits 
package specified in the HIA is fairly comprehensive and includes 
hospital care, GP services, prescription drugs and maternity care. 
Having bought an insurance policy, the enrollee gets access to 
all hospitals of the contracted network without co-payments. As 
described in section 4.2, there is an annual deductible per adult 
individual, although most hospital product prices are higher than 
the fixed amount that is set by the deductible207 and hence the 
deductible does not play a role in patients’ hospital choices. Dutch 
health insurers are furthermore required to offer all applicants 
standardized coverage at a community-rated premium, the insurers 
have to offer all basic health insurance policies to all applicants (i.e., 
a guaranteed issue requirement) and consumers are free to choose 
their health insurer during an annual enrolment period. Risk 
equalization across insurers takes place to ensure a level playing 
field for health insurers and to prevent risk selection. The insurers’ 
market shares are relatively stable208.
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In 2005, a product classification system for hospital and medical 
specialist care was introduced. Each activity and/or service 
provided by a hospital, including outpatient care, which is 
associated with a patient’s demand for care, is referred to as a 
Diagnosis and Treatment Combination (DTC)209. Following the 
introduction of the DTC system, the scope for free negotiations 
of prices between hospitals and health insurance companies has 
gradually increased from 10% of hospital revenue in 2005, to 20% 
in 2008, to 34% in 2009 and to 70% in 2012. For the remaining 
part, hospital prices are still regulated. For products and services 
included in the free-pricing segment, each hospital typically 
renegotiates the terms of its contracts with health insurers on 
an annual basis. Dutch health insurers are allowed to engage in 
selective contracting with healthcare providers. As explained in 
section 4.2, there are several cases in which the insurer contracts 
only a subset of treatments in hospitals.
The two-stage model that underlies the bargaining theory 
developed above reflects how Dutch health insurers and hospitals 
negotiate over the products in the free-pricing segment: consumers 
buy health insurance from health insurers and health insurers 
bargain and contract with hospitals on behalf of those that they 
insure. In the early years of the reform selective contracting was 
limitedly used, but over the years, the number of health insurers 
offering contracts with restricted provider networks has increased. 
Furthermore, the available evidence on the nature of hospi-
tal-insurer negotiations in the Netherlands suggests that until 
2012, hospital-insurer bargaining focused on price, rather than on 
quality of volume of care (Ruwaard et al., 2014; Meijer et al., 2010; 
NZa, 2009). The introduction of the HIA has led to strong price 
competition between health insurers and health insurers have put 
increasing pressure on hospitals to charge lower prices (Schut & 
Van de Ven, 2011). It seems as if the threat of selective contracting, 
rather than its actual use, may already have had an impact on hos-
pital-insurer bargaining.
4.4 The merger
Dutch local and regional hospital markets are highly 
concentrated210 and mergers represent the largest change in the 
Dutch hospital industry nowadays as no hospitals have entered or 
exited the market since 2005. Between 2005 and 2012,  
209  The DTC system is based on the 
concept of Diagnosis-Related Groups 
but constitutes a newly developed 
classification system. The Dutch system 
originally contained 29,000 DTCs. In 
2007, a project was initiated to decrease 
the number of DTCs to about 3,000. This 
was known as the ‘DOT revision’ and was 
implemented in January 2012.
210  In 2006, the average HHI of Dutch 
hospitals equaled 2.350 (Halbersma et 
al., 2010) and since then no hospitals 
entered or exited the hospital market. 
Only mergers have decreased the 
number of hospitals.
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17 mergers involving 34 hospitals were cleared by the Authority for 
Consumers and Markets (ACM)211 (www.acm.nl), among which the 
merger that we study in this article. All mergers took place between 
neighboring hospitals.
The merger that we study was consummated in year t (which was 
between 2005 and 2012). The merger was notified to the ACM 
prior to taking place212. Following the notification, the ACM carried 
out a general review of the proposed merger in which they made 
prospective inferences regarding the expected anticompetitive 
effects of the merger on the market. In the Netherlands, a merger 
requires a license when there is reason to assume that ‘a dominant 
position that appreciably restricts competition on the Dutch market 
or a part thereof could arise or be strengthened as a result of the 
said concentration’ (Mededingingswet, Section 37.2). The merger 
that we study did not require a license and was cleared after the 
first general review. The decision to clear the merger evoked critisim 
by health economists, however, who argued that the prospective 
merger analysis by the antitrust authority had been lacking and 
that it was likely that the merger had created a dominant position 
for the two hospitals involved (Varkevisser & Schut, 2008). Hence, 
this merger seems to be on the enforcement margin, making it an 
interesting case for further retrospective studies.
4.4.1 The locations
The merger involved a general acute care hospital (hospital M1) and 
a neighboring general acute care hospital that also provides tertiary 
hospital care (hospital M2). Hospital M1 is located in an isolated 
geographical area, whereas hospital M2 is located in a more densely 
populated region with several other hospitals nearby. The distance 
between hospitals M1 and M2 is about 50 kilometers213. According 
to the ACM, the merging hospitals were subject to competition from 
five other hospitals before the merger took place. Prior to the merger, 
hospital M2 was the largest competitor to hospital M1 and therefore 
posed a major constraint on hospital M1’s prices, whereas hospital 
M2 had multiple competitors. After the merger, hospital M1 was 
expected to experience competitive pressure from only one rival 
hospital, whereas hospital M2 was expected to experience notable 
competitive pressure from five other hospitals214. The differences in 
competitive pressure in the markets of hospitals M1 and M2 may 
result in heterogeneous price effects of the merger (see section 4.2). 
To find out whether the merging hospitals exploited this opportunity, 
we disaggregated the merger effect for each of the two merging 
hospital locations.
211  The Authority for Consumers and 
Markets is the Dutch antitrust agency. 
The legal predecessor of the Authority 
for Consumers and Markets, the 
Netherlands Competition Authority, has 
carried out the review of some of these 
mergers. For reasons of clarity, however, 
we ascribe the decisions made by the 
Netherlands Competition Authority to 
its legal successor, which has been in 
charge since April 1, 2013: the Authority 
for Consumers and Markets.
212  According to most antitrust 
laws, mergers must be reported 
to an antitrust authority prior to 
consummation (see 15 USC §18A for 
the US and the competition laws of the 
EU Member States or EC: 2004 for the 
European Union’s rules on prior merger 
notification). The Dutch antitrust law 
is no exception (Mededingingswet, 
section 37.2).
213 1 kilometer is approximately 
0.621 miles  
214 None of these rivals provides 
tertiary hospital care.
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4.4.2. The products
In this article, we estimated the impact of the merger in three 
separate product markets that jointly make up 47.5 percent of 
the merged hospital’s turnover in the segment for which Dutch 
insurers and hospitals were allowed to freely negotiate prices 
at the time of the merger. We looked at hip replacements, knee 
replacements and cataract surgery. Most hospitals provide these 
services. In year t, 95% of all Dutch hospitals (n=97) and 2.7% of 
all Dutch Independent Treatment Centers (ITCs)215 (n=73) provided 
hip replacements, 95% (hospitals) and 7% (ITCs) provided knee 
replacements and 96% (hospitals) and 15% (ITCs) provided cataract 
surgery. These products were also provided by hospitals M1 and 
M2 and all five rivals in year t. At time of the merger, there were 
no ITCs in the regional market that offered any of the hospital 
products considered. Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics on the 
patients for each product in hospitals M1 and M2 and four rivals216 
before and after the merger.
After merger, the hospitals had an opportunity to concentrate care 
in one of the two hospital locations. This does not seem to have 
occurred, however. Even though it follows from table 4.1 that 
hospital M2 provided many more hip replacements in year t+1 
than in t-1, the provision of hip replacements in hospital M1 did 
not change significantly. The hospitals therefore do not seem to 
have concentrated care in hospital M2 after the merger. Rather, 
it seems that hospital M2 is, post-merger, better able to attract 
patients in need of hip replacements because the number of hip 
replacements performed in rival hospitals decreased slightly 
whereas the total number of patients in the market did not change 
significantly.
In hospital M1, the average age of patients undergoing knee 
replacements dropped between t-1 and t+1. Again, this does 
not seem to be an attempt to change patient flows in the 
merged hospitals, as the mean age of patients undergoing knee 
replacement surgery in hospital M2 did not change. However, 
according to hospital M1’s website, the hospital has been testing 
out an innovative procedure for knee replacements since year t for 
which only patients under 60 years old are eligible. This is likely 
unrelated to the merger, but could potentially explain the decrease 
in the patients’ average age observed in the data.
215  ITCs are comparable to 
freestanding Ambulatory Surgery 
Centers (ASCs) that operate in the US 
and UK healthcare markets (see e.g., 
Gaynor & Town, 2012; Carey et al., 
2011). Independent Treatment Centers 
(ITCs) are typically much smaller than 
general hospitals and only compete 
on a narrow range of specialties. Their 
market share is relatively small, but their 
influence has increased because they 
usually offer elective care treatments, 
focus on the free-pricing segment and 
have rapidly grown in number and size 
(NZa, 2012; 2009). The joint market 
share of all ITCs increased from 1.5 
percent (2005) to 4 percent (2007) of 
the free-pricing segment’s total returns 
(NZa, 2009) and from 1 percent (2007) 
to 2.3 per cent (2010) of total medical 
specialist care (NZa, 2012).
216  We excluded all hospitals that 
had more than 15% missing prices 
for either hip or knee replacements or 
cataract surgeries in the period t-2 to 
t+2. The fifth rival hospital was therefore 
excluded from the analysis. See section 
4.5 for more information on the 
exclusion criteria.
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Panel A. Hospital M1
Volume
Gender (% male)
Patients’ average age 
Patients’ average SES score
Panel B. Hospital M2
Volume
Gender (% male) 
Patients’ average age
Patients’ average SES score
Panel C. Rival 1
Volume
Gender (% male) 
Patients’ average age
Patients’ average SES score
Panel D. Rival 2
Volume
Gender (% male) 
Patients’ average age
Patients’ average SES score
Panel E. Rival 3
Volume
Gender (% male)
Patients’ average age
Patients’ average SES score
Panel F. Rival 4
Volume
Gender (% male)
Patients’ average age 
Patients’ average SES score
Panel G. Other hospitals
Volume
Gender (% male) 
Patients’ average age
Patients’ average SES score
t-1
174
0.28
68
0.05
390
0.34
68
0.31
165
0.27
70
-0.22
237
0.32
70
0.15
136 
0.34 
70 
-0.83
169
0.34
69
0.24
231 (14)
0.33
69 (0.37)
-0.04 (0.05)
t-1
223
0.34
64
0.15
271
0.34
69
0.39
164
0.27
71
-0.06
162
0.32
68
0.15
146
0.40
70
-0.76
101
0.38
70
0.09
196 (12)
0.32
69 (0.27)
0 (0.05)
t-1
387
0.38
72
0.09
2144
0.41
72
0.35
1026
0.41
75
-0.09
881
0.43
73
0.22
650
0.38
75
-1.01
855
0.43
75
0.17
1590 (146)
0.39
73 (0.32)
0.01 (0.05)
t+1
175
0.38
68
-0.14
511
0.35
70
0.42
154
0.36
71
-0.05
195
0.34
68
0.12
114
0.28
62
-0.88
155
0.26
73
0.46
234 (15)
0.34
69 (0.25)
-0.18 (0.08)
t+1
293
0.43
56
0
299
0.32
69
0.48
135
0.29
69
-0.09
162
0.38
68
0.28
118 
0.29
70
-0.69
151
0.35
71
0.36
199 (12)
0.33
69 (0.26)
-0.11 (0.07)
t+1
361
0.35
73
-0.06
2113
0.40
73
0.42
1045
0.37
75
-0.02
1088
0.41
72
0.26
972
0.42
74
-0.96
763
0.44
75
0.4
1545 (137)
0.41
73 (0.29)
-0.09 (0.07)
Table 4.1 — Descriptive statistics
Hip replacements Knee  replacements Cataract surgery
Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. We excluded all hospitals that had more than 15% missing prices for either hip or knee 
replacements or cataract surgeries in the period t-2 to t+2. The fifth rival hospital was therefore excluded from this analysis. Panel G displays 
the descriptive statistics of the hospitals other than hospitals M1, M2 and the rival hospitals. Within panel G, 51 hospitals performed hip 
replacements, 56 hospitals performed knee replacements and 57 hospitals performed cataract surgeries. The rows on volume only report cases 
which have a valid gender, age and SES-score.
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217  In fact, there are six health insurers 
active in the region. However, for the 
sixth health insurer, we did not have 
valid prices in the post-merger year (t-1) 
for the merging hospitals M1 and M2. 
This health insurer was therefore not 
included in the difference-in-differences 
estmates or in any other analysis. The 
effect of excluding this health insurer 
for hospital M1 and hospital M2 is most 
likely neligible, however, because the 
health insurer only accounts for less 
than 2% of all hip, knee and cataract 
patients in hospital M1 and M2.
218  For reasons of confidentiality, we 
cannot report the national market shares 
of the health insurers.
4.4.3. The health insurers
At the time of the merger, at least five health insurers were active 
in the region217. Four of these were independent health insurers, 
whereas the fifth was in fact a joint purchasing organization 
representing the majority of smaller health insurers. For reasons of 
clarity, we will henceforth treat this purchasing entity as a health 
insurer. All five health insurers are active on the national insurance 
market. According to table 4.1, the volume of patients has not 
changed significantly across hospitals, indicating that health 
insurers did not shift enrollees away from the merged hospitals to 
rival hospitals in t+1.
Table 4.2 shows the insurers’ market share for each product and 
for each hospital in years t-1 and t+1. The market shares have not 
changed significantly over the years.
Although insurer 1 has the largest market share per product 
per hospital (its market share ranges from 61% to 84%) it is not 
the largest health insurer nationally218. Regional market shares 
reflect the continuing effect of the former regional legal monopoly 
positions of local health insurers (a policy that was abolished in 
1992) (Halbersma et al., 2010).
Panel A. Hospital M1
Hip replacements 
Knee replacements 
Cataract surgery
Panel B. Hospital M2
Hip replacements 
Knee replacements 
Cataract surgery
Table 4.2 — Health insurers’ market share per product per hospital in t-1 and t+1
t-1
0.76
0.69 
0.84
0.62 
0.69 
0.70
t+1
0.74
0.61
0.77
0.62
0.62
0.71
Market share 
insurer 1
t-1
0.05
0.05
0.01
0.08
0.04
0.04
t+1
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.06
0.03
0.05
Market share 
insurer 2
t-1
0.09
0.16
0.09
0.19
0.17
0.16
t+1
0.13
0.20
0.09
0.17
0.20
0.14
Market share 
insurer 3
t-1
0.05
0.06
0.04
0.04
0.01
0.02
t+1
0.02
0.08
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.03
Market share 
insurer 4
t-1
0.05
0.05
0.02
0.07
0.09
0.08
t+1
0.07
0.06 
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.08
Market share 
insurer 5
Notes: The health insurers’ market shares are based on the number of cases per hospital-insurer-product combination.
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4.5 Empirical model specification
We use data on hospital-insurer negotiated contract prices in the 
Netherlands for each of the three hospital products considered, to 
investigate whether the merger between hospitals M1 and M2 has 
led to price changes and if so, whether this effect varies between 
locations, payers and products. There are several ways to calculate 
price changes post-merger. The first method is to calculate the 
post-merger price change for each hospital product indexed on, 
for example, the average price change over all hospitals. However, 
these price changes would only give us a crude indication of the 
effect of the merger as it does not take account of changes in prices 
that would also have occurred if the merger had not taken place.
Although our model focuses on the price effects that follow from 
the interaction between health insurers and hospitals, large 
post-merger price increases for merged hospitals in comparison 
to prices among a control group could be consistent with at least 
four hypotheses according to the empirical literature (Haas-Wilson 
& Garmon, 2011; Adams & Noether, 2011): (i) the merger created 
or enhanced the hospital’s power to raise its prices for general 
acute inpatient services; (ii) between the years t-1 and t+1 there 
was an increase in the product complexity of inpatient cases or an 
increase in the severity of patients’ illness in the merging hospitals 
relative to non-merging hospitals; (iii) between the years t-1 and 
t+1, the quality of care associated with the products improved at 
the merging hospitals relative to non-merging hospitals, which 
increased value and (perhaps) cost and (iv) pre-merger prices at 
the merging hospitals were lower than the competitive equilibrium 
prices. In other words, the post-merger price increases at the 
merged hospital could be an adjustment towards equilibrium 
(Garmon & Haas-Wilson, 2011). We call this latter phenomenon 
‘catching up’. When interpreting our results in section 4.8, we will 
also reflect on these alternative explanations, arguing that the first 
explanation is the most likely in our case.
Because we wanted to control for price changes that would have 
occurred even if the merger had not taken place, we used a  
difference-in-differences (DID) model in which price changes at the 
merging hospitals are compared to price changes among a group of 
comparison hospitals which were unaffected by the merger 
(i.e., the control group). The identifying assumption of a difference- 
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in-differences estimation is that trends (price trends) would be 
the same in both groups in the absence of the event (merger). 
This assumption is referred to as the ‘common trend assumption’. 
We visually investigated whether the common trend assumption 
applies by using data on multiple periods.
To examine the effect of aggregating the merger price effect, we 
estimated difference-in-differences models at various aggregation 
levels. As a benchmark, we started with the most aggregated model. 
In other words, we first estimated the price effect for the merged 
hospital fully aggregated over hospital locations, products and 
insurers. We then disaggregated this effect stepwise to ultimately 
arrive at the most differentiated model in which we fully differen-
tiated the merger price effect across hospital locations, products and 
insurers. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the different models.
We first estimated the most aggregated model:
ln pjt  =  α + λ · POSTt + δ · POSTt · MERGEDj + ϑj + εjt (4.11)
where pjt is the weighted average hospital negotiated price. POSTt 
is one in year t+1 (the post-merger year) and zero in year t-1 (the 
pre-merger year), MERGEDj is one for the merger hospitals and 
zero for the control group hospitals, λ ∙ POSTt denotes the change 
in the average price in year t+1 compared to year t-1, δ is the 
DID estimator (i.e., the average treatment effect on the treated; 
see Blundell & Costa Dias, 2009) and ϑj is a hospital fixed effect. 
To account for potential endogeneity of the merging policy, we 
matched a control group to the event group (i.e., hospitals M1 and 
M2). In this control group, we included all Dutch hospitals that 
provided the three products and excluded any other hospitals that 
also merged between years t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treatment 
Centers.
Models
Baseline model (equation (4.11)) 
First disaggregated model
Second disaggregated model
Third disaggregated model
Fourth disaggregated model
Fifth disaggregated model
Disaggregated model
Merger price effect
Fully aggregated over hospital locations, products and insurers
Aggregated over hospital products and insurers; disaggregated across locations
Aggregated over hospital locations and insurers; disaggregated across products
Aggregated over insurers; disaggregated across products and locations
Aggregated over hospital locations and products; disaggregated across insurers
Aggregated over hospital products; disaggregated across insurers and locations
Fully disaggregated across hospital locations, products and insurers
Table 4.3 — Continuum of aggregated and disaggregated models
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219  We also estimated the models 
using the per hospital-product revenue 
in t-1 as a weighting factor for the 
aggregation over products. The results 
of these models do not differ from 
the main model and are therefore not 
included in this article. The results are 
available from the authors upon request.
220  We also wanted to know whether 
our disaggregated model was robust 
to hospital-specific covariates. As a 
sensitivity check, we therefore also 
included hospitals-specific covariates in 
an additional difference-in-differences 
model (i.e., the number of patients, 
the percentage of males, the average 
(standardized) socio-economic status 
score, the average age of the patients 
and the weighted market share 
per hospital). The results using this 
model did not differ from the other 
disaggregated model effects and are 
therefore not included in this article. The 
results are available from the authors 
upon request.
To estimate the most aggregated difference-in-differences model we 
aggregated the patient-level hospital data to an average price per 
hospital. It is important to note that in the Netherlands, negotiated 
prices differ between health insurers but not between patients 
with the same health insurer who are treated in the same hospital. 
Therefore, we can aggregate the data to hospital-insurer level 
without a loss of information. Furthermore, due to aggregation, 
we do not have to consider the correlation between prices within 
each hospital-insurer combination, which would otherwise lead to 
biased standard errors (see for example Thompson, 2011; Donald 
& Lang, 2007 and Bertrand et al., 2004). First, we calculated an 
average price per product for each hospital-insurer pair. Second, 
we aggregated these prices over the insurers to an average price 
for each hospital-product combination, whereby we weighted 
the prices with the insurer’s specific volume shares in year t-1. 
Third, we aggregated over the products to an average price per 
hospital, whereby we weighted the hospital-product prices with 
the market-wide revenue shares for each product in t-1219. We 
calculated an average price for the merged entity M1 + M2 by 
weighting the prices for hospitals M1 and M2 with their cor-
responding revenue shares in year t-1. We then removed the 
aggregations stepwise to show the effect of aggregating over 
products, locations and insurers until, finally, our results were dis-
aggregated over all three sources of heterogeneity.
We investigated whether our results from the disaggregated model 
were robust to changes in the control groups by using six different 
control groups220: (1) all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, 
excluding hospitals that also merged between years t-2 and t+2 
and Independent Treatment Centers; (2) control group 1, excluding 
all university hospitals; (3) control group 2, excluding rivals of 
the merged hospitals; (4) control group 3, excluding the hospitals 
with low market power; (5) control group 3, excluding all hospitals 
with low health insurers concentration; and (6) control group 3, 
excluding hospitals of a different size to hospitals M1 and M2. We 
thus had twelve control groups: six for each hospital. Table 4.4 
summarizes the number of hospitals in the control group.
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The reasons behind the various exclusion criteria for the control 
groups were as follows. Control group 2 excludes all university 
hospitals because these generally spend more time on research 
and education and they usually treat patients with more complex 
problems than general acute care hospitals. This could result 
in different price trends. Control group 3 excludes the merged 
hospital’s rivals, which were identified as such in the ex ante 
merger review by both the merged hospitals and the ACM. If the 
merger hospitals exercise their newly acquired market power 
by raising prices, their rivals may respond by also raising their 
prices (see e.g., Dafny, 2009; Gaynor & Vogt, 2003). Because of this 
rival-effect, rivals are excluded from control group 3. Hospitals 
with limited market power are excluded from control group 4. 
It is generally assumed that hospitals with a 55 percent market 
share or higher have significant market power (NZa, 2008; EC, 
2004). Both hospital M1 and hospital M2 have a weighted average 
market share221 of 55 or higher for all three products. In control 
group 4, we therefore only take into account those hospitals that 
also have significant market power. We ranked the hospitals from 
control group 3 according to their weighted average market share 
and excluded the hospitals in the bottom quintile. Furthermore, 
Panel A. Hip replacements
Control group 1
Control group 2
Control group 3
Control group 4 
Control group 5 
Control group 6
Panel B. Knee replacements
Control group 1 
Control group 2 
Control group 3
Control group 4 
Control group 5 
Control group 6
Panel C. Cataract surgery
Control group 1 
Control group 2 
Control group 3
Control group 4 
Control group 5 
Control group 6
55 
50 
46
38 
41 
36
60
56
52
46 
44 
44
61
55
51
49 
42 
36
55 
50 
46
38 
41 
40
60 
56
52
46 
44 
44
61 
55 
51
49 
42 
45
Table 4.4 — Number of hospitals in control groups for hospitals M1 and M2
Hospital M1 Hospital M2
Notes: Control group 1 includes all 
Dutch hospitals that provide the 
product, excluding hospitals that also 
merged between years t-2 and t+2 and 
Independent Treatment Centers; control 
group 2 is control group 1 excluding all 
university hospitals; control group 3 is 
control group 2 excluding rivals of the 
merged hospitals; control group 4 is 
control group 3 excluding the hospitals 
with low market power; control group 5 
is control group 3 excluding all hospitals 
with low health insurers concentration 
and control group 6 is control group 3 
excluding hospitals of a different size to 
hospitals M1 and M2.
221  Measured by the inverse LOgit 
Competition Index – see section 4.6 for 
more information
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to control for the effect of health insurers’ concentration in each 
hospital in control group 5, we ranked the hospitals according 
to health insurers’ HHI and excluded the hospitals in which the 
insurers’ HHI was in the bottom quintile. Finally, in control group 
6, we matched the hospitals that were in control group 3 with the 
volume of the merged hospitals. Hospital M2 had a much higher 
volume than hospital M1 and this difference in volume may have 
reflected different costs per unit product. We therefore matched 
two groups of equally sized hospitals with hospitals M1 and M2. 
For hospital M2, we ranked the hospitals by volume per product 
and excluded the bottom quintile. For hospital M1, we ranked the 
hospitals by volume for each product and excluded the top quintile 
(for hip replacements and cataract surgeries) or the bottom quintile 
(for knee replacements).
4.6 Data
We used a comprehensive nationwide patient-level dataset containing 
all inpatient and outpatient visits at all hospitals in the Netherlands. 
For each visit, the patient’s zip code, age (year of birth), gender, health 
insurer, and DTC were observed, as well as the price negotiated for 
each hospital-insurer-product combination between years t-2 and 
t+2. Access to all patient-level data including negotiated prices from 
all insurers makes our dataset unique. The patient-level data that 
we used came from the insurers’ claims administration and hospital 
registries, and was provided by the Dutch Healthcare Authority.
We focused on three products for which prices are freely 
negotiable: hip replacements222, knee replacements223 (both 
orthopedics) and cataract surgery224 (ophthalmology). In year 
t-1, these product markets jointly accounted for 47.5 percent of 
turnover in the free-pricing segment at the merging hospitals225. 
We checked for obvious outliers in the negotiated price data by 
studying the following for each outlier: the average price of the hos-
pital-product combination; the average price of the health insur-
er-product combination; the price change in the hospital-product 
combination; the price change in the health insurer-product 
combination; and the price change in the hospital-insurer-product 
combination over the years. Only if the price deviated markedly 
from all the averages excluded the observation from the analysis226. 
In all other cases, we could not detect measurement error with 
certainty and we kept the prices in the dataset. All hospitals where 
222  The definition used in the Dutch 
hospital product classification system is 
‘joint degeneration of pelvic/hip/upper 
leg; surgery with clinical admission and 
joint prosthesis’.
223  The definition used in the Dutch 
hospital product classification system 
is ‘joint degeneration of knee; surgery 
with clinical admission and joint 
prosthesis’.
224  The definition used in the Dutch 
hospital product classification system 
is ‘cataract; outpatient treatment with 
intervention’.
225  In hospital M1, hip replacements 
represented 18 percent, knee 
replacements represented 27 percent, 
and cataract surgeries represented 
6 percent of the turnover in the 
competitive segment in year t-1. 
In hospital M2, hip replacements 
represented 16 percent, knee 
replacements represented 14 percent, 
and cataract surgeries represented 
14 percent of the turnover in the 
competitive segment in year t-1. By 
way of comparison: in control group 
1, hip replacements represented 15 
percent, knee replacements represented 
14 percent, and cataract surgeries 
represented 14 percent of the turnover 
in the competitive segment in year t-1.
226  In total, 73 hip replacements 
(n=66,437 before cleaning), 57 knee 
replacements (n=61,404 before 
cleaning) and 281 cataract surgeries 
(n=47,6205 before cleaning) were 
excluded from the dataset.
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more than 15% of prices were missing for one or more years 
between t-2 and t+2 were excluded from the dataset227.
The pre-merger price was based on data from the year preceding 
the merger (t-1) and the post-merger price was based on data 
from the year after the merger (t+1). Table 4.5 presents summary 
statistics on the volume and mean prices of the products within 
hospital M1, hospital M2 and control group 1.
Hospitals with limited market power are excluded from control 
group 4. The weighted average market share that was used to 
determine the hospitals’ market power was based on the LOgit 
Competition Index (LOCI), developed by Akosa Antwi et al. (2006; 
2009). The application of the method is explained in Gaynor and 
Town (2012) and NZa (2014). First, we calculated the hospitals’ 
market share for each product in each zip code. The market share 
of hospital j for product d in zip code z is defined as sjd,z = 
where qjd,z is the total number of patients at hospital j (j=1,..,J) 
for product d (d=1,2,3) in zip code z (z=1,...,Z). Second, for each 
hospital and product, we calculated a weighted average market 
share                         ,where we weighted each market 
share with its share in hospital j, i.e., wjd,z =        .
∑j =1
J qjd,z
qjd,z
sjd =∑z =1wjd,zsjd,zZ
∑z =1
Z qjd,z
qjd,z
Notes: The hospitals’ volume per product in this table slightly deviates from the hospitals’ volume per product reported in table 4.1. In this 
table we only report the records with a valid price, whereas in table 4.1 only records with a valid gender, age and SES-score per product per 
hospital are reported. The mean prices for each hospital are the averaged over all patients. The mean price for control group 1 is the average 
over the mean prices of the hospitals within control group 1. The standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel A. Hospital M1
Volume
Mean price (in €)
Panel B. Hospital M2
Volume
Mean price (in €)
Panel C. Control group 1
Volume
Mean price (in €)
t-1
172 
9189.58
(348.00)
389 
9181.96
(144.25)
224
9045.00 
(338.64)
t-1
222 
11022.98
(494.94)
271 
10959.49
(185.30)
189
10592.34 
(473.51)
t-1
381 
1405.00 
(40.78)
2140 
1400.10 
(20.34)
1520
1340,94 
(72.83)
t+1
173 
10188.05 
(559.08)
503 
8991.34 
(109.09)
227
9160.96 
(620.08)
t+1
282 
11291.41 
(651.32)
295 
10321.76 
(245.90)
194
10608.52
(786.32)
t+1
355
1421.27
(45.08)
2077 
1313.40
(29.83)
1498
1349.43 
(104.12)
Table 4.5 — Volume and mean prices for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery in hospitals M1, M2 and control group 1
Hip replacements Knee  replacements Cataract surgeries
227  For hip replacements, 31 out of 90 
hospitals had more than 15% missing 
prices in one or more years in the 
period t- 2 and t+2 and were therefore 
excluded. For knee replacements, 25 
out of 89 hospitals had more than 15% 
missing prices in one or more years in 
the period t-2 to t+2 and were therefore 
excluded. For cataract operations, 25 
out of 89 hospitals had more than 15% 
missing prices in one or more years in 
the period t-2 to t+2 and were therefore 
excluded. The threshold of 15% was 
arbitrary. As a sensitivity check, we 
therefore also used other thresholds 
for the disaggregated model. This had 
no effect on the overall results or the 
conclusions of the article. The results are 
available upon request by the authors.
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228  Although it is also possible to 
calculate the hospitals’ HHI, we opted 
for the weighted average market share 
that was based on the LOgit Competition 
Index (LOCI) because market delineation 
is necessary for the hospitals’ HHI (in 
contrast to the insurers’ HHI), but the 
use of market delineation methods 
in healthcare markets is the subject 
of increasing criticism (e.g., Elzinga & 
Swisher, 2011).
229  Measured by the inverse LOgit 
Competition Index – see section 4.6 for 
more information.
The insurer’s HHI that was used to construct control group 5 is 
based on the insurer’s market shares for each product and ranged 
from zero to one228. The insurer’s HHI for hospital j and product 
d: insurer’s HHIjd =                    ,where qmjd is the total number of 
patients of insurer m (m=1, ...,M) in hospital j for product d.
4.7 Empirical results
To gain a picture of the change in the market structure as a result 
of the merger, we calculated the market share of the combined 
entity M1 + M2 for each product and compared it to the weighted 
average of the separate market shares of hospitals M1 and M2. 
Both calculations were based on the pre-merger market shares 
(i.e., from year t-1)229. As expected, the weighted average market 
shares of the hospitals’ products increased as a result of the 
merger. The increase is from 76.7% to 82.5% for hip replacements, 
from 78.2% to 85.7% for knee replacements, and from 83.5% to 
86.6% for cataract surgeries. In table 4.6, we present the diversion 
shares of hospitals M1 and M2 that follow from the bargaining 
model presented in section 4.2. Diversion shares reflect the degree 
of substitution between hospitals. As indicated in section 4.2, a 
higher value of the diversion share suggests a higher degree of 
substitution between two hospitals in treating the same disease.
From table 4.6 it follows that the diversion shares of hospital M1 
to hospital M2 are much higher. Hospital M1 is located in a more 
isolated region with hospital M2 being its strongest competitor 
pre-merger. As expected, a large share of patients is diverted 
to hospital M2 once hospital M1 is not available. If the more 
centrally located hospital M2 would not be available, however, 
∑m =1
M 2((∑m =1M qmjd
qmjd
Notes: The diversion shares are calculated using a conditional logit model of hospital choice, following Capps et al. (2003). We used 
patient-level data from t-1 to estimate the model, which included the travel time between the patient’s zip code and hospital location, 
a dummy indicating whether the patient is older or younger than 65, a dummy for the patient’s gender and the socio-economic status 
score for the patient’s zip code.
To \ From
M1 
M2
M1
-
0.735
M1
- 
0.663
M1
- 
0.850
M2
0.105 
-
M2
0.158 
-
M2
0.034 
-
Table 4.6 — Diversion shares to/from hospitals M1 and M2 (in t-1)
Hip replacements Knee  replacements Cataract surgeries
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only few patients are expected to be diverted to hospital M1. When 
comparing the diversion shares over products, we find that the 
variation in diversion shares across products within each hospital is 
much smaller than the variation in diversion shares across hospital 
M1 and M2 for each product. Table 4.7 shows the average price 
increases for hip replacements, knee replacements and cataract 
surgeries for control group 1 and the merged hospitals M1 and M2, 
indexed on the average price in control group 1 in year t-1.
The table suggests that following the merger, both hospital 
locations charged different prices. As argued in section 4.4, the 
differences in competition intensity between the markets of 
hospitals M1 and M2, may induce the merged hospital to charge 
different prices. The prices for hip replacements did not change 
substantially between years t-2 and t+2 in control group 1. In 
comparison to the average control group prices in year t-1, the 
prices for hip replacements in hospital M1 increased by 13 percent 
after the merger (year t). This was the most substantial deviation 
from the average prices of control group 1 for year t-1.
As explained in section 4.5, however, price changes only give us 
a crude indication of the effect of the merger because they do not 
control for changes in prices that would have occurred anyway. We 
therefore estimate a model in which price changes at the merging 
hospitals are compared to price changes at a group of comparison 
hospitals which were unaffected by the merger (i.e., a difference- 
in-differences model). We visually investigate the common trend 
Notes: Indexed on the average price in control group 1 in year t-1; that is, the average price in control group 1 in t-1 is 100. 
The price for the control group is averaged over the mean prices of the hospitals in control group 1.
Panel A. Hospital M1
Hip replacements
Knee replacements
Cataract surgery
Panel B. Hospital M2
Hip replacements
Knee replacements
Cataract surgery
t-2
99
101
101
99
100
99
t-2
99
99
98
99
99
98
t+1
113
107
104
99
97
96
t+1
101
99
99
101
99
99
t
110
105
102
97
95
94
t
101
100
99
101
100
99
t-1
102
104
103
102
103
103
t-1
100
100
100
100
100
100
t+2
111
105
100
99
97
94
t+2
100
101
95
100
101
95
Table 4.7 — Price changes of hospitals M1, M2 and the control group pre- and post-merger (indexed on the average 
price in control group 1 in year t-1)
Hospital Control group 1
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assumption on which the DID model is based. Figures 4.1-4.3 
suggest that the pre-merger price change in the merged hospital 
did not deviate substantially from the pre-merger price changes in 
control group 1.
Notes: The prices plotted for control group 1 are averaged over all hospitals in control group 1. Control group 1 
includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also merged between years t-2 and 
t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers.
FIGURE 4.1 — Average price development hip replacements in hospitals M1, M2 and control group 1
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Notes: The prices plotted for control group 1 are averaged over all hospitals in control group 1. Control group 1 
includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also merged between years t-2 
and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers.
FIGURE 4.2 — Average price development knee replacements in hospitals M1, M2 and control group 1
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Table 4.8 presents the results of the difference-in-differences model 
aggregated over locations, insurers and products.
Notes: Models estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors in parentheses under 
coefficients. In this model, hospitals M1 and M2 together are compared to control group 1. Control group 1 
includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also merged between years 
t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers. We aggregated the patient-level hospital data to a mean 
price per hospital. First, we calculated an average price per product for each hospital-insurer pair. Second, 
we aggregated these prices over the insurers to an average price for each hospital-product combination, 
whereby we weighted the prices with the insurer’s specific volume shares in year t-1. Third, we aggregated 
over the products to an average price per hospital, whereby we weighted the hospital-product prices with 
the market-wide revenue shares for each product in t-1. We calculated an average price for the merged 
entity M1 + M2, by weighting the prices for hospitals M1 and M2 with their corresponding revenue shares 
in year t-1.
a For clarity reasons, we do not report the hospital dummies here.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
(intercept)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) 
Post-merger price change
Observations 
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
8.869*** 
(0.029)
0.009 
(0.009)
-0.017 
(0.057)
54 
0.719
0.422
Table 4.8 — Merger effect aggregated over all three products, health insurers and hospital locationsa.
Hospitals M1 & M2
Notes: The prices plotted for control group 1 are averaged over all hospitals in control group 1. Control group 1 
includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also merged between years t-2 
and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers.
FIGURE 4.3 — Average price development cataract surgery in hospitals M1, M2 and control group 1
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Table 4.8 shows that no significant merger effect was observed when 
the result was aggregated over locations, insurers and products.
In table 4.9, we again show the price effect, aggregated over 
insurers, products and locations (panel A, column 1) but we then 
disaggregated the effect by location (panel A, column 2 and 3), by 
product (panels B to D, column 1), by location and product (panels 
B to D, columns 2 and 3), by insurer (panel E, column 1), and, 
finally, by insurer and location (panel E, columns 2 and 3).
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Panel A. Aggregated over insurers & products
(intercept)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ)
Post-merger price change
Observations
R-Squared 
Adjusted R-Squared
Panel B. Hip replacements: aggregated over insurers
(intercept)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ)
Post-merger price change
Observations
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
Panel C. Knee replacements: aggregated over insurers
(intercept)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) 
Post-merger price change
Observations
R-Squared 
Adjusted R-Squared
Panel D Cataract surgery: aggregated over insurers
(intercept)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ)
Post-merger price change
8.869***
(0.029)
0.008
(0.008) 
0.053
(0.057)
54
0.725 
0.434
9.130***
(0.026)
0.014*
(0.007) 
0.090*
(0.053)
57
0.745 
0.476
9.311***
(0.031)
0.004
(0.008) 
0.021
(0.062)
62
0.709 
0.403
7.249***
(0.028)
-0.015**
(0.007) 
0.027
(0.057)
8.869***
(0.029)
0.008
(0.008) 
-0.053
(0.057)
54
0.720 
0.423
9.130***
(0.026)
0.014*
(0.007) 
-0.035
(0.053)
57
0.734 
0.453
9.311***
(0.031)
0.004
(0.008) 
-0.064
(0.062)
62
0.707 
0.399
7.249***
(0.028)
-0.015**
(0.007)
-0.049
(0.057)
8.869***
(0.029) 
0.009
(0.009) 
-0.017
(0.057)
54
0.719 
0.422
9.130***
(0.027)
0.014*
(0.007) 
0.005
(0.053)
57
0.733 
0.452
9.311***
(0.031)
0.003
(0.008) 
-0.021
(0.063)
57
0.708 
0.401
7.249***
(0.029)
-0.015**
(0.007) 
-0.038
(0.057)
Table 4.9 — Merger effect for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery stepwise disaggregationa
Hospitals M1 & M2 Hospital M1 Hospital M2
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Notes: Models estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. In this model, hospitals M1, M2 and 
M1 and M2 together are compared to control group 1. Control group 1 includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that 
also merged between years t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers. The data for the model in Panel A, columns 2 & 3 is aggregated over health 
insurers and products: (i) we calculated an average price per product for each hospital-insurer pair, (ii) we aggregated these prices over the insurers to 
an average price for each hospital-product combination, whereby we weighted the prices with the insurer’s specific volume shares in year t-1 and (iii) we 
aggregated over the products to an average price per hospital, whereby we weighted the hospital-product prices with the market-wide revenue shares 
for each product in t-1. The data for the model in Panels B, C & D, columns 2 & 3 is aggregated over health insurers: (i) we calculated an average price per 
product for each hospital-insurer pair, and (ii) we aggregated these prices over the insurers to an average price for each hospital-product combination, 
whereby we weighted the prices with the insurer’s specific volume shares in year t-1. The data for the model in Panel E, column 2 & 3 is aggregated for 
the control group as in Panel A. For the merged hospital entity M1+M2 (column 1) the data is aggregated: (i) we calculated an average price per product 
for each hospital-insurer pair, (ii) we aggregated these prices over the insurers to an average price for each hospital-product combination, whereby we 
weighted the prices with the insurer’s specific volume shares in year t-1. We calculated an average price for the merged entity M1 + M2, by weighting the 
prices for hospitals M1 and M2 with their corresponding revenue shares in year t-1.
a For clarity reasons, we do not report the hospital dummies here. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Observations
R-Squared 
Adjusted R-Squared
Panel E. Per insurer: aggregated over products
(intercept)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) 
Post-merger price change insurer 1
Post-merger price change insurer 2
Post-merger price change insurer 3
Post-merger price change insurer 4
Post-merger price change insurer 5
Observations
R-Squared 
Adjusted R-Squared
63
0.697 
0.378
8.869***
(0.029)
0.008
(0.008) 
0.074
(0.057) 
0.049
(0.057) 
-0.137**
(0.057)
0.115
(0.057)
0.106*
(0.057)
53
0.796 
0.549
63
0.697 
0.378
8.869***
(0.029)
0.008
(0.008)
-0.052
(0.057)
-0.032
(0.057)
-0.070
(0.057)
-0.019
(0.057)
-0.046
(0.057)
53
0.728 
0.398
57
0.693 
0.371
8.869***
(0.029)
0.008
(0.008) 
-0.008
(0.057) 
-0.008
(0.057) 
-0.088
(0.057) 
0.054
(0.057) 
-0.011
(0.057)
54
0.742
0.430
Table 4.9 — Merger effect for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery stepwise disaggregationa
Hospitals M1 & M2 Hospital M1 Hospital M2
If we only disaggregate by location, product or insurer, no significant 
merger effect is found. However, if we disaggregate by both product and 
location, we find that the merger led to significantly increased prices 
for hip replacements in hospital M1, by a total of 9 percentage points. 
This was the overall price effect of the merger for hip replacements in 
hospital M1. When the price effect was estimated over hospital locations 
and products, the effect disappeared. Also, if we disaggregated by 
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Notes: Models estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. In this model, hospital 
M1 and M2 are compared to control group 1 which includes all hospitals excluding other merging hospitals and Independent Treatment 
Centers. The data for this model is aggregated for the control group as follows: (i) we calculated an average price per product for each 
hospital-insurer pair, (ii) we aggregated these prices over the insurers to an average price for each hospital-product combination, whereby 
we weighted the prices with the insurer’s specific volume shares in year t-1. For the merging hospitals the data is aggregated as follows: an 
average price per product for each hospital-insurer pair.
a For clarity reasons, we do not report the hospital dummies here. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Panel A. Hospital M1
(intercept)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ)
Post-merger price change insurer 1
Post-merger price change insurer 2
Post-merger price change insurer 3
Post-merger price change insurer 4
Post-merger price change insurer 5
Observations 
R-Squared 
Adjusted R-Squared
Panel B. Hospital M2
(intercept)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ)
Post-merger price change insurer 1
Post-merger price change insurer 2
Post-merger price change insurer 3
Post-merger price change insurer 4
Post-merger price change insurer 5
Observations
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
9.130*** 
(0.026)
0.014* 
(0.007)
0.113** 
(0.053)
0.099* 
(0.053)
-0.118**
(0.053)
0.157*** 
(0.053)
0.147*** 
(0.053)
57 
0.828 
0.617
9.130***
(0.026)
0.014*
(0.007)
-0.032
(0.053)
-0.029
(0.053)
-0.049
(0.053)
-0.021
(0.053)
-0.044
(0.053)
57
0.738
0.417
9.311*** 
(0.031)
0.004
(0.008) 
0.049
(0.062) 
0.024
(0.062) 
-0.153**
(0.062) 
0.089
(0.062) 
0.080
(0.062)
62 
0.767 
0.487
9.311***
(0.031) 
0.004
(0.008)
-0.066
(0.062) 
-0.035
(0.062)
-0.084
(0.062) 
-0.016
(0.062) 
-0.049
(0.062)
62 
0.716
0.375
7.249***
(0.028)
-0.015**
(0.007)
0.037
(0.057)
-0.053
(0.057)
-0.114**
(0.057)
0.067
(0.057)
0.059
(0.057)
63
0.740 
0.429
7.249***
(0.028)
-0.015**
(0.007)
-0.051
(0.057)
-0.016
(0.057)
-0.074
(0.057)
-0.010 
(0.057)
-0.022
(0.057)
63 
0.706
0.354
Table 4.10 — Merger effect for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery per health insurer in hospitals M1 & M2a
Hip replacements Knee  replacements Cataract surgeries
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insurer and location, we found that the merger only resulted in price 
changes for specific health insurers and only at hospital M1.
In table 4.10, we disaggregate the merger effect by location, 
product and insurer.
In section 4.4 we explained that we disaggregated the post-merger 
price change for each hospital location to see whether the merging 
hospital differentiated a potential price increase after merger across 
locations. Table 4.7 suggested that the hospitals had done so and when 
we use the difference-in-differences approach we also found that the 
post-merger increase in prices for hip replacements in hospital M1 
varied significantly from the control group, whereas the prices for hip 
replacements in hospital M2 were unaffected by the merger. Apparently, 
the merged hospital differentiated its prices across locations.
We also disaggregated the effect of the merger for each product. 
We found that the price effects of the merger varied significantly 
between hospital products. Specifically, the merger resulted in 
higher prices for hip replacements in hospital M1, whereas the 
prices for knee replacements and cataract care in hospitals M1 and 
M2 remained unaffected.
Finally, we disaggregated the post-merger price changes for each 
hospital-insurer combination. For four out of five health insurers that 
negotiated prices with hospital M1, the post-merger price increases 
for hip replacements were on average 13 percentage points higher 
than for the control groups. The merger’s price effect varied between 
health insurers from -12 to 16 percentage points relative to the 
control groups. Also, the largest health insurer – insurer 1, which 
represented 76 percent of hospital M1’s patients – was unable to 
negotiate lower prices: the prices it paid for hip replacements rose 
by 11 percentage points as a result of the merger. In contrast, one 
of the four other much smaller health insurers – insurer 3, which 
represented only 11 percent of hospital M1’s patients – was able to 
negotiate prices that were much lower than the control groups. These 
results were robust between the control groups. It is therefore less 
likely that the merger effect estimated was driven by unobserved 
characteristics in the control group230.
Hence, what we can deduct from these tables is that aggregating 
the merger effect over locations, products and insurers masked 
considerable variations between locations, products and insurers. 
In other words, failing to disaggregate would prevent us from 
detecting the price effects of a hospital merger.
230  These findings are not reported 
in the article, but are available upon 
request by the authors.
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4.8 Discussion
The main finding of our study is that a merger between two hospitals 
in overlapping geographical markets generated heterogeneous prices 
effects at the two different hospital locations, for different hospital 
products and for different health insurers. The theoretical model that 
was presented in section 4.2 explains why this might be the case.
4.8.1 Different price effects for different products
First, when we compare the price effects of a hospital merger on 
hip replacements, knee replacements and cataract surgery, we find 
a significant increase in the post-merger price of hip replacements 
but not of the other two products. This result was robust across 
all control groups and model specifications. In section 4.5, we 
explained that large post-merger price increases for the merged 
hospitals in comparison to prices among a control group could be 
consistent with at least four hypotheses. By a close consideration 
of the market under study, we can rule out the possibility that 
the increase in the post-merger price of hip replacements can 
be explained by a catching-up effect, or by an increase in quality 
or case mix severity. This because the pre-merger prices of hip 
replacements in hospital M1 were no lower than the prices at the 
comparison hospitals, as table 4.5 shows. Also, the pre-merger 
price for hip replacements at hospital M1 corresponds to the 
pre-merger price for hip replacements at hospital M2. According 
to the ‘learning about demand’ explanation, following a merger, 
a hospital is able to observe the prices paid to one of its former 
competitors, revealing potentially important information about 
the willingness of health insurers to pay for hospital services 
(see Adams & Noether, 2011). This explanation, however, cannot 
apply here as the pre-merger prices are similar. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that the quality of care for hip replacements increased in 
hospital M1 following the merger. Although the hospital advertised 
quality increases in other procedures during the study period, this 
did not include the quality of its hip replacements. Furthermore, 
if it were the case that hospital M1 increased its quality because it 
learned from hospital M2 following the merger, we would expect 
prices to converge between the locations, but this did not happen. 
Also, an increase in quality that would justify such a large price 
increase (9 percentage points on average) would most likely also 
have an effect on patient volume at the expense of patient numbers 
at hospital M2 or rival hospitals, but this did not occur either. 
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Therefore, we find it unlikely that an increase in quality between 
t-1 and t+1 can account for the price increase for hip replacements 
in hospital M1. From table 4.1 it also follows that the demographic 
characteristics of the patients at hospital M1 did not change much 
following the merger. The number of males increased slightly, 
but as the number of males increased in almost all hospitals, this 
cannot explain the increase in the prices for hip replacements at 
hospital M1. Also, it is more likely that if the patients’ case mix 
had increased post-merger, more complex cases would have gone 
to hospital M2 rather than to hospital M1 because hospital M2 is 
a larger general hospital that also provides tertiary care. In view 
of this, the most plausible explanation out of the four possible 
explanations that follow from the empirical literature is that the 
merger enhanced the market power of the hospitals.
However, this raises the question of why the price rise only 
occurred for hip replacements and not for knee replacements and 
cataract surgery. It is possible that this was due to a different level 
of competition intensity for these products. Indeed it followed 
from the theoretical framework that product d’s price change 
after the merger in each hospital is increasing in the diversion 
share between these hospitals, as well as the price-cost margin 
of the partnering hospital. We found that the diversion shares in 
hospital M1 of hip replacements were no higher than the diversion 
shares of other products. In fact, the diversion share of cataract 
surgeries is higher, whereas the price change for cataract surgeries 
in hospital M1 after merger is not significant. Hence, based on the 
conclusions from the theoretical model, the difference in  
product-price effects after merger must be explained by other 
factors, i.e., the pre-merger price-cost margins of hospital M2. 
Unfortunately, we have no information on the product’s price-cost 
margins of hospitals in this market. However, because the 
pre-merger prices for hip replacements in hospitals M1 and M2 
were remarkably similar according to table 4.5, the theory suggests 
that the pre-merger cost of hip replacements at hospital M2 were 
lower than the pre-merger cost of hip replacements at hospital M1.
Nevertheless, the finding that price effects are heterogeneous 
across hospitals’ top-revenue products highlights the importance 
of using a more disaggregated approach rather than the more 
aggregated approach, when defining product markets. In practice, 
it is often assumed that the merger price effect will be the same 
for all hospital products because acute care, inpatient services can 
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231  According to the EC (1997) 
Commission Notice, ‘A relevant product 
market comprises all those products 
and/or services which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the 
consumer, by reason of the products’ 
characteristics, their prices and their 
intended use’.
232  According to the FTC (2010) 
Merger Guidelines: ‘Market definition 
focuses solely on demand substitution 
factors, i.e., on consumers’ ability and 
willingness to substitute away from one 
product to another in response to a price 
increase or a corresponding non-price 
change such as a reduction in product 
quality or service’.
be considered as a single and thus homogeneous hospital product 
in cases of hospital mergers. Typically, antitrust agencies use a 
cluster approach to define hospital product markets and most 
empirical studies follow this approach and look at the aggregated 
price effects of hospital mergers. Also, the bargaining models that 
were developed to reflect hospital-insurer bargaining assume 
that a hospital system and an insurer bargain over a single base 
price per hospital location. In section 4.2, we already noted that 
freeing the product price ratios would more closely correspond 
to hospital-insurer bargaining in practice. The hospital market is 
highly complex due to the multiplicity of services offered and the 
heterogeneity of consumers and therefore many different hospital 
products exist. Sacher and Silvia (1998) show that using the 
standard inpatient cluster may mask considerable variability in the 
concentration statistics across the inpatient categories that make 
up an overall cluster. They argue that disaggregation can provide 
a better understanding of the potential competition effects of a 
merger in a range of market configurations. A similar point is made 
by Hentschker et al. (2014).
Also, from the theoretical model it followed that price effects after 
merger may differ between hospital products. For that reason, 
when we estimated the model parameters, we also disaggregated 
the effects of the merger by product markets. Like Sacher and 
Silvia (1998), we find that disaggregation can provide a fuller 
understanding of the potential competitive effects of the merger. 
However, if potential competitive effects are not homogeneous 
over product markets this may have important implications for 
future antitrust scrutiny. If the rules for market definition that are 
formulated in the EC merger guidelines (EC, 1997)231, as well as 
in the US merger guidelines (FTC, 2010)232, were applied strictly, 
hundreds or maybe thousands of separate hospital product 
markets would have to be distinguished because many hospital 
products and services are not demand or supply substitutes as 
prescribed by these rules. Clearly this would not be a feasible 
strategy in cases of hospital mergers. Hence, only a certain level 
of disaggregation would be warranted. Although our theoretical 
model defines each product d as a treatment of one illness, d may 
also be understood as a product cluster combining several illnesses 
based on revenue or volume or specialism or otherwise. Hence, 
the model conclusions also hold for the situation in which some 
clustering (aggregation) is applied in order to reduce the number 
of product dimensions in the analysis or because this more closely 
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233  In practice, antitrust authorities 
occasionally take potential differences 
between products into account. 
For example, in one case the UK 
Competition Commission performed 
a detailed analysis of the appropriate 
product markets (CC, 2013) and in the 
FTC v. ProMedica Health System case, 
the US antitrust authority paid special 
attention to the inpatient obstetrical 
services in addition to general acute-care 
inpatient services (FTC, 2012).
corresponds with practice. Sacher and Silvia (1998) show that even 
a very limited  disaggregation of the standard inpatient cluster can 
lead to a more accurate merger analysis. Zwanziger et al. (1994), 
too, propose a manageable disaggregation of the standard clusters. 
Because it is unclear how often antitrust outcomes would be affected 
by using a different level of aggregation (Sacher & Silvia, 1998), we 
suggest using both the clustered approach as well as a limited dis-
aggregated approach when defining product markets in the case of 
hospital mergers. One feasible approach may then be similar to our 
approach in which at least the top 3 or top 5 of the highest revenue 
products affected by the merger are analyzed separately. If the initial 
disaggregated approach gives rise to suspicions, the analysis can be 
further disaggregated233.
If antitrust authorities indeed decide to conduct disaggregated 
analyses, it is an interesting question how an antitrust authority 
should deal with differences in merger outcomes between products. 
It is unlikely that the antitrust authority will block a merger if the 
prospective analysis indicates that the prices for one product will 
increase, whereas the prices of other products will not be affected. 
Rather, finding different effects across products may lead to in-
terventions that are specifically addressed only to the product 
that is found to be affected by the merger. For example, antitrust 
authorities may impose remedies requiring the divestiture of a 
specific product, imposing the obligation to support new entrants 
(like ITCs) or introducing a price ceiling on particular products at 
one or more hospital locations.
4.8.2 Different price effects at different locations
Second, the merged hospital raised its price for hip replacements 
significantly at one location (hospital M1), but not at the other 
(hospital M2). To establish whether the merging hospitals 
experienced different price changes after merger, we aggregated the 
post-merger price change according to hospital location. It followed 
from the theoretical model that price changes caused by merger 
are proportional to the merging hospitals’ diversion shares and the 
initial price-cost margins of the merger partner. To date, however, 
most studies have not controlled for this potential source of hetero-
geneity. Only Tenn (2011) examines and finds evidence of differential 
pricing strategies after merger.
In our case study, the merging hospitals’ diversion shares were 
different due to their geographic location. Hospital M1 is located in 
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234   Occasionally, antitrust authorities 
have opted for imposing remedies at 
the entire location level. Divestitures of 
hospital locations were, for example, 
ordered by the US antitrust authority in 
the FTC v. ProMedica Health System case 
(FTC, 2012) and by the German antitrust 
authority in the Asklepios/LBK Hamburg 
case (Bundeskartellamt, 2005), whereas 
in the Evanston Northwestern/Highland 
Park Hospital case the US antitrust 
authority imposed a firewall so that the 
two firms had to negotiate separately 
with insurers after merger (FTC, 2008). 
See Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) for a 
critical review of the latter remedy.
a more geographically isolated area. Hospital M2 was the strongest 
competitor to hospital M1 and therefore posed a major constraint 
on hospital M1’s prices prior to the merger. Hospital M2, however, 
faced additional competition from other hospitals. This difference 
manifests itself in higher diversion shares for hospital M1 than for 
hospital M2 before merger (table 4.6). After the merger, the two 
hospitals were likely able to internalize this constraint, leading to 
higher prices at hospital M1. They were able to do this without being 
penalized by rivals because hospital M1 experienced competitive 
pressure from only one rival hospital after the merger. By contrast, 
hospital M2 still experienced significant competitive pressure from 
five other hospitals after the merger. In this setting, differentiating 
prices according to the location may be a profitable strategy for the 
merged hospital: hospital M1 was in a position to raise its prices 
whereas maintaining a steady flow of patients, whereas hospital 
M2 maintained its prices at the pre-merger level in order to prevent 
losing patients to a rival hospital. Our results are consistent with 
this line of reasoning: the price change after merger was higher 
for hospital M1 whose diversion shares to hospital M2 were much 
higher than the diversions shares from hospital M2 to hospital M1.
By means of our empirical analysis we showed that it needs to be 
recognized that a merger between a rather isolated hospital location 
and its closest substitute creates opportunities for post-merger price 
increases that may be overlooked when not taking the disaggregate 
approach. Our findings suggests that the competition intensity that 
merging locations experience before and after merger may differ 
considerably between locations even if the merger entails two 
neighboring hospitals. Because this difference may result in a heter-
ogeneous merger effects across locations, antitrust agencies should 
take the difference between locations into account. Given that these 
hospitals initially function as separate entities, the data that would 
be needed for the analysis at the location level should be available. 
However, then the question remains how antitrust authorities should 
deal with differences in merger outcomes between locations. We 
discussed product-specific remedies in the previous paragraph. 
Likewise, antitrust authorities may think about location-specific 
remedies in case they predict the merger effect to be differentiated 
across locations. Like product-specific remedies, location-specific 
remedies might entail structural remedies or behavioral remedies 
that are only aimed at the location(s) that is (are) affected by 
merger234.
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4.8.3 Different price effects for different insurers
The theoretical model that we presented in this article showed 
that the price change caused by merger may differ between health 
insurers. In our empirical analysis we disaggregated the overall 
results for each hospital-insurer combination which revealed 
that there is considerable heterogeneity across health insurers 
in the change in the post-merger negotiated prices. For four out 
of five health insurers that negotiated prices with hospital M1, 
the post-merger price increases for hip replacements were on 
average 13 percentage points higher than the control group. The 
merger’s price effect varied between health insurers from -12 to 
16 percentage points relative to the control group. This finding 
corresponds to the results from an earlier retrospective study from 
the US (Thompson, 2011), which indicated that two health insurers 
experienced price increases due to the hospital merger under study, 
whereas a third insurer experienced a price decrease and a fourth 
experienced no price effect from the merger. 
The theoretical model suggests that the insurer-specific price 
differences may arise due to differences in the insurers’ bargaining 
abilities. In particular, a health insurer with more bargaining 
weight or ability is confronted with a higher price increase after the 
merger.
The source of bargaining ability of health insurers is the topic 
of many studies. The evidence suggests that idiosyncratic effects 
such as bargaining skills of the individuals at the negotiating table 
might have a sizeable impact on the market outcomes (Sorensen, 
2003; Halbersma et al., 2010; Grennan, 2014). Thompson (2012) 
furthermore suggests that the differences between insurers may be 
attributed to variations in the types of plans that the insurers offer 
and the services that they provide. Hence, although the bargaining 
model gives us some ideas on the source of heterogeneity in the 
post-merger price effects across health insurers, it remains largely 
unclear why such large differences exist across insurers within 
markets and why some health insurers experience price increases 
whereas others experience price decreases after merger. Because 
this is an issue that has been indicated a few times in research on 
hospital mergers (Thompson, 2012; Gaynor & Town, 2012), we 
suggest that further research on hospital-insurer bargaining should 
aim to establish the source of bargaining ability of health insurers 
in relation to hospital mergers.
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From a policy perspective, the fact that post-merger price effects are 
not homogeneous across insurers within markets is an interesting 
finding, however. It is furthermore interesting to note that the hetero-
geneities are large. In ex ante merger reviews in the Netherlands, 
the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) asks represent-
atives of large health insurers in the region about their expectations 
regarding competitive effects of the merger. In fact, in the guidelines 
for assessing mergers and collaborations in healthcare, issued in 
2013, the ACM says: ‘When assessing a concentration’s implications, 
the arguments put forward by insurers and patient organizations 
will be central.’ (ACM, 2013). Like in most prospective merger 
cases, the representatives of the two largest health insurers in the 
region indicated that they did not anticipate negative competitive 
effects from the consolidation that we studied; and partly because 
of that reason the merger was cleared. However, the retrospective 
analysis indicates that the health insurers that believed to be able 
to counteract post-merger price increases were not both able to do 
that. We therefore suggest that a more critical assessment of health 
insurers’ bargaining ability in merger cases is warranted.
4.9 Conclusion
In this study, we expanded existing bargaining models to allow 
for heterogeneous product-price effects and used a difference-
in- differences model in which price changes at the merging 
hospitals are compared to price changes at a group of comparison 
hospitals. The main finding of our study is that the merger led to 
 heterogeneous prices effects for different health insurers, hospital 
products and hospital locations and that these differences depend 
on (i) the degree of substitution between hospitals, which may also 
vary over products, (ii) the relative bargaining ability of hospitals 
and insurers and (iii) the pre-merger price-cost margins of different 
products delivered by these hospitals.
The theoretical model provided us with valuable insights on the 
sources of heterogeneity, whereas our detailed empirical analysis 
of a hospital merger improved our understanding of the magnitude 
of differences. The analysis, however, also gives rise to three 
areas for future research. First, it would be interesting to replicate 
this study for different hospital mergers to find out which of our 
findings persist. Second, more insight into the sources of insurers’ 
bargaining ability would be valuable. Third, analysis of pre-merger 
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price-cost margins will improve our understanding of  heterogeneous 
post-merger price effects across products.
Nevertheless, the fact that price effects of a merger are  heterogeneous 
across products, locations and insurers signals important conclusions 
for ex ante merger scrutiny. First, it highlights the importance of 
using a disaggregated approach rather than the current cluster 
approach when defining product markets. Second, it suggests that 
future prospective merger analyses should take potential differences 
across hospital locations into account. Finally, it asks for a critical 
assessment of health insurers’ bargaining ability in merger cases.
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the Option Demand Method in the Dutch 
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Abstract
Antitrust authorities need new approaches to predict the effects 
of healthcare mergers. Merger simulation models are promising 
alternatives to highly debated traditional approaches, but they 
have only been validated to a limited extent. This paper evaluates 
the predictive power of the Option Demand method, a merger 
simulation model developed specifically for the US hospital market. 
We contrast the predictions of the merger simulation model to the 
estimated price effects of a consummated merger between two 
Dutch hospitals. We find that the Option Demand method could be 
a valuable addition to the antitrust agencies’ toolkit, but that more 
research is necessary.
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5.1 Introduction
In competitive markets, the aim of preventive merger control is 
to prohibit anticompetitive consolidation. To determine whether a 
merger between two (or more) firms will result in anticompetitive 
price increases (and/or quality decreases), antitrust authorities 
need to carry out an ex ante (prospective) review. Unfortunately, 
the approaches that are commonly used to prospectively review 
mergers are problematic. Generally, these methods first define the 
relevant market for the industry being studied and then use market 
shares to infer how the merger could affect competition in that 
market (Shapiro, 2010; Werden & Froeb, 2006). However, in order 
to delineate the relevant market, they typically rely on disputed 
methodologies and the conclusions drawn from the resulting 
analysis will depend heavily on how that market is defined. 
Moreover, these measurements are imperfect indicators of market 
power and so they do not necessarily reveal the actual exercise of 
market power. Merger reviews in the healthcare sector are subject 
to an additional difficulty because there are unique factors that 
render the most commonly used tests for measuring geographic 
markets less reliable in healthcare than in other sectors (Elzinga 
& Swisher, 2011). Antitrust authorities therefore struggle to 
delineate the healthcare market effectively (Gaynor & Town, 2012; 
Varkevisser & Schut, 2012; Capps et al., 2002).
The most promising alternatives to these traditional approaches 
to review mergers are Merger Simulation Models (MSMs). The use 
of MSMs has clear advantages over the traditional approaches. 
MSMs use structural models to represent specific industries. By 
calibrating these models to the specifics of the market being studied, 
they can be used to predict the price effects of a merger directly 
(Werden, 2005). Merger simulations take into account more than 
just market shares and concentration levels; they do not require or 
depend upon arbitrary market definitions (Argue & Shin, 2009). For 
all these reasons, interest in MSMs is growing, both in the US and 
the EU (see e.g., Budzinski & Ruhmer, 2009; Argue & Shin, 2009; 
Walker, 2005; Kalbfleisch, 2005). However, the important question 
of whether MSMs are able to predict anticompetitive price increases 
accurately has not yet been answered conclusively. So far, MSMs 
have only been validated to a limited extent; they are always used 
in combination with traditional approaches and have rarely been 
subject to public scrutiny (Budzinski & Ruhmer, 2009). Only merger 
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simulation models that can produce reliable predictions are useful 
for merger policies, and the key issue with any merger simulation is 
its predictive capacity.
This paper contributes to the small, but growing, body of literature 
relating to the evaluation of merger simulation methods by 
evaluating the predictive powers of a reduced‐form MSM that was 
developed specifically for hospital markets. The reduced‐form 
MSM that we tested is referred to by its developers as the Option 
Demand method (OD method). In the literature, this model is 
also referred to as the Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (CDS) 
or Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) model. The OD method is designed 
specifically to model markets in which managed care organizations 
or health insurers (selectively) contract with hospitals (Capps et 
al., 2003; Town & Vistnes, 2001). Recently, this model has been 
generalized by Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015)235.
In this paper, we use the OD method to predict the price effects of 
a hospital merger between a general acute care hospital (hospital 
M1) and a neighboring general acute care hospital that also 
provides tertiary hospital care (hospital M2) that took place in 
the Dutch hospital market236. From the viewpoint of the Option 
Demand method, the current Dutch healthcare system bears evident 
similarities with the US healthcare system. We explicitly take the 
multiproduct nature of hospitals into account by examining the 
price effects of the hospital merger for different hospital products. 
We also allow for potential differences in bargaining outcomes 
between neighboring locations by predicting the merger effects for 
each location. We use an instrumental variable approach to control 
for potential endogeneity issues. The actual price effects of the 
merger that we study are determined through a difference-in- 
differences (DID) technique (Roos et al., 2017). By contrasting the 
simulated price effects with the actual price effects of the merger, 
we are able to evaluate the predictive power of the Option Demand 
method for hospital mergers in the Dutch context.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 5.2, we discuss 
how to identify unilateral effects after a horizontal merger and 
we consider the small number of available studies that evaluate 
the accuracy of merger simulation models. Section 5.3 describes 
the Option Demand model and discusses the applicability of the 
Option Demand method to the Dutch healthcare industry. Section 
5.4 focuses on the modeling details of the Option Demand method 
235  For an extensive review of 
the literature on modeling hospital 
competition, see Gaynor et al. (2015).
236  For reasons of confidentiality, we 
anonymize the merged hospitals’ and 
health insurers’ names. For the same 
reason, the merger year is reported as t 
(t lies in the period 2005 – 2012).
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and in section 5.5 we focus on the details of the estimation that 
we carried out. Section 5.6 describes the data that were used 
and section 5.7 presents the results. In section 5.8 we briefly 
discuss the findings of the retrospective study and compare the 
simulation results with the effects of the actual merger. In section 
5.9 we present our conclusions on the predictive power of the 
reduced-form merger simulation model that we have applied.
5.2 Merger simulation models
5.2.1 Identifying unilateral effects after a horizontal merger
According to most national and supranational antitrust laws, 
mergers must be reported to an antitrust authority prior to being 
consummated237. After notification, the antitrust authorities 
carry out a review of the proposed merger, in which they make 
inferences regarding the expected anticompetitive effects of a 
merger in the relevant market. In general, horizontal mergers may 
give rise to two types of anticompetitive effects: (i) unilateral and 
(ii) coordinated effects. Both unilateral and coordinated effects may 
lead to higher post-merger prices, but prospective merger analyses 
focus predominantly on predicting the unilateral effects that a 
merger may cause (Baker, 2003). In this paper, we also focus on the 
potential for unilateral effects.
Two methods are available to determine unilateral effects quantita-
tively: (i) a market definition approach and (ii) methods to predict 
unilateral effects directly. The market definition approach first 
defines the market and then hypothesizes on the merger-effect in 
that market. However, the market definition approach has several 
shortcomings, particularly when applied to the hospital industry 
(Dranove & Ody, 2016; Elzinga & Swisher, 2011; Gaynor et al., 
2011; Kaplow, 2011; Shapiro, 2010; Varkevisser et al., 2008; Capps 
et al., 2002). For example, the approach assumes that a product 
is either inside or outside the market. The products in the market 
are assumed to be subject to equal competitive pressure, while the 
products outside the market are not taken into account. However, 
in a market with differentiated products – which is typically the 
case for hospital markets – the degree of competition between two 
products depends on their substitutability and it is often difficult to 
draw meaningful boundaries between markets (Werden & Froeb, 
2006). Furthermore, it is only when very specific assumptions 
are made (e.g., homogeneous goods) that market shares can 
237  See 15 USC §18A for the US 
and the competition laws of the EU 
Member States or EC:2004 for the 
European Union’s rules on prior merger 
notification.
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be translated into unilateral price effects (Kaplow, 2011). The 
 Elzinga-Hogarty test, in particular, has also been criticized because 
of its limited applicability to the hospital industry, mainly because 
of what has become known as the silent majority fallacy (e.g., 
Elzinga & Swisher, 2011; Capps et al., 2001).
Given the drawbacks of the market definition approach, 
alternatives such as MSMs that screen or predict anticompetitive 
effects directly and that circumvent the need for market delineation 
are promising alternatives.
5.2.2 Merger Simulation Models
An MSM builds a structural model of the industry being studied. 
Typically, a structural model consists of (i) a demand model, which 
models the consumers’ decision-making process and (ii) a model 
of competition, which models the supply-side of the market on 
the basis of the firm’s behavior, the actions of its rivals and the 
consumer demand model. Having defined the competition model 
that best fits the industry being studied, the demand model can be 
estimated and the model of competition should be calibrated with 
pre-merger data. Next, a merger can be simulated by changing the 
ownership structure, for example by modeling that the number 
of competitors in a market decreases from 4 to 3 after merger 
(Budzinski & Ruhmer, 2009).
A major issue with merger simulations is their predictive power 
and, thus, their credibility as a technique in the prospective merger 
review process (Budzinski & Ruhmer, 2009). Only MSMs that are 
able to predict the actual effects of mergers accurately are useful 
for merger policy. Weinberg and Hosken (2013) stipulate that there 
are two methods for testing structural models: (i) the marginal 
costs approach, in which the actual (observed) marginal costs are 
contrasted with the marginal costs calculated by the calibrated 
simulation model; and (ii) the market structure approach, in 
which actual (observed) changes in price and/or quality following 
a merger are contrasted with the changes in price and/or quality 
simulated by the structural model. Budzinski and Ruhmer (2009), 
Werden and Froeb (2006) and Davis and Garcés (2010; chapter 
8) describe both these methods in detail. Our study employs the 
second approach. Hence, we use past changes in market structure 
and the resulting price effects to test the accuracy of a (reduced-
form) merger simulation model.
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238  Budzinski and Ruhmer (2009) 
review an earlier version (working 
paper: Weinberg. Matthew C. and Daniel 
Hosken. 2008. ‘Using Mergers to Test 
a Model of Oligopoly’. Working paper. 
University of Georgia) of Weinberg & 
Hosken (2013).
There are a handful of studies that have used the market structure 
approach to test merger simulation models. In addition to the 
three studies reviewed by Budzinski and Ruhmer (2009) (i.e., 
Pinkse & Slade, 2004; Peters, 2006 and Weinberg & Hosken, 
2013238), Weinberg (2011), Friberg and Romahn (2015), Greenfield 
et al. (2015) and Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016) also apply 
this approach. The studies differ in their efficacy (i.e., whether 
they are able to accurately predict price effects). In terms of 
methodology, they most often use a Bertrand model to model 
market competition. The studies use different demand functions to 
reflect the differences in industries and data and they also differ 
in the methodology that they employ to compare the simulated 
price changes to the actual price changes induced by the merger. 
Also, none of the previous studies have focused on hospital merger 
cases, although the problems that arise from using the more 
traditional market definition approaches are particularly striking 
in this sector (e.g., Elzinga & Swisher, 2011). A notable exception 
is a recent FTC working paper (Garmon, 2016) that reflects on 
the accuracy of hospital merger screening methods. The study 
concludes that the market definition approach is less accurate at 
predicting post-merger price effects than more recently developed 
models, including the Option Demand method (Garmon, 2016). 
In contrast to Garmon (2016), we do not focus on contrasting the 
results of traditional approaches versus MSMs but rather on the 
predictive powers of one reduced-form MSM that is tailor-made for 
the healthcare industry: the Option Demand model.
5.3 The Option Demand method and its applicability to the 
Dutch healthcare system
5.3.1 What are Option Demand markets?
The Option Demand model that we evaluate in this paper was 
developed by Town and Vistnes (2001) and further refined by 
Capps et al. (2003) and Gowrisankaran et al. (2015). The papers 
developed a framework for analyzing bargaining relationships 
between hospitals and insurers under selective contracting. 
Under such a healthcare system, consumers buy health insurance 
from health insurers. The consumers decide on a specific health 
insurance policy on the basis of the network of hospitals that 
the insurance contract offers and the premium. Each hospital 
renegotiates the terms of its contracts with health insurers on a 
regular basis. The idea is that the (threat of) selective contracting 
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of hospitals may enable insurers to negotiate lower prices and/or 
higher quality, which may lower premiums (Ho, 2009).
The OD method builds on this two-layer model of the hospital 
industry; that is, it models that (i) consumers buy health insurance 
from health insurers before fully knowing their medical needs and 
(ii) health insurers bargain and contract with healthcare providers 
(here: hospitals) on behalf of their insured. Following Dranove 
and White (1996), Capps et al. (2003) refer to markets that exhibit 
these two layers as ‘Option Demand’ markets (or OD markets), 
since the consumer commits to a possibly restricted network of 
hospitals when he buys health insurance prior to knowing his future 
healthcare needs and when he is in need of specific care, he has the 
option of visiting any of the contracted hospitals. The value that a 
consumer then places on health insurance depends on his expected 
demand for healthcare and the expected utility that a particular 
hospital from this network will provide him. This value can be 
expressed as Willingness-To-Pay (WTP). The notion of WTP gives an 
estimate of how much consumers are willing to pay ex ante to retain 
access to this hospital in the network. The WTP is therefore a proxy 
of the hospital’s market power: a hospital with a high WTP score will 
be better able to secure higher prices from the health insurer than a 
hospital with a low WTP score (Capps et al., 2003:738).
5.3.2 The applicability of the Option Demand method to the 
Dutch healthcare sector
To date, the OD method has been applied by Capps et al. (2003), 
by Dranove and Sfekas (2009) and by Dranove and Ody (2016) 
who find a positive relationship between hospital profits and WTP. 
Garmon (2016) finds an imprecise relationship between prices 
and WTP. The OD method has also been applied by the US Federal 
Trade Commission (Dranove & Ody, 2016; Garmon, 2016).
From the viewpoint of the Option Demand method, the current 
Dutch healthcare system bears similarities with the US healthcare 
system. In recent decades, the Dutch healthcare system has moved 
away from strict governmental supply-side regulation and towards 
regulated (or ‘managed’) competition (Van de Ven & Schut, 2008; 
Schut & Van de Ven, 2005). Of particular importance to this paper is 
the gradual introduction of hospital-insurer bargaining since 2005. 
In 2005, a product classification system for hospital and medical 
specialist care was introduced. Each activity and/or hospital service 
associated with a patient’s demand for care, including outpatient 
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care, is referred to as a Diagnosis and Treatment Combination (or 
DTC)239. Following the introduction of the DTC system, the room 
for free negotiations between hospitals and health insurers on 
prices, volume and quality was gradually increased from 10% of 
hospitals’ revenue in 2005, to 20% in 2008, to 34% in 2009 and to 
70% in 2012. The remainder of hospital prices is regulated by the 
Dutch Healthcare Authority. For those services in the free-pricing 
segment, each hospital typically renegotiates the terms of its 
contracts with health insurers on an annual basis. Health insurers 
are allowed to contract selectively with healthcare providers.
The two-layer model that underlies the OD method seems to reflect 
the Dutch healthcare system accurately; consumers buy health 
insurance from health insurers and health insurers bargain and 
contract with hospitals on behalf of their enrollees. In the early years 
of the reform selective contracting was limitedly used. However, 
over the years, the number of health insurers offering contracts 
with restricted provider networks has increased. Furthermore, the 
introduction of a new Health Insurance Act has led to strong price 
competition between health insurers, and health insurers have put 
increasing pressure on hospitals to charge lower prices (Schut & 
Van de Ven, 2011). The threat of selective contracting, rather than 
its actual use, may already have had an impact on hospital-insurer 
bargaining. We therefore consider the OD method applicable to the 
free-pricing segment of the Dutch hospital industry.
5.4 The Option Demand method: the modeling details
In this section, we describe how to estimate the demand model 
and Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) (section 5.4.1), how to estimate the 
supply side and the competition model (section 5.4.2) and how to 
simulate a merger with the WTP (section 5.4.3). Our paper makes 
two modifications to the model by Capps et al. (2003).
First, we explicitly take into account the multiproduct nature of 
hospitals by examining the price effects of the hospital merger 
for different hospital products. Typically, antitrust agencies use 
a cluster approach to define hospital product markets, assuming 
that ‘acute care, in-patient services’ can be considered as a single 
and thus homogenous hospital product. Most empirical studies 
follow this approach and examine the aggregated price effects of 
hospital mergers. However, the hospital market is highly complex 
239  The DTC system is based on the 
concept of DRGs (Diagnosis-Related 
Groups) but constitutes a newly 
developed classification system.
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due to the multiplicity of services provided and the heterogeneity 
of consumers, which is in turn caused by differences in medical 
treatment needs and third-party payer coverage. Sacher and Silvia 
(1998) show that using the standard in-patient cluster may mask 
considerable variability in the concentration statistics across the 
in-patient categories that make up a whole cluster. They show that 
disaggregation can provide a fuller understanding of the potential 
competitive effects of a merger in a variety of market configu-
rations. Roos et al. (2017) also find evidence of heterogeneous 
price effects across products in their retrospective case study. They 
studied the same merger case as the one simulated in this paper. 
We therefore also disaggregate the effect of the merger by product 
markets. We estimate the impact of the merger in three separate 
product markets that jointly represent 47.5 per cent of the merged 
hospital’s turnover in the segment for which Dutch insurers and 
hospitals at the time of the merger were allowed to freely negotiate 
prices. The products included in this study are hip replacements, 
knee replacements and cataract surgery.
Second, our study allows for potential differences in bargaining 
outcomes between neighboring locations of merged hospitals by 
predicting the merger effects for each location. Hitherto, most studies 
have aggregated the merger effect, thereby disregarding the fact 
that post-merger differences in market power for each location may 
lead to opportunities to differentiate pricing strategies. In the case 
of multiple locations, price differentiation across locations may be a 
profitable strategy for the merged hospital. In retrospectives studies, 
Roos et al. (2017) and Tenn (2011) find evidence of differential 
pricing strategies in hospital mergers. However, most previous 
studies on mergers have not controlled for this potential source of 
heterogeneity. We disaggregate the predicted price change for each 
hospital location. In sections 5.4.2 and 5.5, we will explain in more 
detail how we handled the modification of the model by Capps et 
al. (2003) in our paper. We also discuss the relationship with the 
extension of the OD model by Gowrisankaran et al. (2015).
5.4.1 Step 1: demand model and Willingness-To-Pay (WTP)
Under the OD method, a consumer’s demand for hospital treatment 
is modeled using a conditional logit demand function (see 
McFadden, 1974). Under this model, patient i seeks treatment after 
falling ill. His health insurance gives him access to network G of 
hospitals (all the available hospitals in the market). The expected 
utility of patient i for receiving treatment at hospital j is given by: 
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240  To avoid the IIA property that 
underlies the conditional logit functions, 
some studies use the mixed logit model 
to analyze patient hospital choice (see 
e.g., Pope, 2009; Varkevisser et al., 
2012). Farrell et al. (2011) find that 
there is almost no difference in the 
estimated hospital-level diversions in 
the patient-level mixed logit compared 
to the standard patient-level conditional 
logit model. Recent studies on hospital 
choice use the conditional logit model 
(e.g., Chandra et al., 2016; Gaynor et 
al., 2016; Gutacker et al., 2016; Frank 
et al., 2015; Chou et al., 2014; Ho & 
Pakes, 2014).
241  The unscaled WTP employed by 
Capps et al. (2003) also increases with 
the number of patients that a hospital 
treats. This is undesirable. The rescaled 
WTP is high only if a hospital does not 
have close substitutes.
Uij =U(Hj,Xi,λi)+εij where Hj is a vector of hospital j characteristics. 
Xi is a vector which combines the characteristics and clinical
attributes of patient i. The patient’s travel time (λi) is determined by 
the distance between the patient’s location (e.g., zip code) and the 
hospital j. Under the conditional logit demand function, we assume 
that the residuals (ε) are i.i.d. with the double standard exponential 
distribution (see McFadden 1974)240.
Using a logit demand model, the probability that patient i chooses 
hospital j is given by: sj(Hj,Xi,λi) =                               .
Denote the utility of patient i for access to network G as VUI(G,Xi,λi). 
The WTP of patient i for hospital j, denoted by ΔVUI(G,Xi,λi), is the 
reduction in VUI due to the exclusion of hospital j from network G. 
Hence, ΔVUI(G,Xi,λi) = V
UI(G,Xi,λi) − V
UI(G/j,Xi,λi), where G/j is the 
network of hospitals G excluding hospital j. Capps et al. (2003) 
show that it follows from the logit demand that for the WTP of 
patient i for hospital j that:
The ex ante WTP for the entire population (with N ill consumers) 
of hospital j is the weighted sum of the patients’ WTPs (Capps, 
Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003:743):
where the population density distribution of all ill consumers 
is given by f(Xi,λi) and constant γ convert utils into monetary 
terms. Since we do not observe constant γ, we use WTP up to the 
unidentified scale factor. For our application this is sufficient, since 
we are not interested in the exact value of the WTP.
We apply the discrete equivalent of the above equation to calculate 
the WTP of each hospital (see also Garmon, 2016; Balan & Brand, 
2015; Farrell et al., 2011). Further, following Farrell et al. (2011), 
we rescale the WTP according to the hospital’s expected number of 
patients. The rescaled discrete WTP equation for hospital j is241:
∑
gϵG
 exp[U(Hg,Xi,λi)]
exp[U(Hj,Xi,λi)]
ij
ij ij ij
    ΔVUI(G,Xi,λi)= ln [               ].j 11– s (H ,X ,λ, )j i iij
Wj = N ſx,λ      ln [               ] f (Xi,λi)dXidλi ,1 j 11– s (H ,X ,λ )γ j i i
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wj =
 ∑ i =1 ln [              ]
 ∑ i =1sj (Hj ,Xi ,λi)
j
1
1– s (H ,X ,λ )j i i
N
N
. (5.1)
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242  In a Monte Carlo setting, Balan 
and Brand (2015) compared the true 
price effects of more general bargaining 
models with WTP-based merger 
simulation methods. They conclude 
that generally the WTP-based merger 
simulation methods perform well.
5.4.2 Step 2: supply side and competition model
Under the OD method, the idea is that if a hospital adds a high 
value to the health insurance network, it will be able to extract 
more profits from its negotiations and vice versa. Hospitals and 
insurers thus bargain according to the total value that hospital j 
adds to the health insurance network, i.e., wj . Following Capps 
et al. (2003), we model this negotiation with a reduced-form 
bargaining model:
where pj is the revenue per patient and cj is the variable cost 
per patient. This equation thus gives the relationship between 
the margin of hospital j, i.e., the per-patient revenue minus the 
variable cost per patient, and the WTP per patient for hospital j. 
The per-patient gain of including hospital j in the network is split 
between the hospital and the insurer. Parameter α is the proportion 
that each hospital captures (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). Parameter α is fixed and 
depends on the parties’ relative bargaining abilities (Farrell et al., 
2011).
Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) present a structural bargaining model 
that is more general than the Capps et al. (2003) model that we 
present here. Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) show that the Capps 
et al. (2003) model is a special case of their structural bargaining 
model. An important extension in the model of Gowrisankaran et 
al. (2015) is that patients face coinsurances. The Capps et al. (2003) 
model assumes that there is no coinsurance, which simplifies the 
bargaining model. In the Dutch market, there is no coinsurance. 
There is a yearly mandatory deductible that the patient pays when 
he starts using healthcare. However, the deductible is limited to a 
relatively small fixed amount (220 euro per year in 2012). Since 
most hospital prices are higher than this amount, each patient 
receiving treatment at any hospital would generally pay the 
same deductible. Hence, deductibles are expected to hardly affect 
patient hospital choice, which implies that the no out-of-pocket 
payment assumption is also justifiable in our application of the 
model. Another extension of Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) is that 
they take health insurers’ costs into account in the bargaining 
model. However, following Capps et al. (2003) and as is often 
done in practice (Gaynor et al., 2015), we regress price on WTP 
measures and add marginal cost controls to the regression in our 
reduced-form merger simulation242.
pj   –  cj  =  α   wj ,. (5.2)
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243  In practice, this is the most 
common negotiating strategy of 
hospitals. The assumption can, however, 
be relaxed by adapting WTP to separate 
bargaining scenarios (Brand & Garmon, 
2014).
5.4.3 Step 3: merger simulation with WTP
In a merger review, antitrust authorities need to make an ex ante 
review to find out whether the merger between two (or more) 
hospitals will result in anticompetitive price increases. In our 
model, this means that we are interested in the increase in the 
post-merger prices of entity j+k compared to the pre-merger prices 
of hospitals j and k. If we know the demand, WTP and bargaining 
model, we can calculate the post-merger WTP of the new entity and 
the post-merger price increase of the merged entity by estimating α 
(Capps et al., 2003).
This works as follows. Let us assume that we want to predict the 
increase in prices due to a merger between hospitals j and k. With 
equation (5.1), we can calculate the pre-merger WTP of hospitals 
j and k, which we will denote with wj     and wk  . Post-merger, 
hospitals j and k form one entity. The weighted joint pre-merger 
WTP of hospitals j and m is: wj+m  : = Sjwj    + Skwk     where Sj
is the post-merger revenue share of hospital j in the merged 
hospital and Sk is the post-merger share of hospital k in the merged 
hospital. We assume that the merged firm will bargain on an all-
or-nothing basis (i.e., the merged hospitals are either in or out of 
the insurer’s network and reimbursement for patients visiting that 
hospital is therefore either 100% or 0%243). Thus, post-merger, the 
WTP of entity j+k is:
The increase in WTP due to the merger for the combined entity is 
then wj+k  − wj+k .
Given bargaining model (5.2), we can calculate the increase in the 
j+k entities’ margin with: (pj+k  − cj+k    ) − (pj+k − cj+k  ) = α ∙ (wj+k  − 
wj+k ). Using equation (5.2) the α can be estimated and post-merger 
prices can be predicted. Capps et al. (2003) estimate α with an OLS 
regression of total hospital profits on the unscaled WTP and use 
the above equation to predict the increase in total profits due to the 
merger. However, we are interested in the predicted price changes 
due to the merger. As is common in the MSM literature, we assume
that the variable costs per patient do not change due to the merger 
(i.e., cj+k  = cj+k ) and we can therefore rewrite the latter equation as: 
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pre pre
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wj+k  =
post
 ∑ i =1(s (H , Y ,Z , λ ) + s (H , Y ,Z , λ ))N j ki ii ii ij k
 ∑ i =1 ln [                                                        ]j 11– s (H ,Y , Z ,λ ) – s (H  ,Y , Z ,λ )j i ii ii iN .k k
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post pre
postpre
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244  The intuition behind this 
assumption is that the hospital for which 
the diversion ratio is relatively high, can 
profit more from the merger. Following Balan and Brand (2013), we divide the merged entity’s 
increase in WTP into a per-hospital WTP increase. To this end, we 
have to determine the post-merger WTP of hospital j and k: wj   and 
wk     . We do this by using two assumptions. The first assumption 
stipulates that the increase in the joint WTP is divided between the 
two hospitals according to their revenue share in the merged entity: 
wj+k  − wj+k = Sj (wj     − wj      ) + Sk (wk     − wk    ). But this equation does 
not yet identify a unique pair (wj    , wk      ), since there is an infinite 
number of combinations that satisfies this assumption. The second 
assumption therefore stipulates that the increase in the hospitals’ 
WTP is divided in proportion to their diversion ratios:
where diversion ratio Djk is the share of patients from hospital j 
that would go to hospital k if hospital j were no longer accessible 
to them244. From the IIA property of the conditional logit model it 
follows that if patient i can no longer visit hospital j, the diversion 
of hospital j to hospital k for patient i is equal to 
sk (Hk, Xi, λi )
1 – sj(Hj, Xi, λi )
 (see for 
example Conlon & Mortimer, 2013). We calculated the weighted 
average diversion of hospital j to hospital k (Djk) by summing over 
all patients and weighting each patient with their predicted share in 
hospital j:
Similarly, diversion ratio Dkj is the share of patients from hospital k 
that would go to hospital j if hospital k were no longer accessible to 
them. Together, the above assumptions can identify the unique pair 
(wj      ,wj       ) of hospital specific post-merger WTPs. 
The hospital-specific increase in WTP for hospitals j and k are  
(wj     − wj      ) and (wk     − wk     ) respectively.
Following equation (5.3), the hospital-specific price increase for 
hospital j is then given by:
Similarly, the hospital-specific price increase for hospital k is given by:
(5.3)(pj+k  – pj+k ) = α  (wj+k  – wj+k )
post postpre pre.
post
post
post post post
post post
pre pre pre
(wj      – wj     )  =       (wk    – wk     ),
post postpre preD
D
jk
kj
Djk = ∑
N
i
( )s (H ,X  , λ )       s (H ,X  , λ )j kj ki ii i ∑ i  s (H , X ,λ ) 1– s (H , X , λ )N j ji ii jj i .
post
postpost
post
prepre
(5.4)(pj      – pj       ) = α  (wj        – wj      ).
post postpre pre
(5.5)(pk      – pk       ) = α  (wk       – wk      ).
post postpre pre.
.
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245  As a robustness check several 
alternative patient choice sets were 
used. Our results are robust to these 
other assumptions. The results are 
available from the authors upon request.
In the following, we will use equations (5.4) and (5.5) to predict  
the price increases resulting from the merger that we examined  
in this paper.
5.5 Estimation
5.5.1 Specification of our choice model
Following Capps et al. (2003), we first estimated a conditional logit 
model (see section 5.4.1). Unlike Capps et al. (2003), however, we 
ran the model for each of the products separately (rather than 
aggregating all the products for each hospital). We used the 
following specification for patient utility:
where TRAVELTIME was the travel time in minutes from the 
patient’s home (zip code) to the hospitals, DAGE was a dummy 
indicating whether the patient is older or younger than 65, DFEMALE 
was a dummy for the patient’s gender and SESSCORE was a 
socio-economic status (SES) score for the patient’s zip code. We 
estimated a fixed-effects conditional logit model. Given that there 
were J hospitals, the dummy variables in this model would pick up 
J different sets of undefined attributes (e.g., Farrell et al., 2011; 
Train, 2009). In our data we observed that 99% of the patients will 
not travel more than 100 minutes for a hip or a knee replacement 
or cataract surgery. We therefore restricted the choice set of each 
patient to the hospitals reachable within 100 minutes245. For 
cataract surgery, we only estimated the conditional logit model for 
the patient’s first cataract surgery. Out of all patients, 30% received 
more than one treatment at the same hospital. It is likely that a 
patient who received more than one cataract treatment at the same 
hospital was treated for both the left and right eyes. In the 
estimation of the choice model (and the calculation of the WTP), we 
excluded such repeat choices by the same patient.
5.5.2 Specification of our WTP regression
For each product, we used the predicted probabilities that followed 
from the conditional logit estimation to calculate the WTP for the 
inclusion of each of the hospitals in the network using equation 
(5.1). From the estimated conditional logit (equation (5.6)), we 
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(5.6)
Uij = ∑j    αj  Dj + β1    TRAVELTIME + β2     TRAVELTIME  DAGE +
β3   TRAVELTIME   DFEMALE +  β4    TRAVELTIME  SESSCORE + εij
J –1 . .
. . . .
. .
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calculated the per-patient probability for choosing a certain 
hospital. Patient type i chooses hospital j with probability:
We use these probabilities and equation (5.1) to calculate the WTP 
for each hospital:
The calculations were performed in R with the package Merger-
Analysis (Halbersma 2013).
The next step was to regress the predicted WTPs on the prices 
negotiated between hospitals and insurers for hip and knee 
replacements and cataract surgery. We estimated the following 
model246:
where PRICE was the average pre-merger price (per hospital per 
product), WTP was the WTP following from equation (5.1) and 
based on the probabilities from the fixed-effects conditional logit 
model (equation (5.6)) (i.e., ŵj), INSURER.HHI is the insurer’s 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each hospital (based on 
the insurer’s market shares of the total revenue of the hospital, 
per product). To control for potential differences in hospital costs, 
we included the average SES-score of the patients (SESSCORE) 
and the average age of the patients (AGE) as proxies for hospitals’ 
casemix differences, the average house price of the hospital’s zip 
code (divided by 100.000) as a proxy for location-specific costs 
(HOUSEPRICE), the hospital type (academic or general hospital247) 
(HOSPITAL.TYPE), and the hospitals’ size, measured in terms of the 
total number of beds (HOSPITAL.SIZE) to account for potential  
(dis)economies of scale. Further, we control for the per hospital 
fraction of the liberalized segment (defined by the revenue of 
the total liberalized segment divided by the total revenue of the 
hospital) (LIBERALIZED). We report the MacKinnon & White (1985) 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors.
(5.7)
PRICEj = c+ α  WTPj + β1    INSURER.HHIj  + β2    SESSCOREj +
β3    AGEj + β4    HOUSEPRICEj  + β5    HOSPITAL.TYPEj + β6    
HOSPITAL.SIZEj + β7    LIBERALIZEDj  + εj
246  We examined the robustness of 
the model by estimating the Huber 
M-estimator (Huber, 1964) and the 
least trimmed squares (lts) regression 
(Rousseeuw & Van Driessen, 1999). Both 
methods produced similar results. The 
results are available from the authors 
upon request.
247  Due to their low number, we did 
not distinguish Independent Treatment 
Centres (ITCs – see also footnote 248) 
or specialty hospitals separately in this 
analysis. They were treated as general 
hospitals.
exp[Û(H , X , λ )]
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5.5.3 Instrumental variable approach
It is possible that our predicted WTP is endogenous. There are two 
important sources of endogeneity. First, performance may feed back 
into structure, causing a simultaneous equation bias (e.g., lower 
prices may induce patients to go to a cheaper hospital, which in 
turn increases the (predicted) WTP of the hospital as derived from 
observed patient choices). Second, there are attributes that influence 
both price and patients’ choice of a hospital (e.g., quality of care). 
These are picked up by the conditional logit model’s fixed effects, 
causing an omitted variables bias (see also Evans et al., 1993).
The common solution to these problems is to use an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach. Kessler and McClellan (2000), Cooper et 
al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013) solve the endogeneity problem 
by using the predicted patient flows generated from models of 
patient choice. These only use observable, exogenous character-
istics of patients and hospitals (Kessler & McClellan, 2000). In our 
paper, we estimate a WTP instrument (TRAVELTIME-WTP) which 
is based on the predicted probabilities of a conditional logit model 
that only includes patients’ travel times (Uij = β1 ∙ TRAVELTIME + εij). 
Following Kessler & McClellan (2000) and Gaynor et al. (2013), we 
explicitly omit hospital-level fixed effects to prevent predicted choice 
being based on unobserved attributes of prices.
After determining the TRAVELTIME-WTP, we carried out a 
two-stage least square (2SLS) model where the instrument list 
consisted of TRAVELTIME-WTP (instrument for WTP), INSURER.HHI, 
SESSCORE, AGE, HOUSEPRICE, HOSPITAL.TYPE, HOSPITAL.SIZE, 
and LIBERALIZED (see section 5.6 for details on these variables).
5.6 Data
In this paper, we analyze the price effects of a merger between a 
general acute care hospital (hospital M1) and a neighboring general 
acute care hospital that also provides tertiary hospital care (hospital 
M2). The merger was consummated in the Netherlands in year t. We 
used pre-merger data (t-1 data) to establish what price increases 
the Option Demand method would have predicted if an antitrust 
authority had used the model in their review after being notified 
of the merger. We contrast the predictions obtained using the OD 
method with the actual price effects of the merger. The latter are 
determined through a difference-in-differences technique (Roos 
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248  ITCs are comparable to the 
freestanding Ambulatory Surgery 
Centers (ASCs) that operate in the US 
and UK healthcare markets.
249  25 hospitals had multiple 
locations for hip replacements 
and cataract surgeries. For knee 
replacements 27 hospitals had multiple 
locations. As a sensitivity check we also 
estimated the choice model using the 
patient’s travel time (in minutes) to 
the main hospital location. This did not 
affect our WTP estimations. The results 
are available from the authors upon 
request.
et al., 2017). In section 5.4 we explained that we focus on three 
products for which prices are freely negotiable: hip replacements, 
knee replacements and cataract surgery. In year t-1 these product 
markets jointly represent 47.5 percent of the merged hospital’s 
turnover in the segment for which Dutch health insurers and 
hospitals were allowed to freely negotiate prices.
We use a nationwide patient-level dataset that contains all inpatient 
and outpatient visits for all hospital locations and Independent 
Treatment Centers (ITCs)248. For each visit, the patient’s zip code, 
age (year of birth), gender, health insurer, diagnosis and treatment 
were observed, as well as the price negotiated for each hospital 
location-insurer-product combination in year t-1. The patient-level 
data that we used came from the insurers’ claims administration 
and hospital registries and was provided by the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority.
For the choice model (see section 5.5.1), we calculated each 
patient’s travel time (in minutes) to the hospitals using a travel 
time matrix for year t-1. Some hospitals have multiple treatment 
locations, but the data does not reflect which location the patient 
actually went to. For hospitals with more than one treatment 
location, we calculated the patient’s travel time (in minutes) to 
the closest hospital location249. Additionally, we obtained socio- 
economic status (SES) scores from the Netherlands Institute 
for Social Research (SCP). A higher SES score means a higher 
 socio-economic status in the zip code area.
In the WTP regression (see section 5.5.2), we included the average 
SES score and the average age. Additionally, we included the 
average house price for the zip code area of the hospital and the 
hospital types as proxies for location-specific costs. The data on 
house prices was obtained from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). We 
differentiated between academic and general hospitals (taking 
general hospitals as the reference group). ITCs and specialty 
hospitals were treated as general hospitals. The insurer’s HHI 
was based on the insurer’s market shares per product (of the total 
revenue of the hospital) and ranged from zero to one. Thus, the 
insurer’s HHI for hospital j and product k was calculated as:
INSURER.HHIjk = ∑l=1
n
2
Σ  l=1n jklREV
jklREV )( ,
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where REVjkl is the revenue of insurer l (l=1,..,n) in hospital j 
for product k. We also included the per-hospital fraction of the 
liberalized segment (LIBERALIZED), which was defined by the 
revenue of the whole liberalized segment divided by the total 
revenue of a hospital (i.e., the regulated and liberalized segments 
together).
5.7 Results
5.7.1 Choice model
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics on the main variables that were 
included in the conditional logit model of patients’ choice of hospital 
for hip and knee replacement and cataract surgery (panels A).
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Hip replacements
Panel A. Patient characteristics
Age
Age Dummy (>65)
Gender (female)
SES score in the zip code area 
Travel time (in minutes)
Panel B. Hospital characteristics
Patients’ average age
Patients’ average SES score
Price hip replacement (in €)
Willingness-To-Pay
Instrument Willingness-To-Pay  
(TRAVELTIME-WTP)
Academic hospital
ITC
Insurers’ HHI
Housing price in the zip code area  
(€1000)
Hospital size (number of beds)
The hospital’s share of 
the liberalized segment 
(LIBERALIZED)
Knee replacements
Panel A. Patient characteristics
Age
Age Dummy (>65)
Gender (female)
SES score in the zip code area 
Travel time (in minutes)
Table 5.1 — Descriptive statistics
69.2 
0.66 
0.68 
-0.002 
12.60
69.0 
-0.023
9092.00
1.813
1.666
0.09
0
0.391
193.9
512.7 
0.11
69.0 
0.65 
0.69 
-0.002 
13.25
10.5
-
-
1.000
13.15
2.7
0.361
293.29
0.885
0.676
-
-
0.134 
32.9
275.0 
0.04
9.9 
-
- 
1.001 
14.15
16
0
0
-5.437
0.00
55.1
-0.909
8527.00
1.024
1.056
0
0
0.163 
134.0
138.0 
0.02
20 
0
0 
-5.148 
0
99 
1
1 
3.813 
99.96
0.6 
0.639 
10408.00 
7.234 
5.177
1
1
0.795 
266.0
1575.0 
0.23
97 
1
1 
2.772 
99.71
N = 20846 
N = 20846 
N = 20846 
N = 20846 
N = 20846
n=82 
n=82 
n=82 
n=82 
n=82
n=82 
n=82 
n=82 
n=82
n=82 
n=82
N = 17558 
N = 17558 
N = 17558 
N = 17558 
N = 17558
Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum ObservationsVariable
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Table 5.2 presents the results of our estimation. We estimated two 
models for each product (hip, knee and cataract). Model 2 is the 
conditional logit model that includes patients’ travel time only (see 
section 5.5.3), while model 1 is the full fixed effects conditional 
logit model that also includes other covariates (see section 5.5.1). 
The results of model 2 clearly show that, as expected, patients 
Panel B. Hospital characteristics
Patients’ average age
Patients’ average SES score
Price hip replacement (in €) 
Willingness-To-Pay
Instrument Willingness-To-Pay 
(TRAVELTIME-WTP) 
Academic hospital
ITC
Insurers’ HHI
Housing price in the zip code area 
(€1000)
Hospital size (number of beds) 
The hospital’s share of 
the liberalized segment 
(LIBERALIZED)
Cataract surgery
Panel A. Patient characteristics
Age
Age Dummy (>65)
Gender (female)
SES score in the zip code area 
Travel time (in minutes)
Panel B. Hospital characteristics
Patients’ average age
Patients’ average SES score
Price hip replacement (in €)
Willingness-To-Pay
Instrument Willingness-To-Pay
(TRAVELTIME-WTP)
Academic hospital
Insurers’ HHI
Housing price in the zip code area
(€1000)
Hospital size (number of beds)
The hospital’s share of the
liberalized segment
(LIBERALIZED)
Table 5.1 — Descriptive statistics
69.0 
0.009 
11493.00 
1.712 
1.579
0.09
0
0.408
194.1
509.3
0.11
73.5
0.81
0.61
0.000
11.30
73.3
-0.031
1365.00
1.875
1.782
0.08
0.421
192.5
488.3
0.12
2.0 
0.357 
390.69 
0.795 
0.589
-
-
0.127
32.2
272.3
0.03
10.4
-
-
1.000 
11.35
2.3 
0.385 
83.80 
0.846 
0.805
-
0.128
33.4
289.35
0.06
 
64.1 
-0.869 
9756.00 
1.019 
1.045
0
0
0.618
134.0
140.0 
0.02
0.0 
0
0 
-6.171
0.00
63.5
-1.148
1046.00
1.018
1.056
0
0.210
134.0
0.0
0.02
74.6 
0.791 
10689.00 
6.628 
4.576
1
1
0.783 
266.0
1575.0 
0.23
110.0 
1
1 
2.809
99.99
77.0
0.627
1547.00
5.795
5.766
1
0.694
284.0
1575.0
0.44
n=85 
n=85 
n=85 
n=85 
n=85
n=85 
n=85 
n=85 
n=85
n=85 
n=85
N = 103750 
N = 103750 
N = 103750 
N = 103750 
N = 103750
n=86
n=86
n=86
n=86
n=86
n=86
n=86
n=86
n=86
n=86
Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum ObservationsVariable
Notes: Summary statistics refer to t-1, where t is the merger year. N = total number of patients that underwent hip or knee replacements or cataract 
surgeries. The total number of patients that underwent cataract surgery only includes the patient’s first cataract surgery. n = total number of 
hospitals in the sample. We calculated the patient’s travel time (in minutes) to the closest hospital location.
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dislike travel time. Model 1 also takes patient heterogeneity into 
account by adding interaction terms. The results show that travel 
time interacts with age, gender and SES score, indicating that older 
patients prefer hospitals closer to home than younger patients and 
that females are less willing to travel further than men, while the 
higher the SES score, the greater the patients’ willingness to travel. 
All coefficients have the expected sign and correspond with findings 
from other studies on patient choice in the Netherlands (e.g., 
Beukers et al., 2014; Varkevisser et al., 2012; 2010). Furthermore, 
the goodness of fit measures that are also presented in table 5.2 
show that our models perform well.
5.7.2 WTP regression
As discussed in section 5.5.2, we used the estimated 
coefficients from the conditional logit models to calculate the 
 Willingness-To-Pay for the inclusion of each of the hospitals in the 
network. We then regressed the predicted WTPs on the observed 
prices. Equation (5.7) is an OLS regression model that we estimated 
with and without instrumental variables (see sections 5.5.2 and 
5.5.3). Table 5.1 presents summary statistics on the main variables 
that were included in the OLS regressions (panels B).
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Notes: Models estimated by conditional logit model with standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. Model 2 is the conditional logit 
model that only includes patients’ travel time (see section 5.5.3), while model 1 includes a full set of hospital dummies (not reported here) 
and other covariates (see section 5.5.1). The conditional logit models are estimated on data from t-1, where t is the merger year. We restricted 
the patients’ choice sets to the hospitals reachable within 100 minutes.
a For clarity reasons, we do not report the hospital dummies (fixed effects) here. The results are available from the authors upon request.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Time
Time * Age
Time * Female
Time * SES-score
Observations
McFadden’s R2
Hit-and-miss
Model 1
-0.1266*** 
(0.0018)
-0.0590*** 
(0.0020)
-0.0031 
(0.0020)
0.0085*** 
(0.0011)
20846
0.68
0.70
Model 1
-0.1248*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0460*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0025 
(0.0020) 
0.0104*** 
(0.0011)
17558 
0.65 
0.67
Model 1
-0.1343*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0551*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0088*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0072*** 
(0.0006)
103750 
0.72 
0.70
Model 2
-0.1488*** 
(0.0010)
20846 
0.64 
0.69
Model 2
-0.1504*** 
(0.0011)
17558 
0.61 
0.66
Model 2
-0.1668*** 
(0.0005)
103750 
0.67 
0.68
Table 5.2 — Conditional logit model of patient hospital choice for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgerya
Hip replacements Knee  replacements Cataract surgeries
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The results of the estimation can be found in table 5.3. The 
first model is a simple ordinary least squares model with price 
regressed on the WTP and the insurers market power vis-á-vis 
each individual hospital (measured by the HHI); model 2 adds 
control variables to model 1; and model 3 is a 2SLS approach 
with control and instrumental variables. As discussed in section 
5.5.3, we use TRAVELTIME-WTP as an instrument for the WTP. To 
determine the relevance of the instrument, we tested its correlation 
with the possibly endogenous regressor WTP by determining the 
first-stage F-statistic (Stock & Yogo, 2005; Staiger & Stock, 1997). 
Our first-stage F-statistic was 62.617 (p-value = 0.00) for hip 
replacement, 39.549 (p-value = 0.00) for knee replacement and 
181.51 (p-value = 0.00) for cataract surgery. This indicates that 
our instrument (TRAVELTIME-WTP) is strongly correlated with 
the WTP. The Wu-Hausman statistic was 0.16 (p-value = 0.68) for 
hip replacement, 2.39 (p-value = 0.13) for knee replacement and 
0.24 (p-value = 0.63) for cataract surgery. This indicates that the 
variable WTP is not endogenous.
Hip replacements
(intercept) 
WTP 
INSURER.HHI 
SESSCORE
AGE 
HOUSEPRICE 
HOSPITAL.TYPE 
HOSPITAL.SIZE 
LIBERALIZED
IV
Observations 
R-Squared 
Adjusted R-Squared
8075.17*** 
(1515.84) 
88.69** 
(40.00) 
-894.08*** 
(324.63) 
-91.61 
(101.93)
16.81 
(20.00) 
-0.24 
(0.98) 
151.25 
(220.69) 
0.09 
(0.19) 
279.38 
(2298.29)
NO
82 
0.13 
0.04
8027.90*** 
(1519.47) 
94.40** 
(42.44) 
-909.52*** 
(335.73) 
-95.51 
(104.86) 
17.30 
(20.11) 
-0.18 
(0.98) 
154.75 
(220.79) 
0.09 
(0.19) 
256.06 
(2295.96)
YES: TRAVELTIME-WTP
82 
0.13 
0.04
9238.21*** 
(100.09) 
76.21** 
(33.28) 
-727.75** 
(294.38)
NO
82 
0.10 
0.08
Table 5.3 — Willingness-to-pay models for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Knee replacements
(intercept)
WTP
INSURER.HHI
SESSCORE
AGE 
HOUSEPRICE
HOSPITAL.TYPE 
HOSPITAL.SIZE 
LIBERALIZED
IV
Observations 
R-Squared 
Adjusted R-Squared
Cataract surgery
(intercept)
WTP
INSURER.HHI
SESSCORE
AGE
HOUSEPRICE
HOSPITAL.TYPE
HOSPITAL.SIZE
LIBERALIZED
IV
Observations 
R-Squared 
Adjusted R-Squared
10805.12*** 
(1947.40) 
3.00 
(125.09) 
-5381.80
(450.97) 
21.99
(136.89) 
8.25 
(26.70) 
-2.12 
(1.63) 
153.74 
(277.65) 
-0.06 
(0.21) 
-394.23 
(2938.10)
NO
85 
0.06 
-0.04
803.25
(899.40)
-2.17
(10.79)
33.65
(89.72)
-19.57
(32.78)
10.12
(11.09)
-0.34
(0.36)
74.51
(83.95)
-0.07
(0.05)
-828.47
(331.48)
NO
86
0.41
0.35
10619.25*** 
(1917.42) 
37.90 
(122.47) 
-613.11 
(447.91) 
-3.59 
(138.74) 
9.88 
(26.27) 
-1.76 
(1.62) 
156.39 
(282.73) 
-0.06 
(0.21)
-605.29 
(2903.94)
YES: TRAVELTIME-WTP
85 
0.06 
-004
295.27 
(899.51) 
-5.94 
(10.77) 
47.49 
(89.22) 
-17.03 
(33.09) 
10.30 
(11.09) 
-0.36 
(0.36) 
75.24 
(83.43) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-822.98** 
(338.05)
YES: TRAVELTIME-WTP
86 
0.41 
0.35
10857.12***
(170.90)
14.38
(105.15)
-473.89
(433.23)
NO
85 
0.02 
-0.00
1319.70***
(35.50)
1.26
(9.70)
100.78
(71.39)
NO
86
0.03
0.00
Table 5.3 — Willingness-to-pay models for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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The average price for hip replacements is €9,092 (table 5.1). Table 
5.3 indicates that a one-unit increase in WTP will increase prices 
for hip replacements by €88.69 (model 2). Following Capps et al. 
(2003), we show how to interpret the magnitude of this estimate 
by considering the hospital with the highest WTP (i.e., WTP: 7.234 
–table 5.1) and the hospital with the lowest WTP (i.e., WTP: 1.024 
–table 5.1). Using the results of model 2, the WTP difference of 
6.210 translates into a difference in the price of a hip replacement 
of €550.76.
For knee replacements and cataract surgeries, the WTP is not 
significantly related to price. Apparently, in our regression model, 
WTP does not explain the variation in prices for knee replacement 
and cataract surgeries. This means that in the market for knee 
replacements and cataract surgeries using the WTP for the 
WTP-based merger simulation is less meaningful than in the 
market for hip replacements.
5.8 Using the WTP for antitrust purposes
In this section, we contrast the ex ante predicted price effects with 
the actual ex post price effects of a merger between a general acute 
care hospital (hospital M1) and a neighboring general acute care 
hospital that also provides some types of tertiary hospital care 
(hospital M2).
The actual price effects were determined through a 
 difference-in-differences technique (Roos et al., 2017). For 
a detailed discussion of the method, data and results of the 
 difference-in-differences technique, we refer to Roos et al. (2017). 
In sum, Roos et al. (2017) use data on hospital-insurer negotiated 
contract prices in the Netherlands for each of the three hospital 
products considered, to investigate whether the merger between 
hospitals M1 and M2 has led to price changes. They first estimate 
an aggregated difference-in-differences model (ln pjt = α + λ ∙ POSTt 
+ δ ∙ POSTt ∙ MERGEDj + ϑj +εjt) and then, to show the effect of 
aggregating over products, locations and insurers, they remove 
the aggregations stepwise. The pre-merger price was based on 
data from the year preceding the merger (t-1) and the post-merger 
price was based on data from the year after the merger (t+1). 
Table 5.4 summarizes the estimated merger effects on prices of hip 
replacement, knee replacement and cataract surgery for hospitals 
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M1 and M2 in comparison with the average price change pre- and 
post-merger in a control group. Roos et al. (2017) find evidence 
of heterogeneous price effects for a merger between neighboring 
hospitals across hospital products and hospital locations. Their 
result is robust for different control groups and different model 
specifications.
0.090* 
(0.053) 
0.021 
(0.062) 
0.027 
(0.057)
-0.035 
(0.053) 
-0.064 
(0.062) 
-0.049 
(0.057)
Merger effect on price (DID coefficient)
Panel A. Hospital M1
Hip replacements 
Knee replacements 
Cataract surgery
Panel B. Hospital M2
Hip replacements 
Knee replacements 
Cataract surgery
Table 5.4 — Merger effect on prices of hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery for 
hospitals M1 and M2 in comparison to average price changes pre- and post-merger in a 
control group (retrospective analysis)
Notes: Time period is t-2 and t+2, where t is the merger. Models estimated by OLS with standard 
errors in parentheses under coefficients. Null hypothesis: difference-in-differences estimator is 
equal to zero. 
Source: Roos et al. 2017.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
The ex ante predictions for merger-induced price increases were 
calculated using the Option Demand method as described in section 
5.4.3. Table 5.5 displays the predicted WTP increases. To see how 
a merger affects WTP, we looked at the change in the predicted 
WTPs. In the case of hip replacements, the WTP for hospital M1 
increased by 25.7%, and the WTP for hospital M2 increased by 
11.7%. Both of these increases were substantial.
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In general, patients are more willing to pay for the inclusion of 
hospital M1 than hospital M2. This is not surprising because the 
merger also had a differential impact on the structure of the market 
in which the hospitals were competing. Hospital M1 is located in 
an isolated geographical area and hospital M2 was the largest 
competitor to hospital M1 pre-merger. Hospital M2, in contrast, is 
subject to notable competitive pressure from (at least) five other 
hospitals in the three submarkets studied in this paper. Note that 
table 5.4 suggests that the price increases are higher for hospital 
M1 than for hospital M2, a finding which is only statistically 
significant for hip replacements.
Next, the increase in the hospital specific prices due to merger can 
be determined using equations (5.4) and (5.5). From equations (5.4) 
and (5.5) it follows that we were able to calculate the predicted 
increase in prices for hospital j as:
(5.8)
PRICEj
α(wj post – wj pre)
where PRICEj is the fitted pre-merger price of hospital j and    is the 
estimated coefficient of the WTP that is obtained by equation (5.7). 
As discussed above, we only estimate the predicted price increases 
for hip replacements. Table 5.6 compares the results with the ex 
post estimates.
α
Panel A. Hospital M1
Hip replacements 
Knee replacements 
Cataract surgery
Panel B. Hospital M2
Hip replacements 
Knee replacements 
Cataract surgery
9135.66 
10693.64 
1393.25
9064.99 
10645.73 
1358.92
4.668 
4.706
3.655
2.296 
2.021
2.500 
1.199 
0.994
1.530
0.268 
0.322
0.157
Table 5.5 — Hospital specific change in WTP after merger for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery
Pre-merger 
price (mean in €)
Pre-merger
WTP
Absolute increase in 
WTP after merger
Notes: For the pre-merger WTP, we used data from t-1, where t is the merger year (WTP estimation using the results from table 5.3, 
model 2). For the change in WTP after merger, we used data from t-1 and t+1, where t is the merger year (change in WTP using the 
results from table 5.3, model 2).
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We constructed 90% and 95% confidence intervals for the predicted 
and estimated price increases using the student t distribution 
of    and treatment effect, respectively. Care should be taken 
in interpreting the results as the ex post estimates have large 
confidence intervals.
The merger simulation showed that the prices for hip replacements 
in hospitals M1 and M2 were likely to increase significantly, 
although at a different magnitude. The confidence intervals of 
the predicted price increases are all nested within the confidence 
intervals of the actual price increases. Given that the confidence 
intervals of the ex post estimates are quite large, however, we 
should be cautious in interpreting this result as evidence that 
the OD method is able to accurately predict price increases after 
merger. If we were to ignore this for a moment, because Roos et al. 
(2017) showed that the ex post estimation was robust for different 
control groups and different model specifications, table 5.6 suggest 
that OD method overestimates the price effects for hospital M2 and 
underestimates the price effects for hospital M1.
5.9 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to examine the predictive power of the 
option demand (OD) method for hospital mergers. Like other 
merger simulation models (MSMs), the OD method has clear 
advantages over more traditional market definition approaches 
because it provides antitrust agencies with direct evidence 
about the expected effects of the merger and does not require 
Panel A. Hospital M1
Hip replacements
Panel B. Hospital M2
Hip replacements
Table 5.6 — Predicted and estimated price increases for hip replacements due to merger
1.16
0.26
9.00
-3.50
[0.12 –2.21]
[0.03 – 0.50]
[-1.63 – 19.63]
[-14.13 – 7.13]
[0.29 – 2.04] 
[0.07 – 0.46]
[0.13 – 17.87]
[-12.37 – 5.37]
Ex ante predictions (by the 
Option Demand Method)
Ex post predictions (by the 
difference-in-differences estimates)
Notes: The increases in the hospital specific prices due to merger are determined using equations 5.4 and 5.5. The ex post estimates 
are obtained using a difference-in-differences technique, which is reported in Roos et al. (2017).
% price 
increases
% price 
increases
95% CI 95% CI90% CI 90% CI
α
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questionable assumptions to be made on the relevant (geographic) 
market. Also, studies that contrasted the predictions by the OD 
method and several traditional measures concluded that the OD 
model outperforms ad hoc measures in predicting prices (Garmon, 
2016; Dranove & Ody, 2016).
Antitrust agencies should aim to use MSMs that are able to explain 
outcomes in the relevant market reasonable well, for example by 
demonstrating that the model accurately predicts the effects of 
mergers in the same industry (Budzinsky & Ruhmer, 2009; Werden 
et al., 2004). We have contrasted the findings of this prospective 
method of analysis with the findings of a retrospective study 
involving a consummated Dutch hospital merger (Roos et al., 2017). 
Our results indicate that there is a relationship between WTP 
and prices for hip replacements. We were not able to establish a 
relationship between WTP and prices for knee replacements and 
cataract surgeries. We therefore only estimated a reduced-form 
merger simulation for hip replacements. The comparison between 
the reduced-form merger simulation and ex post estimates suggest 
that the OD method overestimates the price effects for hospital 
M2 and underestimates the price effects for hospital M1. Yet, the 
 overestimation is not statistically significant.
Garmon (2016) also finds mixed results for the performance of the 
reduced-form merger simulation in the US. Hence, we conclude 
that although the OD method could be a valuable addition to the 
antitrust agencies’ toolkit in signaling potentially anti-competitive 
merger effects, our findings also indicate that more research is 
necessary. For example, the explanatory power of our regression 
models is quite low. This may either indicate that the model needs 
to be reconsidered to find factors that have higher explanatory 
power or that the model does not (yet) fit the Dutch healthcare 
market well enough. With respect to the latter, we concluded in 
section 5.3.2 that the OD method is applicable to the free-pricing 
segment of the Dutch hospital industry. However, the industry is 
in transition and the number of health insurers offering contracts 
with restricted provider networks has increased over the years. As 
the OD method depends upon the bargaining relationship between 
health insurers and hospitals, we expect that the relationship 
between WTP and price will get stronger as the threat of selective 
contracting becomes more credible.
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Abstract
In many OECD countries, healthcare sectors have become 
increasingly concentrated as a result of mergers. However, detailed 
empirical insight into why healthcare providers merge is lacking. 
Also, we know little about the influence of national healthcare 
policies on mergers. We fill this gap in the literature by conducting 
a survey study on mergers among 848 Dutch healthcare executives, 
of which 35% responded (resulting in a study sample of 239 
executives). A total of 65% of the respondents was involved in at 
least one merger between 2005 and 2012. During this period, 
Dutch healthcare providers faced a number of policy changes, 
including increasing competition, more pressure from purchasers, 
growing financial risks, de-institutionalization of long-term care 
and decentralization of healthcare services to municipalities. Our 
empirical study shows that healthcare providers predominantly 
merge to improve the provision of healthcare services and to 
strengthen their market position. Also efficiency and financial 
reasons are important drivers of merger activity in healthcare. 
We find that motives for merger are related to changes in health 
policies, in particular to the increasing pressure from competitors, 
insurers and municipalities.
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6.1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, healthcare sectors in many OECD countries have 
become increasingly concentrated as a result of mergers (Garside, 
1999; Gaynor & Haas-Wilson, 1999; Bazzoli et al., 2002; Fulop et 
al., 2002). The Netherlands are no exception to this (Noordegraaf et 
al., 2005; Fabbricotti, 2007). Both in the Netherlands and interna-
tionally, merger activity has fuelled a public and scientific debate 
about the consequences of mergers and the desirability of further 
concentration of healthcare sectors (see e.g., Gaynor & Town, 2012: 
Postma, 2015). Although there is an increasing amount of research 
on the effects of healthcare mergers (see e.g., Gaynor & Town, 
2012), detailed empirical insights in why providers merge and how 
mergers are influenced by health policy, are lacking. Our study 
aims to fill this gap in the literature by answering the following 
research questions: (i) Why do healthcare providers merge? and (ii) 
How do (changes in) health policy influence motives for merger? 
The answer to these questions is important as a growing number of 
European healthcare systems are in the midst of reforms (Saltman 
et al., 2012), often including measures to increase competition 
either on the delivery side, on the insurance side or on both 
(Propper, 2012). In practice, this means that organizations that first 
operated in a more or less regulated and sheltered environment 
are now increasingly exposed to competition and financial risks. 
It is likely that these reforms influence merger activity, but little 
is known how and to what extent. The Netherlands provides an 
excellent case for such research as the Dutch healthcare sector is 
consolidating rapidly while important reforms are implemented.
We answer the research questions by conducting a survey 
study among Dutch healthcare executives (i.e., end-responsible 
managers). We focus on providers, so mergers between healthcare 
insurers, pharmaceutical companies and other organizations that 
are part of the healthcare sector are not included in the study. 
The contribution of our study to the literature is threefold. First, 
it provides empirical evidence on motives for healthcare mergers, 
which have received little scholarly attention so far. Second, it 
presents findings on merger motives from different healthcare 
sectors, while the focus of most studies so far has been limited to 
hospital mergers. Third, our study contributes to a better under-
standing of the relation between motives for healthcare mergers 
and health policies.
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This paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide an overview of 
literature on merger motives. We then describe the most important 
policy changes in the Dutch healthcare sector that occurred during our 
study period (2005–2012). Third, we specify the methodology used. 
After that, we present the findings of our empirical study and we finish 
with a conclusion and a discussion of the implications of our study.
6.2 Motives for mergers in healthcare
This study is about motives for mergers. A merger differs from an 
acquisition in the sense that in the former, two or more previously 
independent organizations consolidate into a single legal entity. In 
the latter, an organization acquires ownership rights of a second 
organization. The terms ‘merger’ and ‘acquisition’ are often 
used interchangeably (Angeli & Maarse, 2012). Because the term 
‘acquisition’ is hardly used in Dutch healthcare, we use the term 
‘merger’ in this paper to describe both mergers and acquisitions.
6.2.1 Theoretical perspectives on motives for mergers in 
healthcare
The current literature on health policy posits multiple theories to 
account for mergers. The first is improved efficiency by realizing 
economies of scale, for example, by reallocating resources between 
different locations in response to excess capacity or other changing 
conditions (Barro & Cutler, 1997; Spang et al., 2001; Vogt & Town, 
2006; Cutler, 2009). Also, by reducing management and admin-
istrative overhead, concentrating care in a smaller number of 
locations, sharing expertise and increasing volume of treatments 
within locations, mergers may increase efficiency (Dranove & 
Shanley, 1995; Barro & Cutler, 1997; Robinson, 1998; Harrison et 
al., 2003; Choi & Brommels, 2009; Hayford, 2012).
The second theory is that mergers represent strategic attempts by 
organizations to gain market power (Bogue et al., 1995; Barro & 
Cutler, 1997; Brooks & Jones, 1997; Gaynor & Haas-Wilson, 1999). 
This explanation posits that a merger leads to a greater market 
share of a provider, for example, by merging with a competitor, and 
consequently strengthens its market position. Healthcare providers 
with greater market power have an enhanced ability to set prices 
as they are likely to be in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis 
payers and other stakeholders (Bogue et al., 1995; Dranove & 
Shanley, 1995; Barro & Cutler, 1997; Fulop et al., 2002).
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In addition to the two theories discussed above, a third reason for 
healthcare mergers can be distinguished in the literature, namely 
pressure from a third party. For example, in a national health 
system like the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, 
government may force providers to merge for a variety of reasons, 
including the reduction of capacity (Harris et al., 2000; Fulop et 
al., 2002; Gaynor et al., 2013). Although governmental pressure 
is likely to be less important in competitive healthcare systems, 
it is possible that other external stakeholders, such as health 
insurers, influence merger decisions. Also, pressure from internal 
stakeholders (such as physicians and management) may be 
considered as a potential reason for merger. Oldenhof et al. (2014) 
and Witman et al. (2011) show that internal stakeholders are key 
players in the governance of healthcare providers and therefore 
likely influence strategic decisions such as mergers.
6.2.2 Empirical studies on motives for mergers in healthcare
Only few studies empirically examine merger motives in healthcare, 
and these studies mainly focus on hospital mergers. The findings of 
these studies are mixed. Barro and Cutler (1997) provide empirical 
evidence for the two main theories on merger motives, based on 
interviews with executives of all major hospitals in the Boston area 
of the United States. They find that both the need for a stronger 
market position and efficiency concerns motivate hospital mergers. 
In contrast, Brooks and Jones (1997) find in their study on 17 US 
hospital merger cases no proof of either market power or efficiency 
considerations in hospital mergers. Furthermore, Harrison (2007) 
suggests that the primary goal of consolidation is to increase 
market power rather than decrease inefficiencies. Fulop et al. 
(2002) study nine mergers between hospital trusts in the United 
Kingdom and find a variety of motives, including cost savings, 
safeguarding the quality and amount of services provided, external 
pressure for concentration of healthcare services, and lobbying 
from stakeholders (including national government and pressure 
groups).
In the survey studies of Bogue et al. (1995) and Bazzoli et al. 
(2002), hospitals rated strengthening the financial position, 
achieving operating economies, consolidating services, expanding 
scope of services provided, expanding market share and obtaining 
access to new technology as the top six most important reasons 
for merger. A few of these rationales can be regarded as efficiency 
and market considerations, for example ‘consolidating services’ 
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and ‘expanding scope of services provided’. However, Bogue et 
al. (1995) and Bazzoli et al. (2002) show that distinguishing a 
‘healthcare services’ category is consistent with how healthcare 
providers motivate mergers. For example, Bazzoli et al. (2002) 
show that 54% of the healthcare providers reported that expanding 
market share was among the most important reasons for merger, 
while 44% of the providers reported that expanding the scope of 
services provided was among the most important reasons. These 
reasons are closely related, but providers apparently perceive them 
differently. Also other studies show that providers motivate mergers 
with reasons that are related to the provision of healthcare services 
(Fulop et al., 2002; Hayford, 2012). Finally, Bogue et al. (1995), 
Robinson (1998), Bazzoli et al. (2002), Harrison et al. (2003) and 
Choi & Brommels (2009) suggest that ‘strengthening the financial 
position’ may be a motive for merger.
In sum, empirical studies on motives for hospital mergers 
identify efficiency, market power and pressure by stakeholders 
as important drivers for mergers, but also distinguish a range 
of other motives, including motives related to the provision of 
healthcare services and financial considerations. Still, a sector- 
wide, systematic understanding of why healthcare providers merge 
is missing. Also, little is known about the relation between merger 
motives and health policies, although several studies suggest that 
such a relation is present (Barro & Cutler, 1997; Fulop et al., 2002).
6.3 Policy changes in Dutch healthcare
In order to answer the question how merger motives relate to 
policy changes, we describe the most important developments in 
Dutch healthcare policy that took place during our study period 
(2005–2012). The year 2005 served as a starting point because of 
major healthcare reforms that were enacted in the Netherlands 
since that year. Until 2005, Dutch healthcare organizations 
operated in a strictly regulated environment in which hospital 
care and long-term care (LTC) were financed by different social 
insurance schemes. Social health insurance carriers were obliged 
to contract with any willing provider and faced limited risk for 
expenditures on hospital care and were at no risk for expenditures 
on LTC. Also, most healthcare providers received fixed budgets for 
delivering care. Since 2005, the environment of providers is rapidly 
changing due to a series of policy measures aimed at strengthening 
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competition and increasing financial risk for providers. The goals 
of the market-oriented reform are to stimulate entrepreneurship, 
increase the system’s efficiency and improve its responsiveness to 
patients’ needs, while maintaining equal access (Helderman et al., 
2005; Van de Ven & Schut, 2009).
Besides the market-based reforms, healthcare is undergoing a 
variety of other changes that possibly influence mergers. These 
include de-institutionalization of LTC and mental care and decen-
tralization of home care to municipalities (Putters et al., 2010; 
Kroneman et al. 2012; Oldenhof et al., 2014). In the sections 
that follow, we describe the policy changes that were enacted 
between 2005 and 2012 in the sectors that we included in our 
study: hospital care, LTC, and mental healthcare. We focus on the 
consequences that those developments might have had on mergers. 
The policy changes are summarized in Table 6.1.
-      Introduction and gradual 
       expansion of provider-insurer 
      negotiations over quantity and prices
-     Increased competition from new 
      Independent Treatment Centres
-     Increased financial risks for hospitals
-      Introduction of regional budget       
       constraints
-      Introduction of provider-purchaser         
       negotiations over quantity and prices
-      Decentralization of household services   
       to municipalities
-      Ongoing trends of de-institutionaliza-   
       tion and downscaling
-      Increased financial risks for providers   
       through reduction of budget       
       guarantees
-      Increased competition from new      
       entrants
-      Ongoing trend of downscaling
Table 6.1 — Policy changes in Dutch healthcare (2005 – 2012)
Hospital care Long-term care Mental healthcare
6.3.1 Hospital care
In 2006, the Dutch health insurance system was reformed by 
the introduction of the Health Insurance Act (Zvw), comprising 
a mandatory basic health insurance scheme. The aim of the 
reform was to encourage health insurers to increase the efficiency 
of healthcare provision by becoming prudent buyers of health 
services on behalf of their enrollees (Van de Ven & Schut, 2009). 
Since then, health insurers and hospitals have been provided 
with incentives and tools to negotiate over the price and quality of 
hospital care. For example, in 2005, prices for elective hospital care 
products (e.g., knee, hip and cataract surgeries), jointly accounting 
for on average 10% of hospital revenue, became freely negotiable. 
The prices for the remaining products were regulated. After 2005, 
the share of freely negotiable hospital services increased to 20% 
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250  ITCs are comparable to the 
freestanding Ambulatory Surgery 
Centers that operate in the US and UK 
healthcare markets (see e.g., Carey et al., 
2011; Gaynor & Town, 2012).
of hospital revenues in 2008, 34% in 2009 and 70% in 2012. 
Furthermore, health insurers were allowed to selectively contract 
with hospitals and to reimburse only part of the care provided 
by non-contracted hospitals. Around 2010, health insurers 
started using minimum volume standards for a limited number of 
treatments (such as complex cancer surgery) as an instrument for 
selective contracting. Only hospitals providing a certain number of 
treatments are being contracted for these services. The uptake of 
selective contracting for other treatments has been limited so far.
In addition to growing pressure from health insurers, competition 
between providers increased. In particular, Independent Treatment 
Centers (ITCs)250 were allowed access to the hospital market in 
2006, resulting in a rapid growth of the number of ITCs from 149 
in 2007 to 288 in 2012 (NZa, 2012a; 2013). These small-scale 
providers typically focus on non-complex elective procedures, such 
as varices surgery and cataract surgery, for which health insurers 
and hospitals are allowed to freely negotiate prices.
Finally, hospitals became exposed to financial risks for capital 
expenses. Until 2008, hospitals were not at risk for their capital 
expenses since these were fully reimbursed once the hospital 
acquired permission by the government to build or renovate 
hospital facilities. Starting in 2008, however, the compensation of 
capital expenses will be phased out in 10 years’ time.
As a result of these policy changes, hospitals are increasingly 
exposed to financial risk and under pressure from health insurers 
and competitors. This became evident in several cases of hospitals 
that got into serious financial problems over the last years, even 
leading to the first ever bankruptcy of a general hospital in the 
Netherlands in 2013. In the past decades, the Dutch hospital sector 
also consolidated rapidly. As a result of mergers, the number of 
hospitals decreased from 160 in 1985 to ~100 in 2007 and 80 
in 2012 (Blank et al., 2008; RIVM, 2013). In this paper, we aim 
to study to what degree mergers between 2005 and 2012 were 
motivated by the changing context. Changes may have increased 
the need to strengthen market/bargaining power vis-à-vis health 
insurers and other providers, to meet insurers’ requirements of 
a minimum volume of certain treatments or to strengthen the 
hospitals’ financial position.
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6.3.2 Long-term care
Similar to hospitals, inpatient and outpatient LTC providers (nursing 
homes, disability care providers and home care providers) are under 
increasing competitive and financial pressure, albeit less strongly 
than in the hospital sector. In the Netherlands, LTC is financed 
through a separate public LTC insurance scheme (AWBZ). The 
scheme is carried out by regional insurance carriers or contracting 
entities. Regional insurance carriers contract with LTC providers 
within a regional budget constraint, which was set in 2005 by the 
national government to contain the fast rising LTC expenditures 
(Schut & Van den Berg, 2010). By the end of 2004, the government 
repealed the legal requirement for regional insurance carriers to 
contract with any willing licensed provider of outpatient LTC (e.g., 
home care providers). As a result, since 2005, regional insurance 
carriers are allowed to selectively contract with outpatient LTC 
providers. To accommodate the transition to competition for a 
share of the regional budget, all regional insurance carriers started 
with high budget guarantees (on average about 95%) for existing 
outpatient LTC providers (Varkevisser et al., 2007). These guaranteed 
budgets were gradually reduced in subsequent years.
Furthermore, the Social Support Act (WMO) was introduced in 2007. 
Household services – comprising about 30% of total home care 
expenditures – were carved out of the public LTC insurance scheme 
and transferred (decentralized) to municipalities. This is in line with 
decentralization trends in other European countries (Kroneman et 
al., 2012). Facing budget constraints, most municipalities introduced 
competitive bidding procedures for household services. As a result, 
municipalities saved about 12% of the original expenditures on 
household services (about 1.2 billion euros) and many home care 
providers faced a substantial drop in revenues or were not contracted 
at all (Pommer et al., 2009). The reduction of budget guarantees for 
incumbent providers and the tendering of household services by  
municipalities attracted many new providers. As a result, the number 
of home care providers increased by more than 60% between 2007 
and 2012 (Actiz, 2012).
Finally, the LTC sector is undergoing trends of de-institutionalization 
and ‘downscaling’. As a result of de-institutionalization, the number 
of people that live in institutions like nursing homes and facilities 
for disability care has steadily declined over the past decades. For 
example, the number of available places in nursing homes dropped 
by 20% between 1980 and 2010, despite the fact that during this 
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period the number of people over 80 years of age more than 
doubled from about 300,000 to about 650,000 (Tweede Kamer, 
2013). Furthermore, LTC is downscaling: institutional care is 
increasingly provided in small-scale homes (Oldenhof et al., 2014). 
For example, in 2010, 25% of the people with dementia that 
received institutional care lived in small-scale homes, marking 
a 178% increase from 2005 (te Boekhorst, 2010). The trends 
of de-institutionalization and downscaling reflect a changing 
societal attitude towards LTC. Values like self-determination, social 
integration and quality of life in regular domestic settings have 
replaced the traditional model of LTC that was aimed at seclusion, 
protection and quality of care in large-scale institutions (Oldenhof 
et al., 2014).
Also LTC providers engaged in mergers. As a result, between 1998 
and 2004, the number of standalone nursing homes decreased 
from 100 to 21, the number of standalone residential homes 
decreased from 599 to 222 and the number of home care providers 
decreased from 107 to 55 (Fabbricotti, 2007). In light of the policy 
changes presented above, mergers may offer a way out for LTC 
providers: they may help outpatient care providers to enhance their 
market/bargaining position vis-à-vis regional insurance carriers, 
municipalities and competitors, and they may offer inpatient 
care providers opportunities for improving efficiency by reducing 
overcapacity and investing in small-scale homes.
6.3.3 Mental healthcare
Also mental healthcare providers face increasing pressure from 
purchasers and competitors. Until 2008, mental healthcare was 
largely covered by the public LTC insurance scheme (AWBZ). Since 
then, the majority of mental health services – with a treatment 
period of less than one year – was transferred from the LTC 
insurance scheme to the mandatory basic health insurance scheme 
(Zvw) that was introduced in 2006. Approximately two-thirds of 
mental care is now financed through the Zvw (Trimbos-instituut, 
2011). In contrast to the other providers covered by the Zvw 
(e.g., hospitals), mental care providers have to negotiate a budget 
with a representative of all health insurers rather than individual 
health insurers. Hence, they are still confronted with a single 
buyer. Although health insurers guaranteed to maintain budgets at 
the level of the preceding year in 2008, over time they gradually 
reduced these budget guarantees (Mosca & Heijink, 2013).
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Furthermore, new entrants have entered the market for mental 
care during our study period. New entrants providing mental 
health services have to negotiate contracts with individual health 
insurers, including the price per service. While new entrants had 
a market share in terms of expenditure of only 0.3% in 2008, 
this increased to 10% in 2012 (NZa, 2012b; Mosca & Heijink, 
2013). Nevertheless, the market for mental healthcare is highly 
concentrated. In 2009, the average regional market share of the 
largest mental healthcare provider was 62% (NZa, 2010). After 
a range of mergers between inpatient and outpatient mental 
care providers in the 1990s, about 85% of mental care in the 
Netherlands is now provided by 31 regionally organized mental 
care providers (Trimbos-instituut, 2011).
Finally, the mental healthcare sector is undergoing a trend of 
downscaling. Although the number of inpatient places for patients 
with mental disabilities has not decreased during our study period 
(NZa, 2012b; 2014a), inpatient mental care is increasingly provided 
in small-scale ‘protected homes’ instead of large-scale psychiatric 
hospitals. Protected homes are often located in regular neigh-
borhoods and comprise clustered apartments, often with a shared 
living room. The number of places in protected homes increased 
from 4.000 in 1993 to 7.000 in 2004 and 14.000 in 2009, now 
comprising over 60% of inpatient places (Trimbos-instituut, 2011).
Hence, similar to hospitals and LTC providers, mental care 
providers face increasing pressure from purchasers and 
competition with other providers. Furthermore, they are in a 
transition from inpatient mental care in psychiatric hospitals to 
protected homes. It is therefore possible that mergers between 
mental care providers are motivated by an urgency to strengthen 
their market/bargaining position vis-à-vis health insurers and 
competitors, and a need to improve efficiency by reducing 
overcapacity in psychiatric hospitals.
6.4 Methods
To study why healthcare providers merge, we sent a survey to 
Dutch healthcare executives. The survey contained questions on 
the background of executives, the characteristics of the providers 
involved in mergers and merger motives. The survey was sent out 
electronically in April 2012 (with two reminders in May) to all 740 
Chapter 6 – Why Healthcare Providers Merge
200 Mergers and Competition in the Dutch Healthcare Sector
251  The survey was sent to 848 
executives of which 831 received the 
email and 296 filled out the survey 
(response rate 35%). In 17 cases, the 
e-mail was returned as undeliverable. 
After excluding respondents who did 
not work in organizations providing 
healthcare services at time of the 
merger and who did not provide full 
information, the remaining study 
sample consisted of 239 respondents.
252  These proportions are based 
on 223 respondents because 16 
respondents did not fill out the 
questions on age, gender and 
experience.
members of the Dutch Association of Healthcare Executives (NVZD) 
and another 108 executives whose contact details were obtained 
from a Dutch consultancy firm (BMC). We focused on healthcare 
executives because they are key players in merger processes and 
have unique inside information on why mergers are initiated. To 
limit the risk of social desirability bias (respondents may wish to 
provide a preferred image and answer questions accordingly), the 
survey was processed anonymously.
In the Netherlands, there is no public information on the total 
number of healthcare executives. Based on undisclosed documents 
of the NVZD, we estimated that we have sent the survey to about 
70% of Dutch healthcare executives. In the same documents, the 
NVZD analyzed the representativeness of their membership list. 
They concluded that their sample is fairly representative for all 
healthcare executives. They only seemed to slightly overrepresent 
executives of large healthcare organizations within some healthcare 
sectors.
We attempt to extend the reach of the survey by also using 
the contact details that we received from BMC. BMC provides 
consultancy services to (small and large) healthcare organizations. 
By that, we were able to survey a unique population. The healthcare 
executives in our study worked throughout the field of healthcare in 
private not-for-profit organizations that provide (a combination of) 
mental care, disability care, nursing home care, hospital care and 
other forms of care (including home care and primary care).
The final sample consisted of 239 respondents, of which 155 (64.9%) 
had been involved in at least one merger case between January 
2005 and April 2012.251 To limit the risk of recall bias, we asked 
the executives that participated in more than one merger (i.e., 
42.6% of all executives that participated in mergers) to focus on 
the most recent merger case. The executives that participated in 
the survey are mostly male (n = 163; 73.1%). The mean age of our 
respondents is 55.6 years (SD: 5.44; minimum: 32; maximum: 70). 
The executives’ length of career varies strongly in the sample. On 
average, respondents have 13 years of experience in end-responsible 
positions in healthcare, but the standard deviation is 8.89 and there 
are also respondents that have less than one year or over 40 years 
of experience.252 Our findings on the executives’ age and gender are 
similar to those in a previous survey study among Dutch healthcare 
executives (Van der Scheer et al., 2007).
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Table 6.2 displays information on the executives’ healthcare organ-
izations that were involved in a merger during the study period.
Almost three quarters of executives were involved in mergers 
between providers with a turnover of less than EUR 100 million 
(most of which less than EUR 50 million). Furthermore, executives 
were primarily involved in mergers between healthcare organi-
zations that provide (partly) the same type of care (n = 141, 81%). 
Over half of the executives took part in single-sector mergers (i.e., 
mergers that do not involve healthcare conglomerates; n = 77). 
Finally, only 9% (n = 14) of the executives were involved in mergers 
between two or more healthcare providers that are not active in 
the same healthcare sector(s). Hence, we find that most mergers 
between Dutch healthcare providers between 2005 and 2012 
were aimed at integration: mergers involving organizations in the 
same or an adjacent stage of service delivery (Angeli & Maarse, 
2012). Only a limited number of mergers is aimed at diversification 
(mergers between organizations in other markets; Angeli & Maarse, 
2012).
Panel A. Turnover before merger
Less than EUR 15 million
EUR 15 – 50 million
EUR 50 – 100 million
EUR 100 -125 million
EUR 125 – 150 million
More than EUR 150 million
Panel B. Healthcare sector before merger
Nursing homes 
Mental care 
Hospitals 
Disability care 
Otherb 
Healthcare conglomeratesc
Table 6.2 — Background characteristics of the executives’ organizations that were involved in a merger (N=155)a
25
45
44
14
5
22
29
23
21
12
24
44
16
29 
28 
9 
3 
14
19 
15 
14 
8 
15 
28
46
43
38
13
4
11
23 
20 
19 
8 
29 
56
30
28
25
8
3
7
15 
13 
12 
5 
19 
36
Respondents’ organisations Partnering organisations
a Notice that the unit of observation is the executive and not the organization. Since several executives may have been 
involved in the same merger, the number and type of organizations does not refer to unique organizations
b Healthcare sector ‘other’ includes organizations providing youth care, home care and rehabilitation care. The number of 
providers in these healthcare sectors was too small to perform meaningful analysis on the sectors separately
c Healthcare conglomerates are organizations that provide different types of care (e.g., both mental care and disability care)
No. No.% %
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6.4.1 Questions about merger motives
We asked the respondents: ‘What was (were) the most important 
motive(s) to engage in a merger?’ Respondents were able to 
tick one or more of the answer categories that followed from 
the literature: (i) efficiency; (ii) market/bargaining position; (iii) 
pressure from internal and/or external stakeholders; (iv) healthcare 
provision; and (v) financial reasons. The five main categories were 
subdivided into 23 motives. The motives were based on the reasons 
for merger that Bogue et al. (1995), Bazzoli et al. (2002) and others 
found and supplemented with merger motives that were identified 
in a discourse analysis of newspapers texts about organizational 
scale in Dutch healthcare (Postma, 2015). For each category of 
motives, we also provided an open answer category (which we 
named ‘other’). The five categories and the list of motives can be 
found in Table 6.5.
6.5 Results
6.5.1 Merger motives
In Table 6.3, we present what categories of motives healthcare 
executives rate as the most important one(s) for engaging in a 
merger.
Of the five categories of merger motives, healthcare executives most 
often mention the category related to healthcare provision 
(n = 107; 69%). This indicates that executives regard merger as an 
instrument to change the organization and delivery of healthcare 
services. By realizing a broader/more specialized range of services 
or by providing services to new groups of clients or in other 
geographical areas, they seem to aim at attracting new patients 
and/or offer more or better services to their existing patients. 
Main categories of motives for merger
Healthcare provision 
Market/bargaining position 
Efficiency
Financial reasons
Pressure from internal and/or external stakeholders
Table 6.3 — Main categories of merger motives (multiple-response question)
107 
97 
71 
43 
19
69 
63 
46 
28 
12
Healthcare executives
No. %
203
Almost equally frequently mentioned is the category of motives 
related to strengthening the market or bargaining position. The 
fact that this category was mentioned by more than 60% of all 
executives supports the expectation that policy changes aimed 
at increasing competition are important drivers for mergers in 
the Netherlands. Furthermore, although efficiency and financial 
reasons are less frequently mentioned, these considerations were 
still important in almost 50% and 30% of executives’ decisions to 
merge. This is consistent with policy changes aimed at improving 
efficiency of healthcare provision and increasing financial risk 
for providers. Remarkably, pressure from internal or external 
stakeholders did not play an important role in executives’ merger 
decisions. Less than 10% of the executives indicated this reason. 
This suggests that healthcare executives have a large degree of 
autonomy in merger decisions.
The majority of healthcare executives (72%) mentioned more than 
one category of merger motives. Table 6.4 distinguishes between 
executives who mentioned a single category (panel A) and those 
who reported multiple categories (panel B).
Among those who mentioned a single category, the vast majority 
(84%) mentioned healthcare provision or bargaining position as 
drivers to merge. For those who mentioned multiple motives, the 
same two categories were the most important. In total, healthcare 
Panel A. Single categories of motives for merger
Healthcare provision 
Market/bargaining position 
Efficiency
Financial reasons
Pressure from internal and/or external stakeholders
Panel B. Multiple categories of motives for merger
Healthcare provision and market/bargaining position
Healthcare provision, market/bargaining position and efficiency 
Healthcare provision and efficiency
Market/bargaining position and efficiency
Healthcare provision and financial reasons
Healthcare provision, financial reasons and efficiency
Healthcare provision, market/bargaining position, financial reasons and efficiency
Other combinations of motives to merge
Table 6.4 — Single (Panel A) or multiple (Panel B) categories of motive (s) for merger
43 
19 
17 
2 
2 
3
112
24 
18 
11 
9 
8 
7 
7
28
100 
44 
40 
5 
5 
7
100
21 
16 
10 
8 
7 
6 
6
25
Healthcare executives
No. %
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executives reported 22 combinations of categories, of which 20 
include the category ‘healthcare provision’, the category ‘market/
bargaining position’ or both.
6.5.2 Merger motives across sectors
Within each of the categories of merger motives, a number of more 
specific motives were distinguished. Table 6.5 reports the relative 
importance of these motives within the five main categories. 
We first focus on the importance of merger motives across sectors 
(panel A). Within the category ‘efficiency’, the three motives – more 
efficient use of capacity, more efficient deployment of personnel and 
a reduction of overhead – are almost equally important. However, 
although the number of observations is low, more efficient use 
of production capacity seems to be more important for mergers 
involving nursing homes and healthcare conglomerates (93% 
and 96% of the executives, respectively) than in hospitals (50% 
of executives). This is in line with the observed trends of de-in-
stitutionalization and downscaling and the resulting pressure on 
inpatient LTC providers to reduce overcapacity.
Within the category ‘market/bargaining position’, almost all 
executives mention improving the market/bargaining position 
vis-à-vis health insurers. This is not surprising since the financing 
of providers depends on a contract (hospitals, mental health and 
home care providers) or a budget (nursing homes and disability 
care providers) to be negotiated with either competing health 
insurers or regional insurance carriers. Also, the rapid consoli-
dation of the health insurance market (the four largest insurers 
currently have a combined market share of ~90% (NZa, 2014b)), 
might have urged providers to develop countervailing power by 
merging.
For LTC providers, strengthening their market/bargaining position 
vis-à-vis municipalities is also found to be important. This is in 
line with the growing importance of municipalities as purchaser of 
home care.
Furthermore, almost all executives mention fortifying or 
maintaining a strong position versus competitors, thereby 
illustrating the increasingly competitive environment in which 
healthcare providers operate. Despite the increasing role of the 
market, however, executives still seem to perceive the government 
as an important player: about two-thirds of the executives within 
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this category reports that improving or maintaining political 
influence was a motive to merge.
Within the category ‘healthcare provision’, mergers are particularly 
motivated by consolidation and specialization of healthcare 
services. Expanding services to new patient groups and new areas 
is also frequently mentioned, though more often in case of mergers 
between LTC providers than in case of hospital mergers. Increasing 
possibilities for small-scale care is a motive in almost half of the 
LTC and mental care mergers. This is consistent with the trend of 
downscaling.
Within the category ‘financial reasons’, clearly the most important 
motive for merger is strengthening or consolidating solvency. This 
motive is dominant across all types of healthcare providers. This 
likely reflects the increasing financial pressure that was discussed 
earlier, which urges providers to find partners with a better 
solvency rate to achieve more financial stability. For the partner 
with the better solvency rate, the merger might be valuable for 
other reasons, for example because of the portfolio of the other 
organization, despite its worse financial situation. Acquiring or 
safeguarding access to external capital is also important, perhaps 
because of the stricter requirements of banks – in response to 
the increasing financial risk of providers – as primary source of 
external capital.
6.5.3 Changing merger motives
We now turn to the changes in merger motives over time and 
the relation with policy developments. Since the number of 
observations is too low to investigate changes per year and per 
healthcare sector, we split our study period in two equal time 
periods – 2005–2008 and 2009–2012 – and aggregated merger 
motives of the executives of the various healthcare sectors. The 
results are shown in panel B of Table 6.5. Using a χ2 test we find 
no significant dependence between merger period and main 
categories of merger motives. Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
note that especially ‘financial reasons’ and ‘efficiency’ seem to be 
mentioned more frequently in the second period (albeit not signifi-
cantly), pointing to the increasing financial pressure on healthcare 
providers. A reason for the absence of differences in the main 
categories between the two time periods could be an anticipation 
effect: providers foresee changes in health policies and decide to 
merge before the actual changes are effectuated.
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Within categories we find that executives that were involved in 
mergers in the second period (2009–2012) significantly more often 
report ‘providing healthcare services in other geographical areas’ 
and ‘being able to meet volume criteria’ as a motivation to merge 
(p-value < 0.05) than in the first period (2005–2008). The first 
change possibly points to the ambition of healthcare providers to 
expand their market share in reaction to incentives for competition. 
The second change is consistent with the growing importance 
of volume criteria in selective contracting by health insurers. 
Although selective contracting of healthcare services is limited, 
the threat of the use of volume criteria for selective contracting 
may have had influenced mergers already. When we split the 
study period in 2005–2007 and 2008–2012, we find that in the 
second period significantly more executives indicate ‘improving or 
maintaining market/bargaining position vis-à-vis municipalities’ as 
an important motive for merger (p-value < 0.05). This is consistent 
with the decentralization of household services from public 
LTC-insurance towards municipalities in 2007.
6.6 Conclusion and discussion
This study is the first to systematically analyze motives for merger 
over a period of time and across different healthcare sectors, using 
a rich and unique dataset from a survey among Dutch healthcare 
executives. We analyzed why healthcare providers merge and how 
these merger motives relate to (sector-specific) policy changes.
Our study shows that healthcare mergers are motivated by a 
variety of reasons. We find that the dominant motives for merger 
were improving healthcare provision and strengthening market/
bargaining power. Also efficiency and financial reasons are 
important drivers of merger activity in healthcare. Our study 
thereby confirms findings from earlier studies that emphasize the 
importance of market power and, to a lesser extent, efficiency and 
financial considerations as motive for healthcare mergers (e.g., 
Bogue et al., 1995; Barro & Cutler, 1997; Gaynor & Haas-Wilson, 
1999; Bazzoli et al., 2002). Pressure from external or internal 
stakeholders is rarely a reason for Dutch healthcare providers to 
merge. This result does not support earlier studies that indicate 
that pressure from third parties is an important motive for merger 
(e.g., Fulop et al., 2002; Gaynor et al., 2013).
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The importance of motives related to the provision of healthcare 
also confirms findings from earlier studies (Bogue et al., 1995; 
Bazzoli et al., 2002). In most studies on healthcare mergers, 
however, motives regarding the provision of healthcare are not 
identified as a separate category. Although it might be argued 
that these motives are related to market power and/or efficiency 
considerations, the fact that the majority of healthcare executives 
indicate these reasons as relevant, strengthens the idea that 
executives perceive this category as different from market power 
and efficiency. We therefore argue for incorporating reasons 
regarding healthcare provision as a separate category in theories 
on healthcare mergers.
With regard to policy changes, we find that between 2005 and 
2012 healthcare providers increasingly merge because of motives 
related to their market position (‘providing healthcare services 
in other geographical areas’), selective contracting of hospital 
care by health insurers (‘being able to meet volume criteria’) and 
 decentralization of LTC (‘improvement or maintenance of market/
bargaining position vis-à-vis municipalities’) as the pressure from 
competitors, health insurers and municipalities is increasing. We 
also find that providers tend to merge with providers from the 
same healthcare sector (integration), which likely creates more 
opportunities for specialization and strengthening their market 
position. These findings indicate that changes in health policy have 
an impact on merger motives, but further research is required to 
understand how this relation exactly works.
This study contributes to the literature by empirically showing 
what motives for merger executives in Dutch healthcare have and 
how these relate to health policies. However, although we tried 
to minimize the risk of social desirability bias by processing the 
survey anonymously, we cannot rule out the possibility that in 
some cases the answers of executives to our survey questions are 
ex post justifications to hide other types of motives. These could for 
example be ‘mimicking’, i.e., uncritically copying business practices 
(such as merger) from the private sector (Bigelow & Arndt, 2000; 
Kitchener, 2002; Comtois et al., 2004) or the personal ambition of 
management or executives (Angwin, 2007). We recommend future 
studies, for example ethnographic research, to investigate in detail 
whether these other types of motives play a role and to study to 
what degree the goals of mergers are achieved in practice.
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Abstract
Despite the frequent occurrence and sizeable consequences of 
merger abandonment in other sectors, there is no thorough 
 understanding of merger abandonment in health care. The purpose 
of this study is to improve the understanding of determinants of 
health care merger abandonment. On the basis of the literature on 
merger abandonment, we formulated a framework on potential 
determinants of health care merger abandonment. We then 
constructed a survey that was sent to 70% of all executives of 
Dutch health care organizations (response rate = 35%, n = 291). 
We provide descriptive overviews of open, multiple-response, and 
multiple-choice questions on merger abandonment and use chi- 
square tests and Fisher’s exact tests to test whether abandoned and 
completed merger processes differ. About 62% of the respondents 
were involved in at least one merger process during the period 
of 2005-2012. Thirty-eight percent of these respondents reported 
that their last merger case ended prematurely (n = 53). The most 
frequently mentioned determinants of merger abandonment are 
changing insights on the desirability and feasibility during merger 
processes, incompatibilities between executives, and insufficient 
support for the merger from internal stakeholders. We did not 
find significant relationships between merger abandonment and 
executives’ previous merger experience, degree of  organizational 
diversification, health care sector, size differences, or other 
 organizational differences. Our findings partially confirm results 
from previous studies, especially with regard to the importance 
of changing insights and incompatibilities between the involved 
executives in merger abandonment. We also find that pressure 
from internal stakeholders, particularly nonexecutive directors, 
and distrust, fear, and animosity play an important role in merger 
abandonment. To minimize the organizational and societal costs of 
abandoned mergers, we advise executives who engage in mergers 
to construct backup plans with alternative strategies in case the 
merger is abandoned and to conduct a thorough analysis of pros 
and cons before the merger.
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7.1 Introduction
In many countries, increased merger activity in health care has 
fuelled a political and scientific debate about the consequences 
of mergers and the desirability of further concentration of health 
care markets (Gaynor & Town, 2012). Much less attention is paid 
to cases where organizations intend to merge but eventually decide 
to abandon the merger, although studies estimate that between 
11% and 28% of all merger cases across industries are abandoned 
(Pickering, 1978; Madura & Ngo, 2012). From a societal viewpoint, 
merger abandonment may have positive or negative consequences 
(Akhigbe et al., 2000; Song & Walkling, 2000; Wong & O’Sullivan, 
2001; Pett et al., 2003; Neuhauser et al., 2011; Liu, 2012). On 
the one hand, merger abandonment may, for example, prevent 
potentially harmful mergers that are likely to be inefficient or 
aimed at gaining anticompetitive advantage. On the other hand, the 
resources from internal and external stakeholders that are devoted 
to merger preparation are largely lost when a deal is off. Although 
it is difficult to quantify the consequences of merger abandonment, 
abandoning a merger can be costly and undesirable, especially if 
the merger would have been successful when consummated.
Despite the frequent occurrence and sizeable consequences of 
merger abandonment in other sectors, there is no thorough 
understanding of merger abandonment in health care. To fill this 
gap, we issued a survey among Dutch health care executives (i.e., 
end-responsible managers) to examine the determinants of health 
care merger abandonment. Our study provides valuable insights 
into potential deal breakers of health care merger transactions, 
so that organizations are better able to decide whether to engage 
in a merger and improve the process once they are involved in a 
merger.
7.2 Theory
The goal of our study is to improve the understanding of the 
determinants of health care merger abandonment. In this section, 
we provide an overview of the available literature on merger 
abandonment for several industries. We limit our overview to 
findings or determinants that are relevant to health care. On the 
basis of this literature, we develop 11 expectations about the 
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determinants of merger abandonments in health care. We use the 
expectations as a framework for our survey.
7.2.1 External pressure
In competitive markets, antitrust laws are found to play an 
important role in the abandonment of mergers (Wong & 
O’Sullivan, 2001). Antitrust policy may prevent anticompetitive 
mergers in two ways: (i) by direct prohibition if an antitrust 
authority finds that the proposed consolidation will lead to 
anticompetitive behaviour in the relevant market and (ii) by 
anticipatory action of the organizations that have the intention 
to merge. Anticipatory action means that organizations modify 
their behaviour and plans without direct intervention of the 
agencies to remain within the bounds of the antitrust law. In the 
context of this article, this means that organizations abandon 
a merger because they anticipate that the antitrust agency will 
block the merger. Both Baarsma et al. (2012) and Gordon and 
Squires (2008) found that about 10% of the intended mergers 
are abandoned because of (anticipated) objections to the con-
solidation by antitrust authorities. For competitive health care 
markets that are subject to antitrust laws, we therefore expect the 
following:
In addition, pressure from external stakeholders other than 
antitrust agencies, for example, media and other health care 
organizations, is found to influence the likelihood of merger 
completion (Pickering, 1983; Lamberg et al., 2008; Dikova et 
al., 2010; Muehlfeld et al., 2011; McCann, 2013). The studies in 
this field indicate that external uncertainty and unpredictability 
caused by stakeholders in the environment of the organizations 
increases the probability of merger abandonment. Furthermore, 
Aguilera et al. (2007) and Muehlfeld et al. (2007) found that 
merger cases that gather close societal attention are more likely 
to be abandoned than other cases. Because health care is a sector 
with high public interest, often attracting a lot of attention, we 
expect the following:
1. Enforcement by antitrust agencies plays a role in the 
abandonment of health care merger cases, either by prohibition 
of the merger by antitrust agencies or by anticipatory action of 
merging organizations.
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7.2.2 Resistance by internal stakeholders
Several studies indicate that a positive attitude of executives 
toward a merger is the most important factor for completion 
(Walkling, 1985; Branch & Yang, 2003; Muehlfeld et al., 2007; 
Meyer & Altenborg, 2008; McCann, 2013). Holl and Kyriaziz 
(1997) found that the probability that a merger case leads to a 
merger is lowered substantially when executives of one of the 
involved parties do not want to cooperate. Executives may resist 
a merger when they foresee a loss in compensation, prestige, 
job satisfaction, and security after post-merger displacement 
(Aguilera et al., 2007). In addition, personality clashes, a lack 
of trust between executives, inability to work toward common 
goals, a managerial preference for remaining independent, and 
doubts on the (intended) effects of the proposed merger can lead 
to merger abandonment (Pickering, 1983; Sudarsanam, 1991; 
Brennan et al., 2010). Therefore, we expect the following:
According to Wong and O’Sullivan (2001), little is known about 
the role of nonexecutive directors in the abandonment of 
mergers. Henry (2004) found that the corporate governance 
structure (e.g., board composition and the number of 
nonexecutive directors) has no correlation with merger 
abandonment. This is not to say that nonexecutive directors 
are unimportant in merger decisions. Irrespective of whether 
an organization features a one-tier or two-tier executive board, 
nonexecutive directors have an obligation to (dis)approve major 
organizational decisions like mergers. If nonexecutive directors 
reject the merger, the deal is off. Works councils and client 
advisory councils usually have a legal right to advice the boards 
of executives in important strategic decisions, which means that 
they have a say in merger decisions as well. Finally, stakeholders 
like middle management and professionals are often found to be 
important players in the governance of health care organizations 
(Witman et al., 2011; Oldenhof et al., 2014). Therefore, we expect 
the following:
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2. Pressure from external stakeholders other than antitrust 
agencies is a reason for the abandonment of health care merger 
cases.
3. Resistance by executives is a determinant for the 
abandonment of health care merger cases.
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7.2.3 Organization/sector characteristics
A range of studies show that organization or sector character-
istics play a role in the abandonment of mergers.
First, Pickering (1983) and Ingham and Wong (1994) found 
that problems in financial performance or other performance 
problems of one of the organizations that are discovered during 
a merger process could lead to merger abandonment. Therefore, 
we expect the following:
Second, several studies showed that, if organizations have prior 
experience with mergers, the likelihood of merger abandonment 
decreases. However, there is little evidence on how merger 
experience exactly influences abandonment or completion (Dikova 
et al., 2010; Muehlfeld et al., 2011). It is likely that the impact of an 
organization’s merger experience (partly) depends on the merger 
experience of its executives, being the key decision makers. We 
therefore expect the following:
Third, Aguilera et al. (2007) and Aguilera and Dencker (2010) 
found that the more diversified merging organizations are (i.e., the 
broader the range of different products or services they provide), 
the lower the probability that they abandon the merger. They argue 
that diversified organizations develop organizational capabilities 
and routines to facilitate the integration of new activities, which is 
helpful in merger cases. Therefore, we expect the following:
4. Nonexecutive directors, works councils, client advisory 
councils, middle management, and professionals play a role in 
the abandonment of health care merger cases.
5. The discovery of performance problems of one of the 
 organizations during health care merger cases is a reason for 
abandonment.
6. In comparison with executives who complete merger 
processes, executives who abandon mergers have less 
merger experience.
7. Executives involved in abandoned mergers more often work 
in less diversified organizations than executives involved in 
completed mergers.
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Fourth, D’Aveni and Kesner (1993), Aguilera and Dencker (2010), 
and Madura and Ngo (2012) found that mergers between or-
ganizations from different sectors have a lower propensity to be 
abandoned than mergers between organizations from the same 
sector. These authors argue that, although the involved organi-
zations have a common understanding of the sector, merger cases 
in the same sector are abandoned more often because competition 
in the past may have led to informal collisions and personal 
disputes between management of both organizations.
Cross-sector mergers that involve distinct markets do not have to 
deal with these issues and are therefore likely to experience fewer 
conflicts during merger process, resulting in a higher probability of 
merger completion. Therefore, we expect the following:
Fifth, several studies indicate that organizational size is an 
important factor in merger abandonment. Holl and Pickering 
(1988), Akhigbe et al. (2000), Branch and Yang (2003), Maheswaran 
and Pinder (2005), and Aguilera et al. (2007) found that mergers 
between organizations with comparable sizes are less likely to be 
completed than mergers between organizations with a different 
size. Perhaps because small organizations do not try to resist 
the wishes of the larger organizations, especially if it is a hostile 
takeover, whereas equally sized organizations collide over merger 
conditions. Furthermore, Pickering (1978) found that merger 
abandonment is more likely if both organizations are large. 
Therefore, we expect the following:
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8. In comparison with executives involved in completed 
mergers, executives involved in abandoned mergers are more 
likely to operate in the same health care sector as their merger 
partner.
9. Size differences between organizations involving executives 
who complete merger processes are larger than size differences 
between organizations involving executives who abandon 
mergers.
10. Executives are more likely to experience merger 
abandonment if the health care organizations that are involved 
in the merger are both large.
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7.2.4 Case studies on health care merger abandonment
Scientific research on merger abandonment in health care is 
limited and consists of case studies of abandoned hospital mergers 
in the United States and Canada only. The determinants of merger 
abandonment that are found in these case studies in health 
care are consistent with our expectations based on the general 
literature. Appelbaum and Morrison (2000), for example, showed 
that, also in health care, antitrust policy prevents anticompetitive 
mergers (Expectation 1). Furthermore, Neufeld et al. (1993) found 
that a wide variety of variables played a role in the abandonment 
of the merger that they studied, including the absence of a strong, 
systematic analysis of potential costs and benefits and insight in 
the financial viability of the merger (Expectation 5). They also 
found that the hospitals lacked a carefully defined stakeholder 
management strategy (Expectations 2-4).
However, in the case studies, we also identified a reason for 
abandonment that had not been reported in research in other 
sectors. Several case studies have shown that ideological and 
religious differences can be important determinants of the 
abandonment of health care mergers, especially in mergers 
between religiously affiliated and secular hospitals (Appelbaum 
& Morrison, 2000; Gelb & Shogan, 2007; Palley & Kohler, 2008). 
We therefore formulate one additional expectation:
7.3 Data and Method
The case studies provide insight in why specific health care 
mergers have been abandoned, but a more general, sector wide 
insight in the phenomenon is lacking. We fill this gap in the 
literature by investigating the determinants of health care merger 
abandonment in the Netherlands between 2005 and 2012. We 
constructed a survey that was sent to 70% of all Dutch health care 
executives.
7.3.1 Study period
The year 2005 served as a starting point because of major health 
care reforms that were enacted in the Netherlands since that 
year. New regulations in the Netherlands between 2005 and 
11. Ideological/religious differences are determinants for merger 
abandonment in health care.
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2012 include the Health Insurance Act (Zvw) and the Healthcare 
Market Regulation Act (WMG). The first introduced a new health 
insurance scheme that strengthened competition between health 
insurance companies; the second was created to expand the room 
for competition among health care providers. As a consequence, 
Dutch health care organizations that operated in a heavily 
regulated environment until 2006 are now increasingly exposed to 
competition and financial risks.
7.3.2 The survey
To our knowledge, there are no validated surveys on merger 
abandonment. We therefore designed a survey that specifically 
focused on this topic. The survey was constructed using the 
expectations and piloted by former health care executives and 
colleagues. The survey contained open, multiple-choice, and 
 multiple-response questions on the background of executives, 
the characteristics of the organizations involved in a merger, and 
reasons for merger abandonment.
To date, most research on merger abandonment uses the 
organization as the unit of analysis. These studies mostly use 
publicly available information, which is arguably incomplete. 
First, there is no registry of (abandoned) mergers, so abandoned 
mergers that are not publicly announced are not included in these 
studies. Second, even if it is publically known that the merger was 
abandoned, the reasons are often not made public. We therefore 
concluded that we had to survey as many executives as possible 
to get a complete picture of merger abandonment. We focus on 
executives as they are key players in merger processes.
An e-mail with a link to the online survey was sent out in April 
2012 to all 740 members of the Dutch Association of Healthcare 
Executives and another 108 executives whose contact details 
were received from a Dutch consultancy firm (BMC). On the basis 
of undisclosed documents of the Dutch Association of Healthcare 
Executives, we estimated that we have sent the survey to about 
70% of Dutch health care executives. Hence, we sent the survey to 
most health care executives nationally, which provided us with a 
comprehensive and unique data set. We excluded 17 persons from 
the sample as they never received the e-mail (i.e., error message: 
‘e-mail undeliverable’). In total, 291 respondents of 831 contacts 
have filled out the survey (response rate = 35%). We excluded the 
respondents who did not work in health care organizations at the 
Chapter 7 – Getting Cold Feet? Why Healthcare Mergers are Abandoned
224 Mergers and Competition in the Dutch Healthcare Sector
time of the merger or on who we had no full information, so the 
study sample eventually included 223 respondents. Of these, 62% 
(n = 139) had been involved in at least one merger case between 
January 2005 and April 2012. We asked the executives who 
participated in more than one merger (i.e., 38% of all executives 
who participated in mergers) to focus on the most recent merger 
case. Of the executives who had been involved in merger cases, 
62% (n = 86) indicated that their last merger case was completed, 
whereas 38% (n = 53) indicated that their last merger case was 
abandoned. Hence, more than one third of the respondents 
reported that the last merger in which they participated was 
abandoned.
7.3.3 Measurement
According to the definition used in this study, a merger case starts 
when parties decide that they want to merge and ends either in a 
legal consolidation of the organizations (completed merger) or in a 
decision to terminate the process (abandoned merger). We analyze 
(i) the answers that the executives provided to an open question 
(‘What was/were the main reason(s) for merger abandonment?’) 
and (ii) the answers to two multiple-response questions that 
specifically focused on the role of stakeholders in abandoned 
mergers (‘Which external/internal stakeholders have influenced 
the merger abandonment?’). To analyze the answers to the open 
question on reasons for merger abandonment, we used the main 
concepts from our theoretical framework in combination with open 
coding. We also compare the answers of 53 executives who were 
involved in abandoned mergers with the answers of 86 executives 
who were involved in completed mergers. For the comparisons, we 
used chi-square tests of independence and the Fisher’s exact test 
with small sample sizes. Table 7.1 summarizes the distribution of 
the executives’ characteristics.
As a sensitivity check, we used different operationalizations. For 
example, we used different definitions of small/large organizations, 
and we used the overall experience of the health care executive 
as a proxy for the organization’s merger experience instead of 
the respondent’s experience with mergers. In addition, in testing 
Expectations 9 and 10, we assumed a merger between two health 
care organizations, although in practice, health care mergers 
between more than two health care organizations also occur (23% 
of the executives who we surveyed was involved in mergers with 
more than two partners). Because we collected information on the 
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largest merger partner, we only have information on two organ-
izations (the executive’s organization and the largest partner’s 
organization). As a sensitivity check, we also tested Expectations 
9 and 10 limiting the data set to the respondents who indicated 
that their merger only included two organizations. The sensitivity 
checks did not lead to different results. The results of the sensitivity 
checks are available upon request by the authors.
7.4 Findings
7.4.1 Respondents
The executives who are included in our study work throughout 
the field of health care in private not-for-profit organizations that 
provide (a combination of) mental care, disability care, nursing 
home care, hospital care, and other forms of care (including home 
care and primary care). They are mostly men (n = 163, 73%). The 
mean age of the respondents is 55.6 years (SD = 5.44 years). The 
executives’ length of career varies strongly in the sample (mean = 
13 years, SD = 8.89 years). Our findings on the executives’ age and 
gender are similar to those in a previous study among Dutch health 
care executives (Van der Scheer, 2007).
7.4.2 Reasons for merger abandonment
Most respondents gave several reasons for merger abandonment. 
In table 7.2, the most important reasons that were given 
in response to the open question are categorized. Table 7.3 
summarizes the main findings of the two multiple response 
questions that focused on the influence of internal and external 
stakeholders.
In the following, we analyze to what degree our expectations that 
we formulated in the theoretical framework are correct. Hereto, 
we use the answers that the respondents gave to the open and two 
multiple-response questions (tables 7.2 and 7.3).
7.4.3 External pressure
Overall, executives report that internal stakeholders are much 
more influential in health care merger abandonment than 
external stakeholders. The most frequently mentioned external 
stakeholder is the antitrust authority. According to table 7.2, seven 
respondents indicated that antitrust law and/or direct involvement 
of the antitrust authority were the main reasons for merger 
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abandonment (13%). It furthermore follows from table 7.3 that the 
same executives plus one other mentioned the antitrust authority 
as an influential actor in the abandonment of mergers (15%). Of 
these, five respondents indicated that they modified their merger 
plans because they anticipated that the antitrust authority would 
otherwise intervene (anticipatory action). The remaining three 
respondents indicated that the antitrust authority had actively 
blocked the merger. These findings mean that we find support for 
the first expectation that follows from the literature: according to 
over 10% of the respondents, antitrust law plays a role in merger 
abandonment.
Other external stakeholders had a negligible influence on merger 
abandonment. Most executives (64%, n = 34) indicated that no 
external stakeholders influenced the decision to abandon the 
merger (table 7.3). Furthermore, only four respondents claimed 
that pressure from external stakeholders (other than the antitrust 
authority) was a main reason for merger abandonment (table 7.2). 
We therefore find limited support for our second expectation: most 
respondents indicate that pressure from external stakeholders did 
not influence Dutch health care merger abandonment.
7.4.4 Resistance by internal stakeholders
From the literature, it followed that resistance by executives is one 
of the most important determinants for health care abandonment 
(Expectation 3). We find support for this expectation. The second 
most frequently mentioned reason for merger abandonment is the 
Reason for merger abandonment
Changing insights on the desirability/feasibility of the merger
Executives’ stance towards the merger, relationship between executives and changes therein
Pressure from nonexecutive board
Pressure from internal stakeholders (middle management and healthcare professionals)
Distrust, lack of synergy, fear, animosity
Pressure from the antitrust authority/antitrust law
Ideological/religious reasons
Pressure from other healthcare organizations
Chose an alternative for merger (e.g., a joint venture)
Table 7.2 — ‘What was/were the main reason(s) for merger abandonment?’ (Open question)a
17 
16 
8
8 
7
7
6
4
2
32
30 
15 
15 
13
13
11
8
4
Health care executives
No. %
a Notice that respondents were able to give more than one answer
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executives’ stance toward the merger, the relationship between 
the executives, and changes therein (30%, n = 16). These personal 
issues were mostly caused by difficulties in the collaboration 
between executives or by changes in the composition of boards. 
For example, one executive stated: ‘Despite all rationalizations, 
the root cause of the abandonment was the lack of positive energy 
among the executives involved’ and two executives mentioned 
‘frictions between executives’ and ‘[a lack of] cooperation between 
the members of the executive board’ as the most important reasons 
for abandonment. In addition, seven respondents indicated that 
feelings of distrust, a lack of synergy, fear, and animosity between 
key players (likely executives) were among the main reasons for 
merger abandonment. Answers include ‘On paper it worked out 
well, but after a number of incidents during the merger process, we 
lost trust in each other’ and ‘conflicts of interest’.
We also expected that the nonexecutive board, works councils, 
client advisory councils, middle management, and professionals 
play a role in the abandonment of health care mergers. We find 
support for this expectation. Nonexecutive directors (66%, n = 35) 
are by far the most mentioned internal stakeholders in merger 
Panel A. Internal stakeholders
Nonexecutive board
Middle management
Works Council
No internal stakeholders
Client Advisory Council
Healthcare professionals
Other
Panel B. External stakeholders
No external stakeholders
Antitrust authority
Another healthcare organization (besides the merger partner(s)) 
Media
Government
Politicians
Other: 
Consultants
Patient and Consumer Federation
Banks
Health insurance companies
Table 7.3 — ‘Which internal/external stakeholders have influenced the merger abandonment?”
(multiple-response questions)a
35 
16 
14
13 
9
8
1
34
8
6
1
1
1
2
1
0
0
66 
30 
26
25 
17
15
2
64
15
11
2
2
2
4
2
0
0
Health care executives
No. %
a Notice that respondents were able to tick more than one category.
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abandonment (table 7.3), and according to table 7.2, pressure 
from nonexecutive directors is the third most important reason 
for merger abandonment (15%, n = 8). Deviating opinions on 
strategic choices (e.g. ‘insufficient support to the merger as the 
nonexecutive directors preferred another merger partner’) forces 
executives to abandon a merger. In addition, the interaction 
between executives and nonexecutive directors matters: ‘there was 
no chemistry between the designated chairman of the nonexecutive 
board and the designated chairman of the executive board’. Works 
councils (26%, n = 14) and client advisory councils (17%, n = 9) are 
important actors (table 7.3), but these seem to be less important 
than nonexecutive directors in the abandonment of health care 
mergers. None of the respondents indicated that pressure from 
either the works council or client advisory council was decisive in 
abandoning the merger (table 7.2).
In addition, middle management is found to influence the decision 
to abandon the merger. Although attitudes and behavior of middle 
management are rarely mentioned as a main reason for merger 
abandonment in response to the open question, it follows from 
table 7.3 that 30% of the executives (n = 16) ticked the middle 
management option in the multiple-response question on internal 
stakeholders. Hence, our findings indicate that middle management 
often influences the decision to abandon the merger. According to 
table 7.3, however, pressure from health care professionals seems 
to be less important (15%, n = 8).
7.4.5 Organization/sector characteristics
It follows from table 7.2 that changing insights into the desirability 
and feasibility of the merger during the merger process are the 
most frequently cited reasons for abandonment (32%, n = 17). One 
executive, for example, stated that there was a ‘lack of agreement 
on the organizational structure and positions’. Another executive 
mentioned that the merging organizations were not able to 
‘come to terms on the organization of medical care’. If we look 
more specifically at the issues over which disagreements arose, 
we find that financial issues are mentioned most often (n = 6 or 
35% of those who indicated disagreement as the main reason for 
abandonment – not in table 7.2). For example, two executives 
stated that ‘insufficient value and the bad financial position of the 
merger partner’ and ‘sudden financial deficits at one of the merger 
partners’ resulted in abandonment of the merger. These findings 
provide support for the fifth expectation that was found in the 
literature.
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To find out whether organizational differences like predicted by the 
literature (Expectations 6-10) matter, we compared the answers 
by executives involved in completed health care mergers with 
answers by those involved in abandoned ones. We find that none 
of the expectations that follow from the literature are supported 
by our survey data as the p-values of all relationships exceed .10. 
Our analysis shows that the association between the executive’s 
merger experience and merger abandonment is not significant 
(χ2(1) = 1.331, p-value > .10).We therefore find no support for the 
sixth expectation. Likewise, we find no support for Expectation 7 as 
diversification is not found to be related to executives’ involvement 
in merger abandonment (χ2(1) = 0.156, p-value > .10). In addition, 
the relationships that were predicted under Expectations 8, 9, and 
10 are not found to be significantly related (Fisher’s exact test,  
p-value > .10; χ2(1) = 1.764, p-value > .10) and (χ2(2) = 2.711, 
p-value > .10, respectively). Hence, organizational differences do 
not seem to play a role in explaining why mergers are abandoned 
or not. A caveat, however, is that this finding may be influenced 
by the fact that different executives may have been involved in the 
same merger. Finally, in table 7.2, we find no strong support for 
the expectation that ideological/religious differences play a role 
in merger abandonment as only six executives (11%) indicated 
that religious reasons were among the most decisive reasons for 
abandonment.
7.5 Discussion
On the basis of a survey among most Dutch health care executives, 
this study is the first to present nationwide evidence on merger 
abandonment in health care. Our findings partially confirm results 
from previous studies, especially with regard to the importance of 
changing insights on the desirability and feasibility of the merger 
in merger abandonment. In addition, we find that many health care 
executives are getting cold feet because of incompatibilities with 
the other executive(s). Unlike previous studies, we do not find that 
pressure from external stakeholders, other than antitrust agencies, 
is a major determinant of merger abandonment. We do find that 
pressure from internal stakeholders, particularly nonexecutive 
directors, and notions like distrust, fear, and animosity play an 
important role in merger abandonment. These elements have 
hardly received attention in studies on abandoned mergers so far.
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We were not able to find support for the expectations on organ-
izational characteristics that we found in the literature. This 
may mean that these relationships are not (or no longer) valid in 
health care; that there is not enough variance between health care 
organizations in our sample; or that, despite the fact that we sent 
the survey to most Dutch health care executives, the number of 
observations on merger abandonments is rather small.
Our study also shows that a large portion of health care executives 
has to deal with abandoning a merger: 38% of the respondents 
reported that they have been involved in at least one abandoned 
merger between January 2005 and April 2012. This percentage 
exceeds the number of abandoned mergers that has been found 
in other sectors (i.e., 11%-28%). This does not necessarily imply, 
however, that merger abandonment occurs more frequently 
in health care, because studies from other sectors are likely to 
underreport the actual number of abandonments as they predom-
inantly use data from publicly announced mergers. We, instead, 
directly asked executives whether they were involved in abandoned 
mergers. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that we 
may have counted some mergers multiple times, because different 
executives may have been involved in the same merger. This may 
also explain the rather large number of abandoned mergers that 
we find.
Despite the differences between the Dutch health care system and 
other health care systems, our findings likely bear external validity 
to other countries and health care systems. Changing insights and 
executives’ attitudes, which are the most important determinants of 
merger abandonment found in our study, are likely to be relevant 
in any system. The same holds for the pressure from internal 
stakeholders. However, the exact influence of each stakeholder 
will depend on the institutional context. It would be interesting 
to replicate our survey to other countries and to find out whether 
those and other institutional differences matter in health care 
merger abandonment.
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7.6 Practice implications
Our study shows that merger abandonment is not a rare 
phenomenon. We derive three recommendations for executives 
from our study. Our first recommendation is that executives 
who engage in a merger should construct backup plans with 
alternative strategies in case a merger is abandoned. This helps 
the executive to stay in control of the organization’s strategy and 
avoids unnecessary negative effects of merger abandonment on the 
organization.
As changing insights on the desirability and feasibility of the 
merger during the merger process seem to be the most important 
reasons for abandonment, we also recommend that executives 
conduct a thorough analysis of pros and cons before engaging in 
a merger and monitor the progress of the merger closely. This will 
not prevent all unpleasant surprises during merger processes, but 
at least, some of the changing insights can be spotted earlier on, 
preferably before the decision to merge is made.
Third, we emphasize the importance of relations between 
executives, nonexecutives, and other stakeholders. Both 
strategic (e.g., different goals) and interpersonal (e.g., bad 
personal relations) considerations seem to play a role in merger 
abandonment. Dealing with nonexecutive directors and other 
stakeholders requires a delicate balancing act of executives. On 
the one hand, they have to keep the formal and legal relationships 
between actors in mind, which sometimes call for distance and 
discretion, whereas, on the other hand, they have to invest in 
strong informal ties with stakeholders to prevent feelings of 
distrust, a lack of synergy, fear, and animosity. As such, a merger 
is a process that calls upon the social competences of executives. 
Executives should be prepared for that.
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8.1 Introduction
Over the last forty years, the same questions have continued to 
dominate the policy debate on the structure of the Dutch healthcare 
system: why do hospitals merge? And which distribution of 
hospital services across the country leads to the highest efficiency, 
 accessibility and quality of care? Important changes in the 
healthcare system have also led to the emergence of new questions. 
This is because today, compared to forty years ago, a larger role for 
competition is envisioned in the sector, and ongoing consolidation 
among healthcare providers is leading to new threats. The gradual 
introduction of competition into the Dutch healthcare system has 
also led people to ask how far competition in healthcare should be 
taken, how mergers impact competition, and what the effects of 
competition are.
In this thesis, we have sought to contribute to a better under-
standing of the effects of competition and mergers in the Dutch 
healthcare sector. The findings presented may help the government 
and its regulatory agencies to improve the functioning of markets 
in healthcare.
8.2 Main findings
In many OECD countries, healthcare sectors have become 
increasingly concentrated as a result of mergers. The Netherlands 
is no exception. Because ongoing hospital consolidation is 
at odds with the objectives of increased competition into the 
Dutch hospital market, merger activity over the past decade has 
fueled a debate regarding the consequences of mergers and the 
desirability of further concentration. However, in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, we showed that consolidation of the Dutch hospital 
market predates the introduction of competition by a long way. 
We set out to answer the following question:
8.2.1 How do institutional changes relate to hospital 
mergers?
Chapter 2 described developments in the Dutch hospital market 
structure over the past 40 years and discussed the implications of 
those developments for current healthcare policy.
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The chapter shows that although the organization and financing 
of the Dutch hospital market has changed tremendously over the 
past 40 years, market concentration has increased consistently 
and continuously over the same period, notwithstanding wider 
developments in the policy context. Increasing market concen-
tration has been caused by a high number of mergers, some 
closures and very few new providers entering the market. Chapter 
2 shows that the introduction of competition seems to have 
accelerated consolidation, but that this has occurred in an already 
highly concentrated market.
The problem with increasing market concentration is that changing 
the market structure is much more difficult than modifying the way 
in which healthcare is organized and financed. Because mergers 
leave the remaining hospitals with greater market power and 
few new competitors enter the market, the effect of consolidation 
on the market structure is (semi-)permanent. In the near future, 
markets may become even more concentrated, since there is no 
reason to believe that hospital merger activity will cease. Neither is 
it likely that new hospital organizations will enter the market in the 
foreseeable future.
In the remainder of the thesis, we discussed our research into the 
effects of these changes, starting with the question:
8.2.2 What is the effect of hospital competition on quality of 
care?
Like many health systems around the world, the Dutch healthcare 
system increasingly encourages competition between providers. 
For a number of years now, Dutch insurers have been competing 
for customers, while healthcare providers compete for contracts 
with insurers. Specifically, since 2005, insurers and hospitals have 
been able to negotiate freely on prices when contracting for
the provision of certain procedures. In Chapter 3, we studied the 
impact of price liberalization on quality of care.
Empirical evidence on the theoretically ambiguous effect of price 
liberalization on healthcare quality is scarce, but studies suggest 
that the relationship is negative when information on quality 
is poor. In our research, a difference-in-differences analysis 
across more and less concentrated markets identified the effect 
of increased price competition. Previous studies had examined 
the impact on quality for acute admissions, where the scope for 
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competition is limited. We, by contrast, examined the impact on 
quality of non-acute hip replacements, where competition can play 
a much larger role.
Given that information on the quality of hospital care was absent 
when free price negotiation was introduced into the Dutch 
healthcare market, there was a risk of a negative impact on quality. 
However, we found no evidence of this. On the contrary, in the first 
year following price liberalization, we found that in regions with 
low market concentration, readmissions actually fell (i.e., quality 
increased) compared to highly concentrated regions. This effect, 
however, was not sustained. Thus despite the absence of quality 
information, the introduction of price competition does not seem 
to have harmed the quality of elective hospital care. In the next 
chapter, we turned our attention to price effects:
8.2.3 What are the price effects of a hospital merger?
To research the effect of market concentration on prices, we carried 
out a case study involving a hospital merger in the Netherlands. 
The study aimed to provide a better understanding of the price 
effects of consolidation. Because merged hospitals often continue 
to operate at different locations, provide multiple products and 
negotiate prices with a range of payers, an interesting question is 
whether these differences matter. If it turns out that they do matter, 
this may have important implications for ex ante merger scrutiny 
by antitrust authorities.
In Chapter 4, we expanded existing bargaining models to allow for 
heterogeneous price effects and used a difference-in-differences 
model, whereby price changes at the merging hospitals’ locations 
are compared to price changes at comparison hospitals. Using the 
hospital-insurer bargaining model, we showed that the price effects 
of a hospital merger can vary and that the differences between 
locations, products and insurers may influence the result of 
hospital-insurer price setting in different ways. We then used a 
unique national dataset of hospital-insurer negotiated contract 
prices for each hospital product in the Netherlands to investigate 
whether the price effects of a merger between a general acute care 
hospital and a neighboring general acute care hospital that also 
provides tertiary hospital care varied between different hospital 
locations, different products and different insurers. We found 
evidence of heterogeneous price effects across health insurers, 
hospital products and hospital locations. We also found that where 
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this merger affected prices, this effect was positive. The research 
question in Chapter 5 was then whether we are able to predict 
these merger price effects prospectively:
8.2.4 What is the predictive power of an ex ante merger 
simulation model?
In competitive markets, the aim of preventive merger control is 
to prevent anticompetitive consolidation. To determine whether a 
merger between firms will result in anticompetitive price increases, 
antitrust authorities need to carry out a prospective review of the 
effects of that merger. However, the approaches that are commonly 
used for prospective merger reviews are problematic. The most 
promising alternatives to these highly criticized traditional 
approaches are Merger Simulation Models (MSMs). Since MSMs 
have only been validated to a limited extent, chapter 5 addresses 
the question of whether we are able to predict the effects of 
mergers using these models.
To this end, we used the same merger case as in chapter four, but 
we took our analysis one step further and compared the results 
predicted by a merger simulation model to the actual changes that 
were reported in chapter four. More specifically, we evaluated the 
predictive power of the Option Demand (OD) method. This is a 
merger simulation model that has been developed specifically for 
hospital markets in which insurers compete for customers and 
providers compete for contracts with insurers. We explicitly took 
account of the multiproduct nature of hospitals by examining the 
price effects of the hospital merger for various hospital products. 
We also allowed for potential differences in bargaining outcomes 
between neighboring locations by predicting the merger effects for 
each location. We concluded that the OD merger simulation model 
could be a useful and powerful addition to the toolkit of antitrust 
agencies, but that further refinements are needed in order to better 
reflect the peculiarities of the Dutch healthcare market.
Chapters 2 to 5 focused on the effects of the introduction of 
competition and the effects of concentration in the Dutch 
healthcare market. We examined both price and quality effects. 
A further key question is whether price and quality consider-
ations were important reasons for healthcare executives to pursue 
mergers. In the Netherlands, providers that deliver inpatient care 
must be non-profit organizations, implying that they may not 
distribute any profits they make to owners or shareholders. 
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As such, profit maximization may not be the main driver for 
mergers between Dutch healthcare providers. This leads us to the 
following question, which was addressed in Chapter 6:
8.2.5 Why do healthcare providers merge?
In this chapter, we not only studied the motivation for healthcare 
mergers but we also looked at whether the motivation for mergers 
related to (changes in) healthcare policies. We conducted a survey 
study among 848 Dutch healthcare executives, 35% of whom 
responded. The majority of our respondents (65 percent) had been 
involved in at least one merger between 2005 and 2012. During 
this period, Dutch healthcare providers faced a number of policy 
changes, including increasing competition, more pressure from 
purchasers, growing financial risks, the de-institutionalization of 
long-term care and the decentralization of healthcare services to 
municipalities.
Our study showed that during this period, healthcare executives 
had a range of motivations to seek to merge with other providers. 
We found that the dominant motives for merger activity were 
improving healthcare provision and strengthening market/
bargaining power. With regard to policy changes, we found that 
as the pressure from competitors, health insurers and munici-
palities increased, healthcare providers were increasingly inclined 
to merge for motives relating to their market position or in order 
to improve their provision of healthcare services. These findings 
indicate that changes in health policy have impacted on merger 
motives.
Finally, in chapter 7 we turned to the question of why healthcare 
mergers are abandoned. So far, we have only focused on why 
healthcare organizations merge and the effect of concentration on 
quality and prices. However, it is also interesting to consider those 
merger plans that have been less successful:
8.2.6 Why are healthcare mergers abandoned?
To improve our understanding of the reasons why healthcare 
mergers may be abandoned, we used the same survey that was 
used in chapter 6. We found that thirty-eight percent of the mergers 
that our respondents were involved in were mergers that had been 
prematurely terminated – in other words, merger plans in the 
healthcare sector are frequently abandoned.
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Our study indicated that the most frequent determinants of 
abandoned mergers in healthcare were changing insights into 
desirability and feasibility during the merger process, incompati-
bilities between executives, and insufficient support for the merger 
from internal stakeholders. Our findings partially confirm the 
results of previous studies, especially with regard to the important 
role of changing insights into the desirability and feasibility of 
the merger. Unlike previous studies, we did not find that pressure 
from external stakeholders was a major factor in the abandonment 
of mergers. However, we did find that pressure from internal 
stakeholders, particularly nonexecutive directors, and factors 
such as mistrust, fear, and animosity played an important role in 
the abandonment of mergers. These elements have scarcely been 
addressed in previous studies on abandoned mergers.
8.3 Implications
What can we learn in policy terms from the findings summarized 
above, and which questions need to be explored in future 
research? We would argue that the policy debate on healthcare 
in the Netherlands, which has tended to focus on the merits of 
introducing more competition into the hospital sector, has largely 
overlooked the underlying structural changes in the market, which 
have greatly enlarged the market power of hospitals. Since there 
is no reason to believe that hospital merger activity will decline 
in the near future and few new competitors enter the market, the 
effect of consolidation on market structure is (semi-)permanent. 
Consequently, if the government decides to introduce more 
competitive forces in the healthcare sector, it needs to take account 
of the structure of the market. Policymakers should recognize that 
competition can only be an effective way of increasing efficiency, 
quality and accessibility when sufficient provider alternatives 
are available to consumers and/or insurers. There is a risk that 
this necessary, but not sufficient, precondition would not be met 
in a highly concentrated market. Thus, when committing the 
government to regulated competition, policymakers should also 
bear in mind the prevailing market structure and find effective 
ways to prevent the abuse of market power where necessary. If 
they fail to do so, increased competition will not have the intended 
effects.
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The first policy implication of this is that stricter competition 
enforcement by the competition authority is required. Guidelines 
for improving the enforcement of competition could be drawn up 
based on a retrospective analysis of concentration. The research 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, for example, shows 
that future prospective merger analysis could benefit from (i) an 
increased focus on the delineation of product markets, (ii) taking 
potential differences between hospital locations into account, (iii) 
a better understanding of the dynamics of negotiations between 
insurers and healthcare providers and (iv) changes to general 
Merger Simulation Models so that these better reflect the unique 
attributes of the Dutch healthcare system. Research on other 
merger cases is advisable in order to identify which areas merit 
further development. Furthermore, the analyses presented in 
Chapters 6 and 7 show that Dutch healthcare organizations 
sometimes merge for strategic reasons and seem to have a high 
degree of autonomy when deciding whether or not to merge. It is 
therefore important that there is an acknowledgement that even in 
a non-profit sector like healthcare, organizations may be strate-
gically motivated and that the strict and uniform application of 
antitrust laws is therefore appropriate in relation to concentration 
in the healthcare sector.
However, it is also important to realize that stricter enforcement 
of competition alone will not be sufficient if the market has 
already become overly concentrated. Some have argued that by 
being overly permissive of mergers in the past, the competition 
authority has not only allowed complexities to develop in hospital 
competition, but also restricted the scope for hospital competition 
in the future (Varkevisser & Schut, 2017). The effective enforcement 
of competition thus not only entails ex ante merger control, but also 
the effective use of the policy instruments that allow authorities 
to effectively prevent the abuse of specific dominant positions as 
well as to “re-design” markets that have already become highly 
concentrated. In other words, even where mergers have resulted 
in markets that are dominated by a few hospitals, competition 
authorities could still seek to limit anticompetitive practices using 
the ‘significant market power’ instrument. The market entry of 
new competitors could also help restore competitive pressure. 
New entrants are critical to the proper functioning of any market, 
but healthcare regulations are often unnecessarily inhibitive in 
this respect. These legal barriers need to be eliminated wherever 
possible. In addition, competitive pressure in markets not only 
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needs to come from traditional organizational forms like new 
hospitals or independent treatment centers, but could also come 
from emerging technologies and new organizational forms. 
Gaynor et al. (2017), for example, conclude that the adoption of 
new practices such as e-health could lead to the entry of new 
competitors and should not be stifled by regulations; a similar 
conclusion is drawn by Janssen (2016) in the context of Dutch 
healthcare.
Another important precondition for proper competition is the 
availability of information on quality (e.g., Van de Ven et al. 
2013). In recent years, despite the efforts made in this regard, 
the availability of adequate and reliable quality information 
for patients and insurers in the Netherlands has remained 
inadequate (e.g., Rekenkamer, 2013; NZa, 2017). The lack of 
adequate information may have significant implications for the 
introduction of competitive forces and the consequences of this. 
Because information on quality of hospital care was absent when 
free negotiation on pricing was introduced into the Dutch hospital 
market, there was a significant risk of negative impact on quality. 
This effect was found in other countries where similar policies have 
been introduced (Propper et al. 2008; 2004; Volpp et al. 2003). In 
Chapter 3, however, we found no evidence of a negative impact of 
price liberalization on quality of care provided to hip replacement 
patients in the Dutch hospital sector. Since this finding may not 
hold for other time periods and for other procedures, policymakers 
cannot ignore the possibility that price competition may jeopardize 
quality if there is an absence of adequate information on quality. 
Further research is needed and a real effort needs to be made to 
increase the quality information that is available.
Overall, given the current level of concentration and the fact 
that the available research suggests that mergers typically have 
limited benefits for society or the organizations involved, and in 
some cases they may have no benefit at all, further consolidation 
in the healthcare sector may well be harmful. Hence, in areas 
where the concentration of activities is likely to be beneficial, 
more cooperation rather than outright mergers may be preferable. 
Whether this is indeed the case remains a matter for future 
research.
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This thesis shows that, given the often irreversible nature and 
potentially adverse consequences of consolidation in healthcare 
markets, policy measures that enhance or facilitate consolidation 
should not be taken lightly and should be carefully investigated 
before they are implemented.
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The aim of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding 
of the effects of competition and mergers in the Dutch healthcare 
sector. We focused our analysis on the Dutch hospital industry. 
The reason for this is twofold. First, hospital care accounts for the 
majority of overall healthcare spending. Second, competition was 
introduced in the Dutch hospital industry following a long period 
of strict regulation, while the sector simultaneously experienced 
increasing levels of consolidation. The combination of these factors 
creates an excellent opportunity to study the effect and rationale of 
competition and consolidation in the healthcare sector.
Chapter 1 of this thesis introduces the research on the rationales 
and effects of mergers and competition in the Dutch healthcare 
sector. It explains why health economists do not simply open an 
economics textbook, read what the sections on oligopolies or 
bilateral bargaining have to say about the rationales and effects 
of mergers and competition and leave it at that. The chapter also 
provides a brief overview of the empirical research done so far. 
Furthermore, we outline the research topics and question that will 
be addressed in the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter 2 outlines the history of Dutch hospital mergers. In this 
chapter, we show that the Dutch hospital market has experienced 
several waves of mergers. These waves are the main reason for the 
high level of concentration in the Dutch hospital industry. The few 
studies that have investigated the effects of concentration suggest 
that high market concentration may not be beneficial for society or 
the organizations involved. The introduction of competition into the 
sector has meant that market concentration has become a source 
of concern. This is because competition can only be an effective 
way of increasing efficiency, quality and accessibility if sufficient 
alternatives are available to consumers and/or insurers. This 
necessary, though not sufficient precondition risks not being met in 
a highly concentrated market, which is the case for most hospital 
markets in the Netherlands. Government policy has focused on 
how to best organize and finance healthcare. At the same time, 
the underlying and structural changes that have led to the levels 
of concentration in today’s hospital market have largely been 
neglected.
In Chapter 3, we present our study into the effect of hospital 
competition on quality of care. In this study, we looked at the 
effect of the introduction of price competition in the Dutch hospital 
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market and considered whether its impact on the quality of 
care differs between highly concentrated hospital markets and 
less concentrated hospital markets. Previous research on the 
 competition-quality relationship measured quality in market sectors 
where the scope for competition is limited – acute admissions. 
By contrast, we examined readmission for the elective procedure 
‘non-acute hip replacements’ for which the scope for competition 
– and hence its potential effect – is larger. The most important 
finding of our study is that, despite the lack of information on 
quality when free price negotiations were introduced, competitive 
pressure does not appear to have damaged quality.
In Chapter 4, we turn our attention to price effects. Most studies 
on hospital concentration find that mergers lead to higher prices. 
These studies mostly take the merged hospital as the unit of 
observation, while the observed price is the weighted average 
across hospital products and across payers. Therefore, little is 
known about whether and why price effects vary between hospital 
locations, products and payers. In this chapter, we introduce a 
case study of a Dutch hospital merger. We expanded existing 
bargaining models to allow for potentially heterogeneous price 
effects of mergers. Furthermore, a difference-in-differences model 
was estimated in which price changes at the merging hospitals 
are compared to price changes at comparison hospitals. The most 
important finding is that where the merger under study affected 
prices, the effect is positive and that price effects may differ across 
locations, products and payers. We explained why these findings 
have important implications for ex ante merger scrutiny by 
antitrust authorities.
Chapter 5 addressed the question whether we are able to predict 
merger price effects prospectively. Merger simulation models are 
promising alternatives to highly debated traditional approaches, 
but they have only been validated to a limited extent. In this 
chapter, we investigated the same merger case as in chapter 4. 
We compared the predicted results of the Option Demand method 
– a merger simulation model developed specifically for the (US) 
hospital market – to the actual changes that were reported 
in chapter 4 to evaluate whether the current models perform 
sufficiently well to be used in antitrust cases. We concluded that 
the Option Demand method could be a valuable addition to the 
antitrust agencies’ toolkit, but needs further refinements in order to 
better reflect the peculiarities of the Dutch healthcare market.
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In Chapter 6, we study merger motivations of healthcare providers. 
Although mergers occur frequently in the Dutch healthcare sector, 
empirical insight into why healthcare providers merge is lacking. 
Neither do we know enough about the influence of healthcare 
policy on mergers. To identify the reasons for mergers and their 
relation to (changes in) healthcare policies, we conducted a survey 
on the motivation for mergers that was sent to the majority 
of Dutch healthcare executives. Thirty-five percent of the 848 
executives in our sample responded to the survey. The majority 
of respondents had been involved in at least one merger between 
2005 and 2012. The study indicated that the main reasons for 
merger mentioned by executives were to improve the provision of 
healthcare services and to strengthen the market position of the 
providers. We furthermore found that motives for merging are 
related to changes in health policies, in particular to the increasing 
pressure from competitors, insurers and municipalities.
In Chapter 7, we turn to the question why healthcare mergers are 
abandoned. The reason for examining this is the lack of thorough 
understanding of the abandonment of healthcare mergers despite 
the frequent occurrence and sizeable consequences of merger 
abandonment in other sectors. In this chapter, we use the same 
survey that was used in Chapter 6. Thirty-eight percent of our 
respondents reported that the last merger case that they were 
involved in, ended prematurely. The most frequently mentioned 
causes of merger abandonment were changing insights regarding 
desirability and feasibility during the merger processes, incompat-
ibities between executives and insufficient support for the merger 
among internal stakeholders. These findings partially confirmed 
results from previous studies.
In Chapter 8, the main findings of this thesis are presented and 
discussed.
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Deze dissertatie beoogt bij te dragen aan een beter begrip van de 
effecten van concurrentie en fusies in de Nederlandse gezond-
heidszorg. Onze analyse richt zich voornamelijk op de Nederlandse 
ziekenhuiszorg. De ziekenhuiszorg heeft een belangrijk aandeel 
in de algemene zorguitgaven. Ook werd in de sector na een lange 
periode van strikte regulering, concurrentie geïntroduceerd terwijl 
er op hetzelfde moment veelvuldig gefuseerd werd. Dat maakt 
dat deze sector een interessant beginpunt voor onderzoek naar 
concurrentie en fusies in de Nederlandse gezondheidszorg is.
In Hoofdstuk 1 wordt het onderzoek naar de motieven en effecten 
van fusies en concurrentie in de gezondheidszorg ingeleid. Er 
wordt uiteengezet waarom gezondheidseconomen niet zomaar 
naar algemene economische theorieën kunnen refereren als zij op 
zoek zijn naar meer informatie over fusies en concurrentie in de 
zorg. Ook wordt een kort overzicht gegeven van het empirische 
onderzoek dat tot op heden uitgevoerd is. Daarnaast introduceren 
we de onderwerpen en onderzoeksvragen die in de rest van de 
dissertatie aan bod komen.
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt de geschiedenis van Nederlandse 
 ziekenhuisfusies beschreven en op hoofdlijnen geanalyseerd. 
De Nederlandse ziekenhuissector heeft meerdere fusiegolven 
ondergaan. Deze fusiegolven vormen de belangrijkste reden voor 
de huidige hoge marktconcentratie. De weinige studies naar het 
effect van concentratie suggereren dat fusies zeker niet altijd positief 
uitpakken voor de samenleving of de betrokken organisaties. Met 
de introductie van meer marktwerking in de gezondheidszorg zijn 
de zorgen omtrent concentratie alleen maar toegenomen. Dat komt 
omdat marktwerking alleen maar kan leiden tot efficiëntere, betere 
en toegankelijkere zorg als voldoende alternatieven beschikbaar 
zijn voor patiënten en verzekeraars. In een sterk geconcentreerde 
markt zoals de Nederlandse ziekenhuissector wordt er mogelijk aan 
deze noodzakelijke, maar overigens niet voldoende voorwaarde, niet 
voldaan. Overheidsbeleid heeft zich lange tijd voornamelijk gericht 
op de organisatie en financiering van de gezondheidszorg, maar er 
lijkt onvoldoende aandacht geweest te zijn voor de onderliggende 
en structurele veranderingen die tegelijkertijd als gevolg van de 
toenemende marktconcentratie plaats hebben gevonden.
In Hoofdstuk 3 presenteren we onze studie naar het effect 
van de introductie van prijsconcurrentie in de Nederlandse 
 ziekenhuiszorg. We hebben bekeken of de invloed van de 
Samenvatting
266 Mergers and Competition in the Dutch Healthcare Sector
introductie van prijsconcurrentie op kwaliteit varieerde tussen 
regio’s waar veel concurrentie mogelijk is en regio’s waar weinig 
concurrentie mogelijk is. Eerder onderzoek naar de relatie 
 concurrentie-kwaliteit heeft betrekking op ‘acute opnamen’, 
waarvoor de ruimte voor concurrentie beperkt is. Wij onderzochten 
daarentegen ‘heropnamen bij niet-acute heupvervangingen’, 
een electieve procedure waarvoor de ruimte voor – en dus het 
mogelijke effect van – concurrentie aanzienlijk groter is. Er was 
ten tijde van de introductie van prijsconcurrentie in Nederland 
zeer weinig kwaliteitsinformatie aanwezig. In dat geval bestaat 
het risico dat prijsconcurrentie ten koste gaat van de kwaliteit van 
zorg. De belangrijkste bevinding van onze studie is dat, ondanks de 
destijds zeer beperkt aanwezige kwaliteitsinformatie, de introductie 
van prijsconcurrentie in de daarop volgende jaren geen negatief 
effect heeft gehad op de kwaliteit van zorg.
In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we de prijseffecten van een Nederlandse 
ziekenhuisfusie. De meeste studies vinden dat ziekenhuisfusies leiden 
tot substantieel hogere prijzen. In deze studies is echter gekeken 
naar het gefuseerde ziekenhuis als geheel, waarbij het prijseffect 
voor alle producten en voor alle verzekeraars tezamen berekend 
werd. Er is daardoor niet bekend of en waarom prijseffecten variëren 
tussen ziekenhuislocaties, producten en verzekeraars. Voor onze 
casestudie gebruikten we bestaande  onderhandelingsmodellen 
om heterogene prijseffecten van fusies te modelleren. Daarnaast 
voerden we een  verschillen-in-verschillen analyse uit waarbij we 
de prijsveranderingen in de fusieziekenhuizen vergeleken met de 
prijsveranderingen die in vergelijkbare niet-gefuseerde ziekenhuizen 
waren opgetreden. De belangrijkste bevinding is dat waar de 
onderzochte fusie effect had op prijzen zij leidde tot hogere prijzen 
en dat prijs effecten kunnen verschillen tussen locaties, producten en 
verzekeraars. We leggen uit waarom deze bevindingen belangrijk zijn 
voor prospectief fusietoezicht door mededingingsautoriteiten.
In Hoofdstuk 5 staat de vraag centraal of het mogelijk is om 
de prijseffecten van een ziekenhuisfusie te voorspellen. Fusie-
simulatiemodellen zijn veelbelovende alternatieven voor niet goed 
 functionerende traditionele methoden, maar hun effectiviteit is 
zelden geëvalueerd. In dit hoofdstuk onderzoeken we dezelfde 
fusiecasus als in Hoofdstuk 4. We vergelijken de voorspelde prijs-
effecten die volgen uit de Option Demand methode – een specifiek 
voor de (Amerikaanse) zorgmarkt ontwikkeld fusiesimulatiemodel – 
met de werkelijke effecten die volgen uit de analyse van Hoofdstuk 4. 
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Dit om te onderzoeken of het fusiesimulatiemodel dusdanig goed 
genoeg voorspelt dat het door mededingingsautoriteiten gebruikt kan 
worden bij hun beoordeling van een voorgenomen ziekenhuisfusie. 
We concluderen dat de Option Demand methode een waardevolle 
toevoeging aan de gereedschapskist van een mededingingsautoriteit 
kan zijn, maar nog wel verbetering behoeft.
In Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoeken we fusiemotieven van zorgaanbieders. 
Hoewel er veel fusies plaatsvinden in de Nederlandse gezond-
heidszorg, bestaat er een tekort aan kennis over de reden waarom 
zorgorganisaties fuseren en wat de invloed van gezondheidszorg-
beleid op de motieven voor fusies is. Om de redenen voor fusies 
en hun relatie tot (veranderingen in) gezondheidszorgbeleid te 
achterhalen, maakten we gebruik van een survey die is verzonden 
aan het grootste deel van de Nederlandse zorgbestuurders. 
Vijfendertig procent van de 848 uitgenodigde zorgbestuurders 
vulde de enquête in. De meerderheid van de respondenten was 
betrokken bij een fusietraject tussen 2005 en 2012. Eén van de 
bevindingen van de studie was dat aanbieders voornamelijk 
fuseren om het zorgaanbod te verbeteren of om hun marktpositie te 
versterken. Verder vonden we dat fusiemotieven gerelateerd zijn aan 
 veranderingen in gezondheidszorgbeleid, en voornamelijk aan de 
toenemende druk van concurrenten, verzekeraars en gemeenten.
In Hoofdstuk 7 richten we ons op de vraag waarom eenmaal gestarte 
fusies, niet altijd afgerond worden. Hoewel het voortijdig afbreken 
van fusies in andere sectoren veelvuldig blijkt voor te komen en 
volgens de daarnaar uitgevoerde onderzoeken erg kostbaar kan zijn, 
is naar afgeketste fusietrajecten in de zorg nog nauwelijks onderzoek 
gedaan. Het doel van dit onderzoek was dan ook te achterhalen of 
het afketsen van fusies in de zorg vaak voorkomt en wat de redenen 
voor fusieafbreking kunnen zijn. We maakten hierbij gebruik van de 
eerder in Hoofdstuk 6 genoemde enquête. Achtendertig procent van 
onze respondenten rapporteerde dat de laatste fusiezaak waarbij zij 
betrokken waren, voortijdig was afgeketst. Veranderende inzichten met 
betrekking tot de wenselijkheid en haalbaarheid van het fusieproces 
als ook bestuurders met onverenigbare wensen en gebrekkige interne 
ondersteuning voor het fusieproces, waren de belangrijkste redenen 
voor het voortijdig afbreken van fusieprocessen. Deze resultaten 
komen gedeeltelijk overeen met resultaten uit eerdere onderzoeken.
In Hoofdstuk 8 worden de belangrijkste resultaten van het 
proefschrift beschreven en bediscussieerd.
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